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ABSTRACT: 
The aim of this treatise is to propose an analytical framework that gives insight into where 
territorial expansion is most likely to happen and to give an example application. There are two 
distinctions that set apart the framework developed here and almost every other framework 
dealing with territorial expansion: 1) this framework attempts to account for both forcible and 
amenable expansion under a single rubric, and, 2) this framework is not concerned with 
explaining the specific reasons which drive an actor to expand. Rather the concern is the 
circumstances that make territorial expansion more or less likely to come to pass.  These two 
differences lend to creating a framework that is much more versatile in its application and the 
ability to produce intelligence that is actionable in understanding the likelihood of territorial 
expansion, which in turn is more useful in proposing apt foreign-policy when dealing with the 
potential of shifting borders. This is a completely new and innovative way of looking at and 
understanding territorial expansion. To my knowledge there is no other framework dealing with 
territorial expansion in the way it is dealt with here.  
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I.    Chapter 1- Introduction 
The aim of this treatise is to propose an analytical framework that gives insight into where 
territorial expansion is most likely to happen and to give an example application. The present 
body of literature tends to focus on explaining territorial expansion in the context of the reasons 
that drive an actor to undertake policies of expansion. Here we take a different approach. Firstly, 
this study is not concerned with explaining the specific reasons that drive an actor to expand. 
Rather the concern is the circumstances in which territorial expansion is likely to come to pass. 
An explanatory exploration into the reasons that drive an actor to want to enact policies of 
territorial expansion is very different from an exploration into the conditions that make territorial 
expansion more or less likely. This difference can be better understood if one imagines a 
situation where an actor wants to enact policies of territorial expansion (due to specific 
explanatory reasons) but does not territorially expand because the circumstances surrounding the 
territorial expansion do not allow it. Constructing an analytical framework aimed at 
understanding the circumstances which make territorial expansion more or less likely is very 
different from attempting to explain the specific reasons behind the want of an actor to expand. 
To my knowledge, there is no other study that has attempted to devise an analytical frame 
focused on the circumstances that affect the likelihood that territorial expansion will come to 
pass. This frame is designed to be a tool with which to make more informed foreign policy 
decisions when dealing with the potential of shifting borders. 
 
It is important to note that this endeavor does not fall under the rubric of a single discipline. It 
should not be considered political science, sociology, anthropology or social psychology. Rather 
it should be considered an interdisciplinary attempt to do something completely new.  
 
Territorial expansion can be parsed into two types, 1) Forcible-expansion that is achieved 
through military action and occupation, and, 2) Amenable-expansion that is achieved through 
willing annexation and integration. It is common that studies of territorial expansion treat the two 
types (amenable and forcible) as analytically incompatible components related to the larger 
(disassociated) phenomenon of expansion as a whole. Studies that focus on one type of 
expansion often disclaim away the other type as analytically incompatible with “the frame of 
analysis being used” and hence, “outside of the scope of the research” being conducted. Though 
it must be noted that this professed incompatibility is (most often) cited in studies whose aim is 
to explain or analyze the mechanisms and reasons behind the decision of any specific actor to 
undertake programs of expansion. Here there is no claim as to the analytical compatibility of the 
two types of expansion in the context of explanatory reasons and mechanisms behind the 
decision to expand. The claim here is that it is possible to account for both types of expansion 
through a singular frame when the aim is analyzing conditions that affect likelihood that 
expansion will come to pass. The analytical frame here aims to highlight the likelihood that a 
specific actor will enact programs of expansion, type of expansion, and regions most likely to be 
expanded upon.  
 
A reading of Walter Mattli’s “The Logic of Regional Integration and Beyond” is instrumental in 
devising a strategy with which to bridge amenable and forcible expansion. Mattli began by 
focusing on economics as an explanatory mechanism driving the process of voluntary regional 
integration. Along the way he realized that economic theory alone could not account for all the 
factors, and that these additional factors lay in the realm of political science. That amenable 
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expansion had two overarching components: economics and political science. Accordingly, 
Mattli concluded that amenable expansion could only be sufficiently understood through an 
analytical framework that unified these two overarching components (i.e. economics and 
political science). 
 
“The analytical framework presented in this book seeks to remedy some of the weaknesses of 
traditional approaches by bridging political science and economics. Such an analysis is based 
on the conviction that market integration cannot be explained without reference to institutions, 
and that institutional analysis that fails to refer to market transactions risks being empty.”1 
 
The belief here is that Mattli’s assessment of a necessary blended analysis that considers multiple 
overarching components holds true for territorial expansion as a whole -- not just for voluntary 
regional expansion. Thus, any analysis that fails to account for all overarching components “risks 
being empty.”   
 
Lapid (2001) warns of the importance of picking the right analytical concepts: that “picking good 
concepts is, in fact, somewhat analogous to taking out a "conceptual loan" that must be repaid if 
we are to succeed in our scholarly ventures. Key concepts are, in this respect, solid picks with 
excellent collateral backing.”2 McLennan (1995) claims that a good component should be "ever-
interesting" and "indispensable", interesting “by virtue of their ability to reconfigure in face of 
changing realities” and indispensable in “their sustained relevance to many major theoretical 
undertakings.”3   
 
The overarching analytical concepts of this analytical frame are geopolitics and identity. But, 
these overarching concepts alone are not sufficient to be successful, for they (the overarching 
concepts) need to be bridged using several underlying synthesizing components (these 
synthesizing components are not listed here but will be discussed in full later in the text).  
 
Here territorial expansion is understood to be part and parcel of a “simultaneous processes of 
fragmentation and integration.”4 Ascending Empires and disintegrating unions (fragmentation 
and integration) are dependent on territorial expansion.  
 
“In terms of human history, both unification and fragmentation of territory have been persistent 
thrusts, each tendency always being present, but with one or the other being stronger at different 
times and places.” 5 
 
It is clear how integration is dependent on territorial expansion but less intuitive is how 
fragmentation is also dependent. Fragmentation is induced when: (1) an outside power 
incorporates territory from another power, or, (2) an internal territory/population claims 
                                                      
1 Mattli, Walter. pg. 11, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, 1999 
2 Lapid, Yosef. pg. 6, "Introduction. Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New 
Direction." Identities, Borders, Orders. Rethinking International Relations Theory (2001): 1-20. 
3 McLennan, Gregor. Pg. X, Pluralism. U of Minnesota Press, 1995. 
4 Huntington, Samuel P. pg. 37, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Penguin Books India, 
1997. 
5 Knight, David B. pg. 516, "Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism." 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72, no. 4 (1982): 514-31. 
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independence. Concerning point (1): B territorial expands taking land from C. This expansion by 
B at the expense of C necessarily means that as B expands as C fragments. Concerning point (2): 
An internal population claiming independence: Confederate territorial expansion and the first 
fragmentation of the United States happened simultaneously, December 20, 1860, when the State 
of South Carolina seceded from the Union. Before, the Union was 31 states and after 30.. 
Therefore the secession of South Carolina should be considered fragmentation while at the same 
time it should also be considered integration. The act of secession was Confederate amenable 
territorial expansion of South Carolina (before secession the Confederacy had no land, but after 
they did).  Continued Union fragmentation (more States seceding) resulted in continued 
Confederate integration.6 
 
“Processes of integration and globalization have been largely matched, and perhaps exceeded, 
by co-occurring processes of fragmentation and disintegration.”7 
 
Here territorial expansion is understood as a process of transformative change driving the 
evolution of our societal structuring. According to Lapid (2001) present IR scholarship is 
“lacking the logic and vocabulary to understand transformative change.”8 A deficit that has 
allowed the status quo to become “an assumptive framework that allows, and perhaps even 
requires, an a priori stipulation of preformed identities and interests, where neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism have practiced their theoretical trade in a profoundly durable 
"world".”9,10 The belief is that “mobility and flux (rather than fixity and stasis) will increasingly 
determine the mercurial horizon against which the contemporary IR theory needs to be 
reworked”, 11 and that, "the methodological shift from a language of interacting variables to a 
language of mutually constitutive processes requires a somewhat different approach than 
traditionally found in the toolboxes of International Relations."12 
 
To aid IR theory in its ability to understand transformative change Lapid devised the IBO 
(Identities, Borders and Orders) triad. Identities, Borders and Orders are three concepts that 
“massive bodies of cross-disciplinary literature strongly suggest {…} are intimately related to 
each other; they are therefore best defined, and best discussed, in relation to each other. 
Processes of collective Identity formation invariably involve complex bordering issues. 
Likewise, acts of bordering (i.e., the inscription, crossing, removal, transformation, 
multiplication and/or diversification of borders) invariably carry momentous ramifications for 
political ordering at all levels of analysis. Processes of identity, border and order construction are 
                                                      
6 A total of 11 states seceded: South Carolina (December 20 1860), Mississippi (January 9, 1861), Florida (January 
10, 1861), Alabama (January 11, 1861), Georgia (January 19, 1861), Louisiana (January 26, 1861), Texas 
(February 1, 1861), Virginia (April 17, 1861), Arkansas (May 6, 1861), North Carolina (May 20, 1861), and 
Tennessee (June 8, 1861)  
7 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 26 
8 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 1 
9 Ruggie, John Gerard. Pg.4-6, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and 
Method." Global changes and theoretical challenges (1989): 32. 
10 Alker, Hayward R, and Michael J Shapiro. Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
11 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 2 
12 Bach, Jonathan Paul Gregory. pg. 10, “Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National 
Identity."  (1997). 
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therefore mutually self-constituting. Borders, for instance, are in many ways inseparable from 
identities. They can help demarcate or individuate. Likewise, they are also inseparable from 
orders constituted to a large extent via such acts of individuation and segmentation. Thus, in any 
specific case, if we want to study problems associated with any one of our three concepts, we can 
richly benefit from also considering the other two.”13 
 
The IBO nodes are three interrelated pressure points that can be manipulated to push or retard the 
evolution of societal structuring. Therefore, changing any one of these three nodes should be 
considered part and parcel of the process of societal evolution. As such, territorial expansion (i.e. 
the changing of borders) can be considered an iteration of societal evolution, which cannot be 
fully understood without considering the other two IBO nodes. A mature and full understanding 
of the circumstances of territorial expansion in the context of its likelihood necessitates 
accounting for all the necessary component parts; it is this reason why this analytical frame 
incorporates all the nodes of the IBO triad. The dependent variable (i.e. territorial expansion) 
clearly is part and parcel of borders, while the overarching components include identity and 
geopolitics (i.e. orders). This logic also demands that all actors involved in any potential move 
towards territorial expansion must be accounted for. As such, the analytical frame has three 
(independent) levels of analysis corresponding to the different actors involved. The levels of 
analysis are: 1) the expanding power, 2) the populations being expanded upon and 3) the region 
where expansion may take place.  
 
The endeavor to devise a singular frame of analysis (that accounts for both types of expansion) 
concerning the likelihood of territorial expansion requires interdisciplinary, inter paradigmatic 
out of the box thinking, which will lead to some operationalizing theoretical pivot points that are 
brand new. Points that might not have the level of backing literature that academics generally 
like to display. This does not mean that the whole frame is without a solid academic foundation. 
It means that the search for scholars who have already written about these theoretical pivot 
points was unsuccessful. To the extent possible there has been a concerted effort to discuss the 
literature concerning the themes used in designing these pivot points. Even so, there are places, 
which at times may seem sparse in the context of citation of those who have previously said or 
agree with what is being written.  
 
The frame is operationalized by the subjective reading of a number of variables, which can result 
in different analysts (using the same analytical variables in the context of the same expanding 
power, populations being expanded upon and region) reaching different conclusions as to the 
likelihood of territorial expansion. This is not a flaw in the framework rather than being 
necessary by design. It must be emphasized that the point of this research is not to argue about 
this or that subjective reading of the involved variables. Rather the point is to demonstrate how 
the frame of analysis is constructed and fits together and to give an example analysis so that the 
analysts may us the frame themselves. 
 
Analyzing the conditions that affect the likelihood of expansion involves using variables that are 
inherently subjectively understood. Fairgrieve, who was one of the earliest scholars to deal with 
borderlands (and by extension the conditions that affect likelihood of expansion), noted the 
subjectivity involved. He understood that his analytical frame quite likely would produce 
                                                      
13 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 7 
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different results depending on the analyst and their subjective reading of the analytical variables 
involved. He pre-emptively, in the introduction, dealt with this issue, writing:  
 
“some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but the 
correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that statement or 
view.”14 
 
Below is a chapter outline: 
 
Chapter 2- fleshes out the concepts that are used in constructing the frame and discusses the 
literature in the context of each concepts conceptual usage. First will be a review of the literature 
surrounding forcible and amenable expansion, then the two main overarching components; i.e., 
geopolitics (in the context of borderlands and cultural fault lines) and identity will be discussed.  
Following the explanation of the overarching components, and then, the underlying synthesizing 
components will be addressed. First emotions (specifically fear and hope) followed by a 
discussion of societal attention spaces, populational lobbyist and manipulation, system 
progression, collective memory, power, and, framing legitimacy.  
 
Chapter 3- will discuss the 4 sets of analytical typologies that have been devised to 
operationalize the frame, two that pertain to geopolitics (i.e. geopolitical viability and proximate 
faultline typologies) and two that pertain to identity (i.e. identity viability and identity 
typologies)). The chapter will conclude with a discussion of hope confidence and concrete vs. 
non-concrete events. 
 
Chapter 4- will explain the frame of expansion and how it functions in conjunction with the 
analytical typologies discussed in chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 5- will apply the frame to Central Asia.  
 
Chapter 6- will apply the frame to the Ukraine. 
 
Chapter 7- includes the conclusion and final thoughts. 
 
For the convenience of the reader a summary will be included at the end of each chapter 
 
Chapter 1 Summary: The purpose of the research is to account for both forcible and amenable 
expansion in a single framework, which aims to analyze the likelihood of territorial expansion. 
Such an achievement needs to account for two overarching components (geopolitics and identity) 
as well as several underlying synthesizing components. It was made clear that territorial 
expansion is simultaneously fragmentation and integration, which is understood as a process of 
transformative change driving the evolution of our societal structuring, and that it (territorial 
expansion) is but one iteration of societal change that operates in an interconnected (IBO) triad, 
which includes borders, orders and identity, and that a change to one of the triad nodes 
necessarily influences the other two.  Also mentioned was that the present IR scholarship is 
                                                      
14 Fairgrieve, James. pg. VI, Geography and World Power. Dutton, 1921. 
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“lacking the logic and vocabulary to understand transformative change,”15 and that "the 
methodological shift from a language of interacting variables to a language of mutually 
constitutive processes requires a somewhat different approach than traditionally found in the 
toolboxes of International Relations."16 It was then stated that the frame being devised accounts 
for all three of the nodes on the IBO triad, and that it would account for all of the actors involved 
through a tiered analytical framework that considers the expanding power, the region and the 
populations being expanded upon. 
 
 
II. Chapter 2 - State of the Literature 
 
This chapter will flesh out the concepts used in constructing our frame of through looking at the 
current literature in the context of the necessary concepts.   
 
A. Present Views on Expansion 
 
As noted the aim here is not explain the mechanisms or analyze the reasons an actor is pushed to 
enact programs of territorial expansion. Despite this it is still worthwhile to give a general 
overview of common mechanisms and reasons found in the present literature. After the 
discussion about territorial expansion we will move on to the overarching frame components. 
 
1. Forcible Expansion 
Many have claimed that the international system exists in a state of anarchy, and that this 
anarchic nature feeds states need/want to forcibly expand, and that an anarchic system 
incentivizes maximization of relative power. These arguments are consistent with structural 
theories, such as neorealism17 and offensive realism.18  
 
According to Neorealism a state can never be sure of the future intentions of another state. 
Therefore, there is a lack of trust between states. When there is no trust the incentive is driven 
towards counting in terms of (guarding against losses and striving towards gains in) relative 
power (a loss of relative power has the potential to allow another state to threaten one’s 
survival). This fact quickly pushes the game into an arena in which survival becomes the primary 
factor influencing behavior. The neorealist paradigm then becomes one in which states work 
towards increasing their relative power so as to maximize chances of survival. One popular way 
in which this increase in relative power is achieved is through the development of offensive 
military capabilities.19  
 
Power in an anarchic system becomes to be understood as the fundamental tool with which to 
increase chances of survival, which creates an incentive/induces states to work towards 
achieving regional hegemony. This regional hegemony is often achieved through territorial 
                                                      
15 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 1 
16 Bach, Jonathan Paul Gregory. (1997), pg. 10 
17 Waltz, Kenneth N. "Theory of International Politics." Reading: Addison-Wesley (1979). 
18 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001. 
19Taylor Fravel, M. "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial   
Expansion." International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 505-32. 
7 
 
expansion. According to offensive realism the more relative power a state acquires the more 
likely it becomes that they will pursue forcible expansion. 20,21,22,23  
Fravel (2010) attempted to analyze the likelihood that future Chinese territorial expansion would 
be peaceful or violent (i.e. forcible or amenable). In the article “International Relations Theory 
and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion” he (Fravel) discussed 
several common theories that are frequently attached to the phenomenon of forcible expansion.   
First, he discussed systemic reasons: 
 
• Lateral Pressure theory - “offers one argument to explain why states seek to increase their 
influence abroad through a variety of means, including territorial expansion. States 
experiencing high rates of population growth and technological change require increasing 
stocks of resources to fuel further economic development. Over time, states find that they 
lack resources within their boundaries and thus face mounting ‘‘lateral pressure’’ to 
expand abroad.”24 
 
• The Security Dilemma- “According to the logic of the security dilemma (Jervis 1978), 
states in search of security may nevertheless pursue expansion to create secure frontiers 
or buffer zones with which to protect homeland territory from attack. Territorial 
expansion in pursuit of security results from fear and the perception of vulnerability to 
attack by the other great powers. As a state’s economy grows and generates increasing 
levels of wealth, the importance of defensible frontiers or buffers increases because the 
state has more to protect and defend. States may also worry that their increased wealth 
might attract other states that seek to block or contain its rise. According to this 
argument, the principal benefit of expansion is security through the establishment of 
buffer zones.”25 
 
After discussing systemic mechanisms of forcible expansion, he (Fravel) discussed and 
highlighted “domestic pathologies in the onset of international conflict”,26 pathologies arising 
from leaders attempting to maximize their domestic political power. These domestic 
explanations are often consistent with variants of defensive realism. 
 
• Nationalism –is often used towards incentivizing expansion based on a number of different 
reasons.  This includes expansion towards rescuing from persecution or bringing back 
into the fold and/or reunification of ethnic brethren living in neighboring countries. 
27,28,29 Nationalist expansion is often sold in the form of regaining territory based on 
                                                      
20 Labs, Eric J. "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims." Security studies 6, no. 4 
(1997): 1-49. 
21 Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.  Vol. 82: Princeton 
University Press, 1999. 
22 Mearsheimer, John J. (2001)  
23 Elman, Colin. "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional 
Hegemony." American political science review 98, no. 4 (2004): 563-76. 
24 Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 513 
25 Taylor Fravel, M, (2010), pg. 517 
26 Ibid 
27 Van Evera, Stephen. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." International security 18, no. 4 (1994): 5-39. 
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historical claims, revitalizing lost national pride and status, or, towards realization of a 
certain national identity.30 
 
• Log-rolling – “argues that expansion occurs through the process of forming political 
coalitions, especially in cartelized political systems where political power is concentrated 
in only a few groups, such as industrialists and the armed forces. As these actors trade 
favors with each other, they often justify their policies in terms of expansionist goals to 
maintain coalition unity. A dynamic that often results in the pursuit of aggression 
abroad.”31,32 
 
• Militarism - “commonly known as the ‘‘cult of the offensive,’’ the glorification of the 
offensive within professional militaries and the belief among civilian leaders that offense 
confers important advantages. According to this argument, militaries prefer offensive 
doctrines for several reasons, but primarily because they advance organizational interests 
by increasing autonomy, resources and social status.”33,34  
Another popular explanation of forcible expansion is Power Transition theory, which highlights 
territorial disputes as a source of dissatisfaction concerning the prevailing status quo.35  
Favel’s conclusion concerning the above theoretical perspectives is that they suffer “from two 
limitations. First, although unrealized benefits are the root cause of aggressive behavior for both 
Power Transition theory and Realism, neither the scope nor sources of these benefits are 
discussed in the current literature. Second, power Transition Theory and Realism rarely take on a 
cost benefit analysis of the conflict resulting from expansive aggression. Likewise, scholars who 
stress the effects of economic interdependence also do not tend to undertake a systematic 
cost/benefit analysis.”36 
2. Amenable Expansion 
Neo-functionalism is often cited when trying to explain voluntary integration. Its (neo-
functionalism’s) base line assumption is that supra-nationality is the only avenue through which 
states can secure maximum welfare. Ergo, the main idea of neo-functionalism is that regional 
incorporation develops through gradual integration of sector specific areas and “spillover” from 
integrated functions into new areas.37,38,39 The implication is that integration within certain areas 
                                                                                                                                                                           
28 D Davis, Graham A. "The Credibility of a Threat to Nationalize." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 42, no. 2 (2001): 119-39. 
29 Tir, Jaroslav. "Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and Secessionist States." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 5 (2005): 713-41. 
30  Van Evera, Stephen. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." International security 18, no. 4 (1994): 5-39. 
31 Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 521 
32 Snyder Jr, James M. "On Buying Legislatures." Economics & Politics 3, no. 2 (1991): 93-109. 
33 Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 522 
34 Snyder, James M. (1991) 
35 Lemke, Douglas. Regions of War and Peace.  Vol. 80: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
36 Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 506 
37 Haas, Ernst B. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process." International organization 15, 
no. 3 (1961): 366-92. 
38 Schmitter, Philippe C. "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration." International 
organization 23, no. 1 (1969): 161-66. 
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will push integration in other sectors.  
 
“Neo-functionalism is an important building block of a comprehensive account of integration. 
But it is not enough. By its very assumption it fails to give an explanation of the link between 
welfare maximization and regional integration.”40 Another weakness is that while accounting for 
the institutional arrangements that govern economic transactions the transactions themselves are 
unexamined. Also, neo-functionalism never fully specifies the conditions under which sub-
national demands for integration become accepted at the national level (a question that is 
pertinent to this research).41 
 
An alternative approach to neo-functionalism is inter-governmentalism, which approaches the 
phenomenon of regional integration from the perspective of nation-states, arguing that states are 
the major actors of international relations, and that states follow only their own interests. The 
main priorities of these actors are survival and accumulation of power.42 Unlike neo-
functionalism, it assigns a central role to heads of states and approaches regional integration 
from perspective of nation-states. The argument is that regional integration can be best 
understood as a series of bargains based on the convergence of preferences among the political 
leaders of the major states in a region. Small states are often bought off with side-payments 
offered by the leading states. Similarly, to inter-governmentalism, liberal inter-governmentalism 
argues that governments act as rational actors pursuing domestic goals and interests.43 
Integration is formed through interstate bargaining. States negotiate “deals” on the basis of their 
preferences and power. The most powerful states have the most power to decide and the treaties 
concluded are to their advantage. This approach implies the presence of a leader in a region. 
According to liberal inter-governmentalism, integration presents a “process of collective choice 
through which conflicting interests are reconciled.”44 
Inter-governmentalism suffers from several shortcomings. For example, by focusing solely on 
episodes of interstate bargains, the theory cuts into ongoing economic, legal, and social processes 
and presents a picture of integration that ignores and discounts events that precede and follow 
said bargaining. Furthermore, if progress towards integration through interstate bargains is the 
result of converging preferences on the part of the leaders of major states then the speed of the 
process of the integration must also reflect preferences of the leaders. However, a theory that 
"explains" the varying course of integration in terms of shifting preferences offers little to assess 
the theory's validity.45 
                                                                                                                                                                           
39 Lin Lindberg, Leon N, and Stuart A. Scheingold. Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European 
Community. Prentice Hall, 1970. 
40 Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 10 
41 Ibid 
42Hoffmann, Stanley. "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe." 
Daedalus (1966): 862-915. 
43 Moravcsik, Andrew. Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International 
Cooperation. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1994. 
44 Moravcsik, Andrew. pg. 24, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1993): 473-524. 
45 Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 15 
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“Economists who study regional integration look primarily at market relationships among goods 
and factors of production within a region; for example, customs union theory seeks to understand 
the welfare implications of integration in terms of trade creation, trade diversion and terms of 
trade. More broadly, economic explanations are positive theories of welfare gains and losses 
associated with regional integration, not explanations of the political choices that produce such 
areas. The weakness arises from the narrow focus on markets; these theories overlook a key 
aspect of integration, namely the provision of common rules, regulations and policies that govern 
regional economic areas.”46 
 
Explanations posited in the current literature regarding territorial expansion have “internal” gaps 
that would be beneficial to further explore. Though here the gap that is of interest is not of the 
“internal” ilk. The interest is not whether economic studies assume away political institutions, or 
if inter-governmentalism in its focus on interstate bargaining fails to incorporate events that 
preceded and followed the integration in question.  Here the interest is the glaring and 
overarching “external” gap hovering above the literature. Here the interest is the gap between 
forcible expansion and voluntary integration. The interest here is to study territorial expansion as 
a whole -- voluntary integration and forcible expansion analyzed in a singular model.  
The above section may seem short and as if it glossed very complex mechanisms and reasons 
behind the want for a state to territorial expand. This brevity was by design for the subject matter 
being explored here is not the mechanisms and reasons that make a state want/feel the need to 
expand. Rather the subject matter is the circumstances that make the want/need to expand more 
or less likely to be put into action. For this reason, a long-detailed discussion of the mechanisms 
and reasons behind said want/need to expand is not necessary.  As such, we move along to the 
overarching components of the frame.  
B. Overarching Components 
1. Geopolitics 
Rudolf Kjellén coined the term geopolitics in 1899 describing it as “the theory of the state as a 
geographical organism or phenomenon in space.”47 According to Cohen (2014) “statesmen and 
scholars who view geopolitics as a vehicle for integrating geography and international politics 
may find it useful to define geopolitics not as a school of thought, but as a mode of analysis, 
relating diversity in content and scale of geographical settings to exercise of political power and 
identifying spatial frameworks through which power flows.”48  
 
 Here geopolitics is assumed to flow in two spaces and in two different ways: 1) regional 
geographical space and geopolitical order, and, 2) the international political space and the 
phenomenon of the perceived geopolitical balance of power. These two spaces are attached to 
two different levels of the frame of analysis. Point 1 is attached to the analysis of the region, and 
point 2 attached to the analysis of the expanding power. Both spaces of analysis rely on two 
assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic and the system exists in a state of constant 
antagonism; and, (2) actors within the system are generally “self-interested, rational actors, who 
                                                      
46 Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 11 
47 Kjellén, Rudolf. Studier Öfver Sveriges Politiska Gränser. 1899. 
48 Cohen, Saul Bernard. pg. 16, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
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seek to increase their chances of survival”49, and, that increased chances of surviving come 
through maximizing security via relative gains, which as a result the “security dilemma” are used 
to procure geographical buffer zones against potential threats. Lastly, the frame views 
“geographical space as a product of political and cultural imagination, rather than as something 
‘natural’ or ‘objective.’”50 
  
First, we will discuss literature and concepts connected to point 1 in the context of regional 
geopolitical order.  
 
Regional geopolitical order  
Regional political order in the frame is used to identify which regions are most likely to 
experience expansion. The two main concepts backing this ability are cultural fault lines and 
borderlands (also known as “shatterbelts” or “crush zones”). In this frame, cultural fault lines are 
applied to identify where borderlands exist. First, we will discuss borderlands and then cultural 
fault lines.  
 
Borderlands: A common notion in “spatial analyses” is that borderlands are “inherently more 
prone to conflict than other areas.”51 Another common notion is that conflict almost always 
involves a dimension that is related to territorial expansion, and will, in one way or another result 
in the shifting of geopolitical borders.52 Therefore, the claim can also be made that borderlands 
are inherently more prone to experience territorial expansion.  
 
Research related to borderlands focuses on “rivalries between major powers, studying areas 
where the push for expansion brought these powers into competition.”53 As early as 1900, Alfred 
Mahan54 used the term “shatter belt” in reference to the zone between the thirty and forty-degree 
parallels in Asia. He concluded that the weakness of states occupying this “belt” and the 
resources thought to be contained therein-catalyzed competition towards territorial expansion by 
neighboring geopolitical powers (i.e. Britain and Russia). Fifteen years later James Fairgrieve55 
used the term “crush zone” to describe a buffer zone between the sea powers and the Eurasian 
heartland. The end of WWI brought attention to a borderland in East-Central Europe, which was 
ethnically and politically diverse, economically underdeveloped and “trapped in the middle of 
the fundamental rivalry between Germany and Russia for control of East Europe.”56   
 
Again, after WWII this Eastern-Central European borderland became the worry of geographers: 
Whittlesey (1942)57 noted that this “middle Europe” borderland was most important in that it 
                                                      
49 Morgenthau, Hans J. pg. 3, "Politics among Nations, 5th Edn Rev." New York: Knopf (1978) 
50 Helleiner, Eric, and Andreas Pickel. pg. 46, Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. Cornell University 
Press, 2005. 
51 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. pg. 2, "Testing Empirical Propositions About Shatterbelts, 1945-1976." Political 
Geography 13, no. 1 (1994): 33-51. 
52 Ibid 
53 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. (1994), pg.  
54 Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies. Little, Brown, 1900. 
55 Fairgrieve, James. (1921)  
56 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. (1994), pg. 3 
57 Whittlesey, Derwent Stainthorpe, Charles Carlyle Colby, and Richard Hartshorne. German Strategy of World 
Conquest. Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart, Incorporated, 1942. 
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could be used as a buffer against Russian aggression. Hartshorne (1941)58 wrote that the states 
within it were weak, politically immature and ethnically diverse. A fact that Whittlesey (1942) 
agreed with when he wrote that WWI had "left Middle Europe subdivided into states with small 
populations--a shatter belt of mutually antagonistic units, unable to organize for commercial 
union or for political solidarity. This weakness left it ripe for the plucking." 59 
 
A consensus from was that “Middle Europe” was caught between the geopolitical competition of 
Russia and Europe, and, that the states of Middle Europe were ethnically and linguistically 
diverse, weak, politically immature and economically undeveloped. Characteristics that were 
understood as making it “ripe to be expanded upon.” The location of “middle Europe” was 
understood as making it important to expand upon and used as a buffer against the opposing 
geopolitical power before being buffered against.60 The goal was to close the open borderland 
before your opponent does. After WWIII, it was the Soviets who closed the “Middle European” 
borderland, after which, according to East (1961) meant that it could "no longer fittingly 
described as 'a political shatter belt'" (i.e. borderland).61 Though, again after the fall of CCCP the 
“Middle European” borderland subsequently opened again only to then (for the most part) close 
again due to and EU territorial expansion.  
 
Early geographers were too preoccupied with “Middle Europe” to extrapolate out its “peculiar” 
characteristics to identify other borderlands that might exist. Cohen (1957,1973)62,63 was the first 
to make such an analytical attempt. He identified the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Southeast Asia as borderlands. His conclusion was that a borderland is a region "whose internal, 
geographical, cultural, religious, and political fragmentation is compounded by pressures from 
external major powers attracted by the region's strategic location and economic resources."64  
 
To Kelly (1986) contiguity to competing geopolitical powers was not a necessity in the definition 
of borderlands. The important part was the aspect of competition. If there is competition for 
control of the space and resources then the location of the players in relation to the borderland 
does not matter. Kelly proposed the following definition. “A shatterbelt is a geographic region 
over whose control Great Powers seriously compete. Great Powers compete because they 
perceive strong interests for doing so and because opportunities are present for establishing 
alliance footholds with states of the region. (...) A shatterbelt originates when rival Great Power 
footholds are present in an area.”65 Using this definition Kelly identified six borderlands: Middle 
East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia and Central America. 
 
                                                      
58 Hartshorne, Richard. pg. 52, "The Politico-Geographic Pattern of the World." The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 218, no. 1 (1941): 45-57. 
59 Whittlesey, Derwent Stainthorpe, Charles Carlyle Colby, and Richard Hartshorn, (1942), pg. 172 
60 Hoffman, George W. "The Shatter-Belt in Relation to the East-West Conflict." Journal of Geography 51, no. 7 
(1952): 265-75. 
61 East, WG. pg. 22, "The Concept and Political-Status of the Shatter Zone." Paper presented at the Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 1960. 
62 Cohen, Saul B. "Geography and Strategy." Naval War College Review 10 (1957): 1-32 
63 Cohen, Saul B. "Geography and Politics in a World Divided."  (1975). 
64 Cohen, Saul B. pg. 226, “A New Map of Global Geopolitical Equilibrium: A Developmental Approach." Political 
Geography Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1982): 223-41. 
65 Kelly, Philip L. pg. 176, “Escalation of Regional Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Concept." Political Geography 
Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1986): 161-80. 
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Cohen responded to Kelly by claiming that his definition was missing the point because it 
ignored the fact that borderlands must present “an equal playing field to two or more competing 
powers operating from different geostrategic realms,"66 and that Kelly’s definition included 
regions in which a single major power already exercised dominant control (i.e. US in central 
America).  Van der Wusten and Nierop (1990)67 criticized Kelly’s definition by the fact that it 
was too broad, and, that defining borderlands as any place that great powers compete due to a 
perceived interest would include all the third world. Kelly realized that his list of borderlands 
was broad and stated that his definition included "literally all contested regions where escalation 
to global conflict could transpire."68 
 
The term “The Great Game” 69 was coined to describe the 19th century struggle for supremacy, 
between the Russian and British empire in the Central Asian borderland. The result, among other 
things, was the creation of Afghanistan as a buffer state.”70.  Borderlands operate as the nexus of 
“conflict and divergence of regional and global interests”71 in a quest “for power and 
influence.”72 Here, borderlands are conceived as a Game. As the board of play in which 
neighboring fault lines will, over time (to a greater or lesser degree according to ability), move 
toward territorial expansion (amenable or forcible). History has shown many iterations of the 
borderland Game. Fundamentally these iterations do not change from the end goal of controlling 
borderland resources, lands and populations. What changes are the players, number of players, 
rules, and, tactics used. Borderlands cyclically open and close and are the most likely site of 
territorial expansion. After WWII “Middle Europe” opened only to be closed by Soviet 
expansion to European contiguity. After the collapse of CCCP it opened again only to be closed 
by EU expansion, which has almost reached contiguity with the Russian Federation.  
 
The literature on borderlands has some main themes: 1) Borderlands are comprised of “weak 
states” that are economically underdeveloped, and are perceived to be internally fragmented in 
the context of race, language, religion, and nationality, 2) The borderland regions themselves are 
also perceived as being fragmented. Borderland states are often “mutually antagonistic, leaving 
them unable or unwilling to cooperate economically, politically, and militarily.”73 The result of 
these first two points is conflict internal to the borderland states and conflict between borderland 
states.74  3) Borderlands are the sites of considerable external military and economic involvement 
by two or more competing geopolitical powers. 4) Borderlands do not fall under the purview of 
the spheres of influence of major powers, yet at the same time, they are accessible to the major 
                                                      
66 Cohen, Saul Bernard. (1978), pg. 48 
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powers, thus creating overlapping spheres. Also, the borderland is a field of competition that 
does yet have a dominant player. 5) Borderlands (more or less) offer an even playing field for 
major powers to gain a footing. Thus, more than one major power must have an ally, military 
presence, or strong patron-client relationship in the area. The presence of multiple major powers 
suggests a competitive aspect to the region.   
  
A generalized definition of borderlands that serves this research are the points listed above, with 
the addition of another point that stipulates that competing geopolitical powers must be 
contiguous to the borderland.  
 
Cultural fault line theory 
Cultural fault lines (an idea that is best known from Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations”) can be used to highlight the movement of borders connected to the identities 
attached. Any identity can be attached to cultural fault lines for analysis, from localized (tribal) 
to esoteric and relatively removed large-scale (civilizational).  
 
Our frame uses identity and the idea of the cultural fault line to determine the geographic 
location of the major geopolitical forces and actors in a specific region. The chosen attached 
identities should be overlaid onto a map and traced in a way that it follows the location of the 
populations that are considered to be encompassed by said identities. Borderlands will be 
illuminated when all the major regional political actors/forces are accounted for and 
corresponding lines drawn.  
 
These lines may be represented by religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation etc. They at times may 
cross nation state borders; other times they may follow national borders. The only rule 
concerning what identities are chosen to attach to the cultural fault lines being drawn is that they 
represent all major geopolitical powers acting in the region being analyzed. Past this, the choice 
is a subjective reading of the analyst as to which identities best represent these major players and 
the regional population structure.  
 
"[a]ny regional division is not a true picture of reality, but it is an arbitrary device of the 
student... depending on what elements appear to him as most significant."75  
 
An example analysis of using cultural fault lines to map out where borderlands lay will be given 
later in the text, in chapter 4.  
 
1.Identity 
Identity theory extends from those that treat identity as a deeply entrenched attachment, implying 
that such attachments should be stable over time76,77 to those that believe individuals possess a 
repertoire of potential identity attachments, and that one’s first tier identity often reflects a 
strategic rationale. In this sense individuals are assumed to adopt certain identities because they 
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offer perceived psychological or material benefits.78,79,80 This logic suggests that identity 
attachments may shift over time due to changes in expected benefits. This (a rationalist) 
approach to identity contends that individuals employ an instrumental calculation in their 
adoption of identities. There are three underlying assumptions: (1) individuals are assumed to 
possess a repertoire of more than one meaningful identity category from which they can 
theoretically self-identify; (2) adoption of an identity is largely conscious in that an individual’s 
self-identification often represents a choice; and, (3) this identity choice is often based on 
strategic or instrumental considerations. Individuals adopt certain identities because of their 
perceived benefits.81 The account of identity that is assumed here is one in which individuals are 
likely to stay with a certain identity category unless there is a clear incentive to shift away. 
 
Below are 11 definitions of Identity that are accepted here. These definitions should help the 
reader get a contextual feel about what is meant when we speak about Identity. 
 
(i)    Identity is “people’s concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they 
relate to others.”82 
(ii) “Identity is the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture.”83 
(iii) Identity “refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their 
social relations with other individuals and collectivities.” 84 
(iv) “National Identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the same 
identification with national symbols – have internalized the symbols of the nation...”85 
(v) “Social Identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the 
perspective of others, that is, as a social object. ... [Social Identities are] at once cognitive 
schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a 
social role structure of shared understandings and expectations.”86 
(vi) “By social Identity, I mean the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place within 
historically specific discourses (or frames of understanding) about the character, structure, 
and boundaries of the polity and the economy.”87 
(vii) “The term [Identity] (by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images 
of self and other.” 88 
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(viii) “Identities are ... prescriptive representations of political actors themselves and of their 
relationships to each other.”89 
(ix) “My Identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame 
or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or 
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.”90 
(x) “Indeed, Identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be 
subjectively appropriated only along with that world {... A} coherent Identity 
incorporates within itself all the various internalized roles and attitudes.” 91 
(xi) “Identity emerges as a kind of unsettled space, or an unresolved question in that space, 
between a number of intersecting discourses {...} a kind of fixed point of thought and 
being, a ground of action {...} the logic of something like a ‘true self.’ {...} Identity is 
a process. Identity is not a fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the 
relationship of the other to oneself.”92 
 
C. Underlying Synthesizing Components 
Manipulation of populations towards collective action is an important aspect to understanding 
the way in which this frame functions. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss Populational 
manipulation and lobbyists. 
1. Populational Lobbyists and Manipulation  
Populational lobbyist leverage programs of manipulation towards catalyzing collective action, 
without these programs of manipulation no citizenry would be inspired/induced to collectively 
act. As such, there are two indications: 1) all leaders, of any group or movement, should be 
considered populational lobbyist, and, 2) manipulation is a is a natural component in pushing 
societal movement, which means that manipulation (on its own) does necessarily not hold a 
negative connotation, and, can be understood as a form of persuasion. 93,94 Persuasion itself is not 
a good or bad thing. What is good or bad are the ends to which this persuasion is aimed, and, 
whether these ends are intended to push towards or away from egalitarianism. Van Djik (2006) 
parses manipulation into a “fuzzy” distinction between legitimate and illegitimate. He defines 
illegitimate manipulation as “all forms of interaction, communication or other social practices 
that are only in the interests of one party, and against the best interests of the recipients.”95 Then 
claims, via Grice (1975), that legitimate manipulation is built on conversations that are “truthful, 
relevant and complete.”96 Van Djik’s conclusion is that illegitimate manipulation is likely to 
“reproduce inequality.”97 Past this, he falls short of claiming (something that is claimed here) 
that the likely outcome of legitimate manipulation (opposite to illegitimate) is movement towards 
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egalitarianism.  
The conceptual model of the role of legitimate/illegitimate manipulation in this process fits with 
Brown’s (2014) theory of System Progression.   
System Progression 
Brown’s theory of System progression is built around the analysis of objectives. His claim is that 
the ultimate progression of any system will be a function of the underlying objectives. He lays 
out what he calls “actual” and “espoused” objectives: 
 
“Espoused” objectives can be defined as the objectives that are publicly proclaimed while 
“actual” objectives can be understood as the collective motivation of the group designing, 
building and/or administering the system or framework. ““Espoused” objectives can be 
considered to mirror the collective societal will because, for system implementation to occur, it 
must be sanctioned by the society on which it will be placed. The collective societal unit will not 
(except in cases of extreme duress) accept or sanction a system whose objectives it believes to be 
contrary to societal goals and values. On the other hand, “Actual” objectives are the real 
intentions and motivations of the group designing, building and administering the system or 
framework. {…} “Actual” objectives dictate what the system is doing while “espoused” 
objectives represent what the system is claimed to be doing.”98  
 
Brown then goes on to talk about in and out of synch systems.  In synch systems occur when 
actual and espoused objectives are aligned. When objectives are aligned the populational 
lobbyist behind the proposed policies have publically espoused the actual objectives, have been 
truthful with the population as to their true intent. Therefore, the assumption is that the “actual” 
objective behind an in-synch system must have the intent (or at least a byproduct) of being 
positive for the whole of the population rather than a specific subpopulation (i.e. push towards 
egalitarianism and be a product of legitimate manipulation). There cannot be an in-synch system 
that has as its actual objective gain for a specific subpopulation at the expense of the whole. This 
because the population in question will reject implementation as soon as the lobbyist espouses 
that the system is designed to benefit a specific subpopulation at the expense of the whole. 
Which means the only way that populational lobbyists can gain implementation of a system that 
is for the gain of a subpopulation at the expense of the whole is by espousing one objective while 
a holding different actual objective (e.g. implementing an out of synch system).  
 
The conclusion is that: 1) out of synch systems can only come about through illegitimate 
manipulation since legitimate manipulation (i.e. “truthful conversation”) will result in the 
rejection of said out of synch system, and, 2) in synch systems can only be sold using legitimate 
manipulation due to the fact that it (an in synch system) must have aligned espoused and actual 
objectives, which means that the lobbyist behind the system had an honest conversation (i.e. 
engaged in legitimate manipulation) about the intention of the proposed system.  
 
The implication is that one can gauge whether any bout of collective action is likely to produce 
societal movement towards or away from egalitarianism by determining whether the system 
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being proposed is in or out of synch, or, whether the manipulation being leveraged is legitimate 
or illegitimate.  
 
From here we will discuss the mechanisms that are used in programs of manipulation towards 
catalyzing collective action. 
2. Emotions 
“Until the 1960s emotions were considered a key—for some, the key—to understanding virtually 
all political action”, 99 yet, “since the end of the 1960s, accordingly, emotions have played almost 
no role in theories of social movements and collective action.”100 Thomas Scheff 101 claims that 
emotions are motivators of action.  Saul Alinsky102 depicted emotions as having the propensity to 
be manipulated towards reaching certain political outcomes over others and that a main 
component in devising mobilizing structures, frames, collective identities and political 
opportunities comes from the emotions held within. Calhoun (2009) claims “emotions are 
produced and organized” 103 and that their propensity to be manipulated “ought to figure more 
prominently”104 in analyzing politics. He also claims different emotions “work differently from 
each other. There are patterns and challenges in relating these to each other, and these may be 
very important for movement analyses. Some emotions may get in the way of others; some may 
specifically call forth others.”105 Lastly, Calhoun claims that emotions can serve to disrupt or 
stabilize political institutions.  
 
Kemper (2009) writes that “without the emotions engaged in movement environments, 
dynamics, and structure, it would be hard to explain how social movements arise, amass critical 
levels of support, maintain such support in long-enduring campaigns in the face of often intense 
opposition, and provide means for recruiting and sustaining supporters, both as active members 
and as favorably disposed publics and bystanders. Unquestionably, understanding the dynamics 
of emotions clarifies social movement dynamics”106, and, that “a structural approach to 
emotions, by contrast, examines social structural conditions to explain why specific emotions are 
either prevalent or likely to arise as the structural conditions either change or continue as 
before.”107 He asks, “What kinds of social relational conditions provoke the emotions that ripen 
the grounds for social movement emergence or recruitment? What kinds of social relational 
conditions lead to the emotions that signify a waning of social movement support?”108 
 
The analytical assumption here is that Fear and Hope are the two base emotions to which all 
other emotions eventually flow.  Hope and fear are part and parcel of each other, while at the 
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same time “paradoxical in their practical deployments.”109 Despite this paradoxical deployment 
hope and fear function in similar fashion, through the same agents, same structure, and 
potentially towards identical ends. Imagine a battery; it has negative and positive flows, and 
although they are diametrically opposed, they operate under the same principles and through the 
same structure. 
Hope 
Miyazaki (2004) sees hope as a method that reorients knowledge, directing it towards an 
imagined future, while Braidotti characterizes hope as “a sort of dreaming forward, it is an 
anticipatory virtue that permeates our lives and activates them. It is a powerful motivating force 
grounded in our collective imaginings.”110 Walter Benjamin talks of “cultural ruination” in 
predicting what identities will emerge as the vehicle of hopeful momentum.  
 
“hope is a key dynamic driving processes of social and political change”111  
Spreading Neo-liberal reforms brought attention to hope as an analytical mechanism in social 
theory112,113,114,115 and (like fear) is conceived as an amalgamation of opposites containing 
competing contradictory elements (i.e. action and passivity;116,117confidence and patience; past 
and future). Hage (2003) links the decreasing ability of a societal structure to distribute hope 
equally to the rise of “paranoid” nationalist movements, which he described as “no-hopers 
produced by transcendental capitalism and the politics of neo-liberal government.”118 Yamada 
(2004)119 talks of neoliberalism creating “winners” and “losers” and how the losers, when pushed 
to a breaking point have the tendency to experience a (temporary) loss of hope in a better future. 
Svenberg defines hope as “the wish for something to come true,” he then goes on to parse this 
definition into three parts: (1) the wish, (2) the something and (3) coming true. Japanese scholar 
Seigo Hirowatari suggested adding action to this list.  
 
In terms of societal evolution populational hope resides in the means and ends of acting towards 
creating and institutionalizing a societal structure that is believed to be able to provide a safer, 
more secure and economically abundant future. Using the verb “exodus” Bloch (2009) also 
connects hope to action aimed at a creating and institutionalizing a new status quo: “There is 
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always an exodus in the world, an exodus from the particular status quo. And there is always a 
hope, which is connected with rebellion—a hope founded in the concrete given possibilities for 
new being.”120 
 
“In all cases hope is coupled with demands for change {…} if there is to be any progress at all, 
hope is one of its ingredients.”121 
 
Hope should not be confused with dreams. Hope is an activating drive towards changing the 
status quo, while dreams a pacifying agent. Marx mistook “religion” as the opium of the masses, 
when in fact the opiate does not reside in religion rather than whether said religion is selling 
dreams in place of hope. Weber calls hope a “robust motive” and then claims that religions 
instead offer “hope of salvation” and “hope of compensation.” Ralf Dahrendorf (1976)122 makes 
a distinction between “utopian hope” and “realistic/effective hope.” He connects “utopian hope” 
to consumerism as an opiate.123 On the other hand, he connects “realistic/effective hope” to 
“what is concrete and possible to achieve.” Søren Kierkegaard124 uses the metaphor of hope 
being the wind that powers the movement of the sailor. Adding that it can also engulf its object. 
Thus, hindering chances of the reaching the desired ends. 
 
“hope is useful in certain doses—to get the wishing going—but that it also can become so strong 
that it overwhelms the normal unfolding of hope and prevents it from becoming true”125 
 
Fear 
Thucydides to Machiavelli to Hobbes have acknowledged fear as a critical mechanism in 
collective action, societal structuring and its evolution. Fear affects this trio following the adage 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Wood (1995) claims “a founding axiom of modern 
political thought” can be encapsulated by the idea that fear of enemies “promotes internal social 
unity.”126 When survival is perceived to be under threat “individuals and small social groups find 
a bond in their common fear that enables them to set their differences aside and unite in the 
pursuit of goals that are otherwise unattainable.”127 Fear is a powerful  motivator because it 
involves threats to self-preservation: physical (life, health, and/or, home) and/or societal 
(collective conceptions of culture, “way of life,” principles of governing structures and/or 
identity). During conflict the line between physical and symbolic attack becomes murky. Both 
involve feelings of vulnerability, denigration and humiliation that link past losses to present 
dangers. Fears can be about physical security and/or the extinction of the self, family, the group 
or its culture (including sacred icons and sites). Smith (1991) uses the term ethnocide to describe 
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deliberate efforts to destroy a community's cultural icons.128 
The social utility of fear of outsiders is claimed to have been driving alliances between 
uncooperative groups for millennia. As groups begin to cooperate their perceptions of the other 
either softens or hardens. Either internalizing a new understanding or reinforcing preconceived 
notions and beliefs about the other group. Softening leads to mixing, while hardening to 
separation. Mixing, towards hope and hybridization and therefore more likely to produce 
substantive transformation of the involved group identities.  Hardening means that the alliance 
will remain one of convenience, one in which the common enemy is the sole bond of unity. 
There is little chance an alliance of convenience will lead to significant transformation of each 
other’s group identities. 
To Carl Schmitt the friend–enemy divergence is the ultimate political criterion. Schmitt 
described the political sphere as one in which the prospect of one’s existence being destroyed is 
the determining factor in who is considered enemy. If the enemy of my enemy is my friend then 
who is enemy is also a determining factor in who is considered friend. Hans Morgenthau 
integrated Schmitt’s Hobbesian views into his account of political realism in which calls to 
security and fear play the part of chicken and egg. Does the fear create the call to security or vice 
versa? Calls to security can be conceived as the ratcheting of fear (i.e. fear mongering) towards 
hidden agendas aimed at creating an out of synch system. Yet calls to security can also be 
considered the reaction to an instinctual self-defense mechanism that has been activated by 
actual threat. Fear is a “complicated state of mind. Some of its mechanisms are clearly liabilities; 
they have a paralyzing effect. On the other hand, one-time liabilities may turn into benefits, since 
fear at the right time and for the right reasons is essential for survival.”129 
“fear of harm, the emotion that triggers our concern with our preservation and security, 
becomes the enemy, the rallying point for political awareness, vigilance, and meaningful 
collective action. Even this enemy is not universal, since it pits those who oppose harm against 
those who threaten or inflict it, and yet it may well be the best that we can hope for.” 130 
Marcus Porcius Cato, a Roman senator during the rivalry with Carthage, was known to end every 
senatorial speech (regardless of the subject matter) with calls for the destruction of Carthage. On 
the other hand, Publius Scipio Nasica would counter argue that Carthage should be left alone, for 
the threat from Carthage was the only thing keeping Rome from descending into civil war.131 
Aristotle also understood this. In “Politics” he recommended that governments “should excite 
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fears and make faraway dangers seem close at hand, so that the citizens will defend the 
constitution and, like sentries on night-duty, never relax their guard”132 
 
According to Waltz, there are two routes that are taken when states perceive a significant 
external threat: states can balance (formation of an alliance to counter the perceived threat) or 
bandwagon (aligning with the threat).133 Waltz came to the conclusion that balancing is “far 
more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially 
weak and isolated states.”134 This conclusion would explain Waltz’s observation that threat was 
much more common than power as the motivating mechanism behind alliances.  
“The primacy of self-preservation renders fear of the threat posed by others vital for the 
formation of alliances, as well as for their subsequent preservation and consolidation, because it 
provides a way of overcoming barriers to group formation and collective action that are 
insurmountable by positive means alone.”135 
McDougall (1985)136 operationalizes fear through created panic so as to induce reactions in an 
attempt to gain acquiescence towards certain policies over others. Transmuted through 
“messages or communications intended as mechanisms for manipulating the recipient’s intrinsic 
notions of threat and efficacy regarding a particular threat and corresponding protective 
behavior”137 (i.e. “fear appeals”). To be successful, fear appeals must play to the self-interests of 
the audience and must achieve a sufficient level of personal relevance (or issue involvement) for 
the individual; otherwise, they are ignored and rendered ineffective.138,139 
 
“A properly constructed fear appeal not only serves to induce the awareness that a threat exists 
but also purveys the severity of the threat and its target population’s susceptibility to the 
threat.”140 
Fear appeals when aimed at manipulating the behavior of a society will attempt to create a 
“moral panic.” A moral panic is a feeling of fear among the citizenry that some evil threatens the 
well being of society.141 A Dictionary of Sociology defines a moral panic as "the process of 
arousing social concern over an issue and is usually the work of moral entrepreneurs and the 
mass media."142  
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The word fear is used to depict responses to any number of stimuli in a variety of situations. The 
nature of any “fearful” reaction is an amalgamation of variables (including but not limited to) 
such as the nature of the stimulus, perceived length of the threat, and previous traumatic contact 
with comparable stimuli. When pertaining to individual psychology fear can be parsed (with 
good precision and consistency) between anxiety, stress, fright, panic, posttraumatic stress 
disorder, phobias…etc. Though populational psychology and collective political theory generally 
conceive fear as a ubiquitous part of the human experience. As such, everyone is regarded as 
having an intrinsic understanding of the concept. Therefore, defining something that is conceived 
as being ubiquitous is (generally) deemed unnecessary. This leads to a situation in which fear, 
without defining or parsing it, is often woven in as a critical mechanism. Aron (2017) claims that 
“fear needs no definition. It is a primal and, so to speak, sub political emotion. But it is one that 
all political theorists have discussed, because many of them, since Hobbes, have regarded it as 
the most human, the most basic emotion-the emotion which underlies the state itself.”143 Shklar 
(1989) argues fear is “without qualification as universal as it is physiological.”144 The exception 
to the lack of definition is Hobbes who defines fear as an “aversion, with opinion of hurt from 
the object, {…} any anticipation of future evil {...} not only flight, but also distrust, suspicion, 
precaution and provision against.”145 Two types of fearful reactions can be parsed from Hobbe’s 
definition: an immediate, almost, instinctual reaction versus a deliberated one. Ledoux (2015)146 
talks about the potential of fearful reactions to travel either the “low” or “high road.” The low 
road is “quick and dirty” allowing for, almost instinctual, rapid responses to perceived threats to 
self-preservation. Conversely, the “high road” yields a more discerning, prejudicial and 
thoughtful reaction. 
Here, a guideline assumption is the immediate (“low road”) response is generated by fear of 
perceived imminent threats to physical preservation of life, health and/or home. On the other 
hand, the deliberated, “high road” reaction is motivated by perceived threats to societal 
preservation (i.e. collective conceptions of culture, “way of life,” principles of governing 
structures and or identity.) 
Of interest here is Machiavelli’s question: is a prince better served by being loved or feared? 
Here love is understood as hope. For the love of the sovereign is born from hope. Subjects loved 
their prince when he was perceived as being kind, courageous, generous, empathetic, noble and 
righteous. A ruler perceived thusly will engender populational hope that his reign will bear a 
future that is more safe, secure and economically abundant than the present. It is this hope that 
allowed the population to develop love of the ruler. As such, hope is a perquisite to loving the 
prince. Therefore, in this context, love is equal to hope and the question becomes whether or not 
a populational lobbyist is best served by generating hope or fear among his target audience. 
Unwinding this question very quickly leads to more questions: “How is hope{/fear} lost and 
regained? What are the economic and material conditions for hope{/fear}? What is the 
relationship between individual and collective hopes{/fears}? What is the linkage between past 
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and future hopes{/fears}? How is hope{/fear} anchored in belief?”147 is there a difference in the 
flavors of collective action/inaction more likely to be driven by fear versus hope? (E.g. fascist 
versus communist movements etc.) And which is the more powerful mechanism in terms of 
spurning and controlling societal evolution? 
Societal movement contains coexisting hope and fear but like yin and yang they do not exist in 
equal amount in any movement. Therefore, despite this coexistence, movements can be classified 
into being fear or hope driven. Furthermore, movements can be classified as upholding (in that 
they push to uphold the current status quo) versus overturning (aimed at overturning the status 
quo.) As a general rule, fear drives upholding the current status quo, while hope spurns 
overturning movements. This logic would explain Machiavelli’s conclusion that fear was the 
more effective tool to maintaining the Prince’s rule (maintaining the status quo). 
 
Epochs of societal evolution are counted by the dividing revolutions that overturned the old and 
implemented the new. The lengths of these epochs are measured by how long a particular status 
quo is upheld. The concern here is the shift from epoch to epoch, the overturning of the old and 
implementation of new; societal evolution. Therefore, following the above general rule, the focus 
should be on overturning movements. Overturning movements more often are driven by hope 
rather than fear. As such, logic dictates that the frame used to track and understand epoch 
transitions should be hope based.   
 
The dynamic relationship between these two forces plays out in the societal attention spaces, 
which will be discussed below.  
3. Societal Attention Spaces 
There are many types of societal attention spaces. Though here we are concerned with the 
political and emotional attention spaces. These two spaces are intertwined and in many ways 
inseparable. Collins (2001) claims that understanding collective action requires “capturing their 
emotional dynamics in a social attention space (…).” He continues to argue that “critical mass 
develop, and fade away, because of emotional dynamics {… and that} Social movements operate 
inside a social attention space, which has room for only a limited number of participants; hence 
there is an implicit struggle to position oneself within this attention space. This process largely 
determines victory or defeat, as well as whether a movement can get off the ground at all and 
how long it will remain important.”148 Societal attention spaces are the field of play in which 
populational lobbyist exploit dynamics so as to gain a majority of the audience’s attention.  
Societal attention spaces are organic, breathing in and out as they open and close. They are 
flexible, overlapping containers conceived in a myriad of ways (cultural, emotional, 
institutional… etc.). Through leveraging emotions populational lobbyist jockey for market share 
of these attention spaces. Action drives focus, focus leads attentiveness. An attentive audience 
will have a lowered ability to accept information coming from a source different than the focus 
of attention. Attentive audiences have closed attention spaces. On the other hand, inaction leads 
loss of focus towards inattentiveness. Inattentive audiences are more likely to accept information 
                                                      
147 Miyazaki, Swedberg. (2016), pg. 3 
148 Collins, Randall. pg. 27, "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention." Passionate politics: 
Emotions and social movements (2001): 27-44. 
25 
 
coming from a source different from what is presently occupying the inattentive gaze. It is in the 
populational attention spaces where populational lobbyist manipulate towards catalyzing 
collective action aimed at structuring the status quo in their preferred image towards preferred 
policies.  
4. Collective Memory 
Collective memory has been studied both narrowly (i.e. a subfield of the sociology of 
knowledge)149 and broadly (i.e. the connective structure of societies).150 Collective memory has 
been “seen as involving sets of practices like commemoration and monument building and 
general forms like tradition, myth, or identity.”151 It has been “approached from sociology, 
history, literary criticism, anthropology, psychology, art history, and political science, among 
other disciplines {… and has been studied} in simple and complex societies, from above and 
below, across the geographical spectrum. Social memory studies are nevertheless, or perhaps as a 
result, a non-paradigmatic, trans-disciplinary, centerless enterprise”152 
 
Collective memory was first referenced by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who described it as, "the 
dammed-up force of our mysterious ancestors within us" and "piled up layers of accumulated 
collective memory."153 Maurice Halbwachs (1925)154 brought about the contemporary usage of 
the term. Walter Benjamin (without explicitly using the term) talked about collective memory in 
his writings about “cultural ruination,” in which he analyzed the world as accumulated history 
and talked about predicting what identities will emerge as the vehicle of hopeful momentum. 
“Cultural ruination” draws attention to the ways in which material and social remains and 
residues continue to assert themselves into the present.155 
Bartlett (1933) is considered to have been the first psychologist to broach collective memory in 
relation to its social dimensions and the importance of group dynamics.156 Anthropologist Evans-
Pritchard (1940) established a theory of "structural amnesia."157 Janet (1927) studied the 
evolution of memory in relation to time. Vygotsky (1929) claimed that memory is a narrative 
that is unquestionably and fully shaped by cultural influences.158 Central to Marx’s thought 
process is social reproduction, though Marxism emphasizes an automatic and unconsciousness 
process, conscious remembering of the past is portrayed as “the tradition of the dead 
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generations" that "weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living."159  
Aries (1974)160 and Agulhon (1981)161 were the first to study commemorative practices as a tool 
of political manipulation, thus shifting the discussion from ideology to imagery, and, from 
meaning to manipulation. Hobsbawm in Invention of Tradition162 portrayed traditions as being 
pointed efforts at securing political power. Many others have highlighted the ways in which 
states deliberately exploit and manipulate “history.” Smith (1986): "One sign of the formation of 
the nation out of the protonation is the shifting of the center of collective memory from the 
temple and its priesthood to the university and its scholarly community."163 Breisbach (2007): 
"Historians were called on to mediate between the demands for change and the equally strong 
desire to see the continuity of past, present, and future preserved and presented by careful 
scholars with great eloquence, these histories became popular possessions rather than scholarly 
curiosa."164 Levi-Strauss (2013): "In our own societies, history has replaced mythology and 
fulfills the same function.”165 Hobsbawm (1983) writes about states inventing traditions to 
buttress failing legitimacy.166  
Manipulation of collective memory is indelibly intertwined with manipulating identities. 
Macintyre claims "the possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity 
coincide." Hobsbawm (1972): “To be a member of any human community is to situate oneself 
with regard to one's past, if only by rejecting it."167 Bellah (1985): "communities... have a 
history-in an important sense are constituted by their past- and for this reason we can speak of a 
real community as a 'community of memory,' one that does not forget its past. In order not to 
forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative."168 
Walerstein (1991): "the temporal dimension of pastness is central and inherent in the concept of 
peoplehood."169  Zerubavel writes, "being social presupposes the ability to experience events that 
happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we joined them as if they 
were part of our own past."170  
Olick (2009) makes two claims about collective memory: 1) “Collective remembering is a highly 
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complex process, involving numerous different people, practices, materials, and themes”, and, 2) 
“the concept of collective memory often encourages us to see memory either as the authentic 
residue of the past or as an entirely malleable construction in the present. “Traditionalist” 
models, for instance, assimilate collective memory to heritage, patrimony, national character, and 
the like, and view collective memory as a bedrock for the continuity of identities. They often ask 
how collective memory shapes or constrains contemporary action. On the other hand, 
“Presentist” models assimilate collective memory to manipulation and deception, a mere tool in 
the arsenal of power. They ask how contemporary interests shape what images of the past are 
deployed in contemporary contexts and see memory as highly variable.”171 
“Collective memory offers accounts of emotionally salient events and persons in the past that 
have particular relevance to how a group understands itself, its present, and, future challenges. 
These accounts are not simply the details about the past.”172 A central feature is the moral, 
political and social lessons they communicate. A starting point for some authors is the difference 
between what is often referred to as history, which is about facts, specific events and truth (as 
positivists use the term) {…} A more subjective understanding of the past is located in popular 
narratives and memories as experienced through the eyes and mind of participants and their 
descendants.”173 Both historical accounts and collective memory are built around plausible 
explanations and accounts about the past found in the narratives offered in school texts, 
commemorative events, sacred places and symbols. Because many people can remember large-
scale events there will be differing accounts in what is remembered. There will always be 
individuals and groups trying to re-write and manipulate memories towards various objectives. 
Three central mechanisms in the development, reinforcement and transmission of collective 
memories: narratives, ritual enactments, and symbolic landscapes. Specific rituals and events 
meant to evoke powerful emotions towards articulating particular narratives and stories about the 
past so as to attribute motives and meanings to key actors. Symbolic landscapes, specific 
physical objects and sites are used convey powerful messages of inclusivity/exclusivity that can 
heighten or diminish tensions in an effort induce or retard the likelihood of conflict. 
Collective memory contains stored emotions which populational lobbyist manipulate towards 
organizing group mobilization through linking past experiences to present-day injustices. 
Transformation of stored emotions into collective action involves making concrete connections 
between memories and life in the future so as to determine action to be taken in present. 
Collective memory when activated is used to give the society a sense of who they are and where 
they belong, or, a sense of who they aren’t and who doesn’t belong. It is unlikely that there is 
only one simple pattern of linkage. Though it is possible (through analysis of specific situations) 
to discover some of the mechanisms and their dynamics to gain an understanding of general 
patterns. 
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A discussion of political manipulation of any kind (emotions, identity and collective memory) 
demands a discussion of power.  
 
5. Power 
Here power is understood to be the forces that create movement and change, therefore the 
settings in which power can be analyzed stretch from office politics to the mechanisms that drive 
celestial motion. Individuals seek out power to create movement and change in their lives, and/or 
the society that they live in. This ranges from inciting a civil rights movement to climbing the 
corporate ladder. Operationalization of power comes in many different sizes and shapes. The 
analytical nexus in which power is placed for inspection will determine the setting in which it is 
being observed (i.e. rise of civil rights movement versus rise of corporate C.E.O.) 
 
“Different types of power interact with other key variables in different ways and we need to draw 
conceptual distinctions in order to isolate these divergent effects. Inferences arrived at in one 
study are not necessarily transferable to another if the meaning and type of power is not 
constant.”174 
 
Peterson (2012) claims “dimensions of power most relevant for distinction between different 
types of power depends on the interests and concerns that motivate us to the study of power in 
the first place. This also means that there is no set number of types of power and that different 
typologies are not necessarily in direct competition with one another.”175 Barnett and Duvall 
(2004) called for an analysis of “the normative structures and discourses that generate 
differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals.”176 
Drawing on Habbermas’s frame of persuasion Mattern (2005) argues that attraction is “an 
interpretation that won out over many other possible interpretations through a communicative 
process.”177 O’Loughlin and Roselle (2014) apply strategic narratives (defined as “a 
communicative tool through which political actors attempt to give determined meaning to past, 
present, and future in order to achieve political objectives”) to their analysis of power.178 
Relevant here are soft, hard, and ideational power. 179  
 
Soft and Hard Power 
Nye (2004) claims soft power (as opposed to hard power) is the “ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”180 Traditionally, hard power is linked to 
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military means and soft power to political maneuvering, cultural diplomacy, mass media, higher 
education etc. Also included is economic leveraging, which is linked to both soft and hard 
power.181,182 Here hard power is linked to forcible expansion and soft power amenable 
expansion. Mattern (2005)183 drew a similar distinction: cooptation versus coercion. Mechanisms 
of hard power (generally) are conceived as resources to be counted (does a country have the 
military resources to forcibly expand?). While soft power is considered a relationship. Here soft 
power keeps the above listed mechanisms (political maneuvering, cultural diplomacy, mass 
media, higher education etc.), though they take a back seat to collective identity. 
 
Hard power remains contingent on having the necessary resources to forcibly expand. While soft 
power is conceptualized as a “relational phenomenon dependent on the specific encounter of 
people with their values and preferences in their historical context.”184 A relationship that grants 
“the ability to create consensus around shared meanings.”185 Power as a relationship necessitates 
that analysts pay attention to audience reception and narrative interpretation. It is necessary to 
understand the “expectations that may feed into decision-making and the expression of support 
for certain courses of action.”186 Felklyunia (2016) asks “should we be concerned only with 
interpretations of a narrative by a small group of decision-makers? What happens when a 
projected narrative is rejected by those in power but accepted by those groups that do not have 
immediate access to the locus of decision making? Can we assess the weight and the dynamics of 
soft power in a relationship between two or more states?”187 
 
Soft power was originally operationalized through shaping the interests and preferences of 
audiences through attraction. “Soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain 
preferred outcomes.”188 Important here is understanding how an actor can influence another 
actor’s understanding of their interests, as well as the transformative tradition of social 
constructivism in which interests are not static and permanent, rather than being formed by 
evolving socially constructed identities that transform through interaction with others. Also 
important are the pressures of both internal and external changes.189 Feklyunina (2016) claims 
that acceptance of the above brings the expectation that “B’s interpretation of their interests is 
likely to be more compatible with actor A’s interests if there is a degree of compatibility between 
their socially constructed identities. In other words, soft power is significantly more likely to be 
present in a relationship between actors who broadly see themselves as part of the same socially 
constructed reality, which would entail compatible interpretations of their identities, compatible 
understandings of their interests and compatible definitions of the situation.”190 
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The relationship between soft power and identity is not a novel suggestion.191,192 Nye (2011) 
advises “we like those who are similar to us.”193 Reich and Lebow (2014)194 stress the necessity 
of shared identities for an actor to be likely to convince another actor to cooperate. Identity is 
also an underlying factor in O’Louglin’s (2014) conceptualization of soft power as strategic 
narratives, which are broken down into three (intertwined and reciprocally reinforcing) narrative 
echelons: “International System Narratives” (describe the structure of the world), “National 
Narratives” (project the stories of individual states) and “Issue Narratives” (provide 
interpretations of various problems and suggest possible solutions).  Though there is no identity 
narrative included in the frame, therefore this frame has no ability to account for collective 
identities that transcend nation state borders (border transcendent identities) such as ideological 
(communism or religious) or regional (i.e. European) identities. Feklyuina (2016) argues that if 
“target audiences” accept an identity narrative they will be more likely to accept “issue 
narratives.” On the other hand, if a “target audience” rejects an identity narrative it becomes 
“significantly more difficult for an international actor to promote their interpretation of a 
particular issue. Thus, the projection and acceptance of collective identity narratives can be seen 
as an important (albeit not the only) mechanism of soft power through which actor B can 
reinterpret their interests as more compatible or even common with those of actor A.” 195   This 
conception also pertains to other forms of non-coercive power (i.e. social power196 and 
normative power.)197 
The implication here (in opposition to Nye’s conception of soft power) is that “an actor cannot 
choose to resort to soft power in any particular moment. Rather soft power is always at work, 
shaping the psychological milieu of the relationship--increasing, decreasing or even disappearing 
together with the evolution of identities and interests. Moreover, because it is working at the 
level of identities and interests, we cannot attribute any individual foreign policy decision of the 
second actor to the exercise of soft power by the first actor. While a wide range of factors can 
affect individual foreign policy choices, soft power works by making some decisions more likely 
than others. At the same time, any action or non-action of the first actor, including their use of 
military or economic resources that are traditionally associated with hard power, can be 
interpreted by the second actor as either reinforcing or undermining the narrative of collective 
identity and common interests. For example, while Nye would describe a promise of economic 
gain as ‘inducement’ and thus as an exercise of hard power, one can argue that this promise can 
also be interpreted by the second actor as confirming their collective identity.”198  
Operationalization of soft power becomes complex when conceptualized as being driven by 
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identity narratives.199 Often, through the projection of constructed identity narratives, states are 
induced to adopt policies that they otherwise would not have implemented. It is impossible for 
any actor to completely control a constructed Identity narrative. Every Identity narrative will 
contend with competing narratives, as well as opposing perceptions as to what their own 
narrative stands for.200,201 The impossibility of any single actor owning any narrative makes the 
debate on agency murky. Duvall (2005) frames power as flowing through “interactions of 
specific actors,” and, through “social relations of constitution.” In his framing, there is structural 
power (compulsory and institutional power), which can be pinned to specific actors and there is 
also productive power, which is dispersed through the “constitutive social processes that are not 
controlled by specific actors”.202 Productive power can be equated with agency, which is 
necessary in producing and reinforcing the institutions through which structural power flows. 
Duvall and Barnett (2005) use as an example a conception in which the US is an “imperial center 
(…) structurally constituted and discursively produced through a complex of imperial relations 
that are not themselves fully under the control of the US state as actor”.203 Guzzini (2013) 
recognizes the significance of structures while assigning primary analytical focus to agency.204 
This interpretation is contemporary with social constructivist and the reciprocal formation of 
agents and structures.205 Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) claim that the evolution of identities is 
“the result of open-ended processes that give space to actors pursuing their specific political 
projects.”206 
“Far from a linear process, it is a messy combination of intended and unintended consequences. 
On the one hand, governments cannot monopolize identity narratives and their own 
understandings of ‘Self’ and ‘we’ are shaped by existing cultural structures that were formed 
and evolved in specific historical circumstances. On the other hand, the process of collective 
identity construction and transformation, although often facilitated by the conscious efforts of 
cultural or political elites, is not dependent on their top-down instrumental efforts.”207  
Identity narratives are projected (by Populational lobbyist) towards being accepted by an 
audience (holding two sub-audiences: the public and elites). If accepted the purveyor will 
“benefit from a more favorable psychological milieu.”208 The agency at play has two spheres of 
operation: (1) supply side (purveyor of the identity narrative), and, (2) the demand side 
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(audience). “It is important to locate and track the agents {...} who have the capacity to affect our 
interests, as well as those of others.”209 Tracking agency on the on the supply side can help us 
understand to what extent Populational lobbyist are moving society away from the societal best 
interest and towards the lobbyists best interest. 
On the demand side the expectation is a lack of identity homogeneity with overlapping audiences 
that express differing identity narratives.210 A non-homogenous audience results in varying 
understanding of projected identities, which affect reception and internalization of said narrative. 
Such variations of interpretation are critical in deconstructing the mechanisms of soft power, and 
hence the mechanism of amenable territorial expansion. An audience has two sub-audiences of 
any projected narrative (Government and Public). This means that there can be situation when 
the government accepts a particular narrative, while the public rejects it, or, vice versa. The 
outcome of this situation is dependent on the concept of “weight” as a key dimension of power, 
which is linked to how soft power and collective identity interact. 
The weight of an actor’s power here is understood as the likelihood that B’s behavior is or could 
be affected by A.211 The expectation is that an actor will have greater ability to leverage soft 
power “if its projected definition of ‘we’, as articulated in the official discourse and signaled in 
practice (intentionally or unintentionally), is accepted in all major identity discourses of state B. 
If the definition of ‘we’ is rejected in some of the major discourses, an ensuing domestic 
contestation is likely to severely limit A’s soft power.”212 Soft power is in constant flux and 
dependent on the amount in which the intended audience accepts said identity narrative. 
Ideational Power  
If soft and hard power is the agency with which states accomplish territorial expansion. What is 
the agency through which states create soft and hard power? Classically, agency of hard power is 
viewed as the ability to amass the physical means and resources to force another actor do what 
they are told. While the agency of soft power rests in being able to market an acceptable border 
transcendent identity to another so as convince them to want to do what they are being told.  If 
one digs deeper it becomes clear that agency (especially when talking about soft power, and to a 
lesser extent hard power) is created by ideational power. According to Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2015)213 ideational power is the “capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to 
influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements. 
This may occur directly through persuasion or imposition, or, indirectly by influencing the 
ideational context that defines the range of possibilities of others {…} ideational power connects 
with compulsory, structural and institutional forms of power {while retaining} enough 
distinctiveness to constitute a form of power in its own right.”214 
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Ideational Power allows meaning to be imprinted on peoples’ experiences of the world.215 It 
facilitates the ability to handle a complex informational nexus, interpret problems and suggest 
potential solutions.216 Ideational power allows for the construction of discourses that justify (in 
cognitive and normative terms) certain policies and programs over others. Ideational accounting 
of actions is “a result of people interpreting their world through certain ideational elements”217 
(i.e. discourse, practices, symbols, myths, narratives, collective memories, stories, frames, 
norms, grammar, models and identities).218  Ideational power is different from other types of 
power: (1) it is built on a concept of power, “which is exerted through the constitution of 
intersubjective meaning structures that agents both draw on to give meaning to their material and 
social circumstances and battle over to affect what ideas and discourses are deemed viable”,219 
(2) Is conceived as top down and bottom up process,220 and, (3) “conceptualized in agency-
oriented terms {…focusing} on the ways that actors, through the use of ideational elements, seek 
to influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs.”221 In this conception actors 
leveraging ideational power are best described as “ideational leaders” 222 or as members of 
advocacy groups, epistemic communities223 and/or social movements.224 (I.e. Populational 
lobbyist) 
The control of information and ideas is the agency through which ideational power is leveraged 
towards nursing favorable perceptions among the listening audience. Focusing on agency does 
not ignore the importance of structures. Populational lobbyists rely on current ideational 
structures that are constantly evolving through the agent’s use in advancing, securing and 
communicating their ideas. Populational lobbyists manufacture ideational structures by pursuing 
a particular set of ideological ideas.225 Ideational power comes in three types. 
Power Through Ideas 
Power through ideas is the “capacity of actors to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their 
views of what to think and do through the use of ideational elements.”  Power through ideas is 
not coercive or threatening and not leveraged based on rank, position or material resources rather 
than being leveraged through oration and reason.226 Ideational power is a function of the amount 
of “cognitive and normative arguments that can be mustered in support” of.227 Cognitive 
discourse to be successful should describe the problem and propose actions to alleviate said 
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problem.228,229,230 On the other hand, normative discourse is aimed at establishing the validity of 
an argument as its value. As such, the point is to petition the customs and values of the audience. 
The weight of ideational power will be contingent on the degree that the marketed idea is 
accepted as appropriate.231 
“success of any elite group engaged in persuasion is often less related to their analytic skills 
than to the broad mass intuitions of the moment.”232  
This is the power of the institution creating internalized expectations of how things should be, 
how things work (i.e. how the economy works). Thus setting (an almost intrinsic) limitation on 
what kinds of policies the populational lobbyist can imagine, and, what kind of policies the 
audience can accept.233 This conception of agency and ideational power differs from structural 
and socialization theories as it allows the population to stand separate from, while still critically 
engaging with the ideas and narratives held. Ideas here are conceived not as a resource or 
immovable framework, rather than a guide existing between the minds of the audience and the 
projected narrative. This in-between placement of ideas allows the audience to (at times) buck 
the system and come together in deliberation towards collective action towards changing the 
status quo.234 Which is why the purveying populational lobbyist is always working towards 
audience internalization of his message.   
Power over Ideas  
There are three groups from which power over ideas emanate. 
Elitist 
Are those who control the mechanisms of “traditional power” (i.e. coercive, structural and/or 
institutional) and thus strong enough to force their narratives. As a result, elitists have the luxury 
to (through the media and education system) to disseminate their narratives to the exclusion of 
the rest.  Here ideational power is (in conjunction with other types of power) leveraged to keep 
the status quo in place. Here ideational power flows top down. 
 
Populist  
Are the people who are not in power, who (generally) do not have access to “traditional power” 
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and therefore not strong enough to force their narrative. A signifying method of this group is 
tactically shaming towards conforming the viewpoints and customs of others.235 Human rights 
and advocacy groups are a good example of this.236 Here Ideational power flows bottom up. 
Obstinates 
Obstinates are found in both elitist and populist groups. They are players who have the facility to 
resist entertaining the possibility of considering different viewpoints. Commonly this 
unwillingness to consider other views results from arguments that rely on complex “technical” or 
“scientific” jargon. This language barrier enables players to ignore alternate methods as 
untenable or not qualified for discussion. Such domineering views constrain what moves are 
considered viable and which outcomes appropriate. Thus, limiting which policies have a 
modicum of possible success and which policies dead on arrival.237 
Financial regulation is a good example where power over ideas has been leveraged by obstinate 
elitist in an effort to keep the neo-liberal status quo.238 “Acceptable” policies concerning 
financial regulation have been cemented (through “elite peer recognition”) into a nexus that 
underrepresents market skeptic ideas and over-represents ideas aligned with private sector 
predilections.239 The ability to affect financial regulation has basically become inaccessible “for 
policy entrepreneurs with alternative views.” As a result of the 2008 crisis there has been some 
softening of the neo-liberal monopoly over financial regulation. Though, essentially, the Game 
has remained the same (i.e. obstinate elitists still have the power to discount alternative 
conceptions of financial regulations).240 
Power over ideas is generally more involved in elitist fending off pressures aimed at changing 
the status quo. Though, it also plays a part in changing the system in an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary way. 
 Power in Ideas 
Power through and over ideas concern the direct leveraging of ideas to affect the other players, 
while power in ideas “is about the background ideational processes – constituted by systems of 
knowledge, discursive practices and institutional setups – that in important ways affect which 
ideas enjoy authority at the expense of others.”241 Here the connection is to historical structures 
producing meaning and a population’s self-understanding, identity and perceived interests.242 
Power in ideas is not focused on the interaction of ideas and Populational lobbyist. Rather the 
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concern is “the deeper-level ideational and institutional structures that actors draw upon and 
relate their ideas to in order for them to gain recognition among elites and in the mass public.”243 
The point here is the way in which ideas become accepted as the natural order of things, the way 
in which they come to structure peoples’ thoughts on the construction of society. Though, these 
“natural” ideas should not be considered as hard and immovable structures. Rather should be 
seen as malleable, as continuously evolving. Changing realities ensure slow and incremental 
evolution of ideas. Power in ideas constrains the ways in which elites are able to justify policies 
to the audience, as well as the range of options that they themselves see as normatively 
acceptable.244 Power in ideas is in line with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and, Foucault’s 
argument that individuals are constituted as objects within a system of thought, which 
necessarily implies a form of subjectification to a particular way of being.245 
Coercive and structural power is leveraged in a visible way. The affected are aware of being 
dominated. On the other hand, players affected by power in ideas, many times, are not aware.  
Therefore, it can be argued that power through ideas is stronger than most other forms of power, 
for power through ideas (ideational structures) constrain not just what actors do but also what 
they think and say. Bourdieu (1994)246 claims that the doxa or vision of the world of élites who 
dominate the state creates the ‘habitus’ that conditions people to see the world in the way they 
(the dominant) choose. 
Historical institutionalists use power through ideas when analyzing the institutionalization of 
ideas embedded in the laws that that come to regulate a society, or, in the way in which 
ideational permanence becomes the defining mechanism behind the trajectory of post crisis 
institutional responses.247 Post Maastricht treaty regulation of the Euro provides a good example.  
Here neoliberal ideas of currency governance became self-reinforcing and ensured more neo-
liberal fixes to forthcoming problems.  
Power Conclusion  
In this analysis, soft and hard power is the agency through which territorial expansion is enacted. 
Hard power is responsible for forcible expansion, while soft power responsible for amenable 
expansion. Soft power is conceived as the ability to convince others to accept the offered 
collective identity being marketed by the expanding power. The more soft power an expander 
can muster translates into a higher likelihood that they will be able to convince the populations 
being expanded upon to amenably join the union. When there is a lack of soft power the 
expander must rely on hard power, and forcibly expand. Both hard and soft power are leveraged 
through the perceived relationship of expander and populations being expanded upon. Therefore, 
controlling ideas that frame these perceptions are of the utmost importance. It is through 
ideational power that these ideas are controlled and molded.  
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The conclusion that should be taken away is that Soft and hard power are the agency through 
which territorial expansion is achieved, and, it is Ideational power that is the agency through 
which soft and hard power are leveraged. 
All instances of political and social manipulation need to be legitimized. Legitimization must be 
framed. Below we discuss how legitimacy is framed.  
6. Framing Legitimacy 
All instances of political and social manipulation necessitate a legitimacy frame. Framing is the 
process in which populational lobbyist employ “reality construction”248 by underscoring certain 
information towards specific ends (i.e. winning an election in a media-rich environment of 
democratic competition,249animating popular support for a social movement,250 or legitimating 
postcolonial rule).251 It is a process of making claims about the nature of reality towards 
influencing an audience. “Frames” have behavioral implications, and, are not necessarily decided 
by present material factors or necessarily a product of the societal will. Framing can help identify 
underlying narratives used by populational lobbyist to foster an accepted legitimacy, and to then 
understand the presentation of said narratives and offered solutions. Here we follow the 
conception advanced by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies-Hamburg who 
hypothesized “that the addressees of legitimation discourses extend beyond domestic audiences 
to the international sphere {…} a conceptualization of the suggested links between legitimation 
and repression, focusing on discursive justifications and their audiences”, and that the “framing 
of repression {power consolidation} can have legitimizing or delegitimizing and deterrent or 
mobilizing effects, depending on the target audience.” “Such justifications may be inspired by 
globalized discourses and targeted at international audiences beyond the domestic public.”  252  
 
When framing Watson (2012) recommends aiming “for the higher level of abstraction within 
framing theory”253 towards what Snow and Benford (2000) call master frames, which are 
“flexible and open to extension and the inclusion of more specific issue frames.”254 One 
conception of master frames:  (1) consolidation of power through  “conservative” “frames that 
focus on stability and security, and, (2) consolidation of power sold as being “progress.”255 
Another conception is that legitimizing frames have six “interlinked but functionally different 
mechanisms”: “(1) ideology, (2) foundational myth, (3) personalism, (4) international 
engagement, (5) procedural mechanisms, and (6) past performance.” Though, the theory/practice 
dichotomy demands that real world cases not be so clear-cut, rather than “highly complex 
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variations, transitional forms and combinations of these pure types.”256  
 
Mirjam (2017) asks “how relevant the international audience is relative to domestic audiences,” 
and “what kind of discourse is likely to resonate with them, what narratives are they most likely 
to accept?”257 Bank (2004) sees the necessity of identifying the different strategies used when the 
target audience is the elite versus being the larger population.258 Though we should not make the 
mistake of assuming that “elites always use the frames that are most likely to resonate, as 
framing literature shows that overly extreme or otherwise unsuitable frames are often used. 
However, there is reason to believe that elites choose their rhetoric strategically.”259 
 
We add two types of the above frame conceptions: (1) frames of legitimacy, and, (2) facades of 
legitimacy. The difference between them; frames of legitimacy are constructed on concrete 
events, while the façade on non-concrete events (concrete vs. non-concrete events will be 
discussed later in the text). The type of legitimacy frame used is vital in understanding the 
“means of rule” as well as “durability” of rule.260,261 Another important aspect of the legitimacy 
frame is whether it is self-contained or non-self-contained (self-contained vs. non-self-contained 
frames will be discussed in depth later). Understanding what kind of legitimacy frame is being 
deployed provides two pieces of valuable information: (1) Projected hope confidence movement, 
and, (2) susceptibility to “external pressure.”    
 
The determination of whether a frame will induce positive or negative movement in relation to 
hope confidence (hope confidence will be discussed in depth later in the text) is directly related 
to whether the frame has been built around a concrete or non-concrete event, is it a frame or 
façade of legitimacy? Frames built on concrete events are expected to (over time) push towards 
egalitarianism, movement towards egalitarianism breeds positive hope confidence. On the other 
hand, façades of legitimacy are built around non-concrete events and (over time) expected to 
push away from egalitarianism. Movement away from egalitarianism translates into negative 
hope confidence, while movement towards creates positive hope confidence. 
 
 Susceptibility to outside actors (external pressure) is directly related to whether a frame is self-
contained. Self-contained frames allow the implementing lobbyist to produce all the necessary 
components domestically. On the other hand, the non-self-contained frame requires components 
that are not available domestically. The result is that lobbyist legitimizing through non-self-
contained frames must look to external suppliers and markets to compile all the necessary parts. 
While lobbyist legitimizing through self-contained frames do not need external help in design 
and implementation of said legitimacy frame. The translation is that lobbyist needing to negotiate 
with external actors for necessary components will be more susceptible to external influence 
towards domestic change than lobbyist that can manufacture all necessary components 
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domestically.  
 
Also, the self-contained frame is more likely to produce periods of isolation than the non-self-
contained frame, because the lobbyists running a self-contained frame are not compelled to 
engage with the outside world to achieve their goal of domestic power consolidation. As such, 
they are not compelled to worry about external perceptions of methods of domestic power 
consolidation. Therefore, the self-contained frame is (also) more likely to produce hard 
repression than the non-self-contained.  
 
Below are examples of the self vs. non-self-contained frame.  
 
Self-contained: A legitimacy frame based on Japanese ethnicity being deployed in Japan.  
 
Non-Self-contained: Legitimacy frame constructed around international recognition, respect and 
engagement being deployed in any domestic setting. 
 
The self/non-self-contained dichotomy also clues us into who the players are in any situation.  In 
the case of the self-contained frame, since all the necessary pieces can be produced domestically, 
(in the context of domestic power consolidation) all-external players are essentially sidelined 
with very little leverage. As such, when analyzing domestic power consolidation where the 
legitimacy frame is self-contained it is not necessary to account for any external players. On the 
other hand, when analyzing domestic power consolidation gained through implementation of a 
non-self-contained frame it is necessary to account for external players. Ascertaining what is the 
missing frame component leads to identifying potential suppliers of these necessary components. 
Potential suppliers should be considered as the most likely external players.  
 
Many authors have mentioned Ideology as a master frame but none have parsed it into analytical 
typologies. Here ideology as a master frame is parsed into two types: 1) Ideological legitimacy 
frame, and, 2) Ideological feedback loop. These parsed types produce different hope confidence 
projections.  The difference between the two is that the former uses an ideology to logically 
bring an argument to a specific conclusion, while the later does not have any logical argument 
leading to the conclusion, rather than cyclically proving itself as true.  An example of an 
ideological legitimacy frame might be a communist party legitimizing their rule through the 
implementing the tenants of communism. The party does not legitimize itself; rather it is 
legitimized through their implementation of the communist ideology into the societal structure. 
Here the party can lose this legitimacy if they are perceived to stray too far from the populational 
perception of what communism is.  On the other hand, an ideological feedback loop legitimizes 
the ruling party cyclically with tenants that are intrinsically part of the ruling party. The tenants 
involved in the feedback loop are claimed valid because they are just intrinsically valid not 
because of an argument that leads to their validity. Rule based on divine bloodline is an example 
of a feedback loop. Another example is rule based on a leader being the pinnacled reflection of 
what a leader is supposed to be, therefore he should be leader because he intrinsically is the 
pinnacle of leadership. Characteristic of the feedback loop is that the point that proves the 
legitimacy of the ruler is intrinsic in the leader or party, and that this intrinsic quality is what 
proves that they should be in charge.  
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An ideological legitimacy frame has the potential exploit both concrete and non-concrete events 
and therefore has the potential to the whole spectrum of hope confidence movement (negative, 
positive and neutral). While ideological feedback loops depend on the non-concrete event and 
produce negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by a hard transmission of the feedback 
loop.  
 
While writing about process of legitimization framed by neo-liberal power consolidation and 
expansion into the post-Soviet space Hopf (2002) differentiated between power consolidations 
achieved through legitimization versus naturalization.262 According to Linz (1978) legitimization 
comes about through the belief that the current structure (despite shortcomings and failures) is 
favorable to “any others that might be established.”  This logic dictates that legitimization cannot 
happen if the audience cannot conceive of any other system variations being established. “If 
alternatives are unthinkable due to a process of naturalization, then legitimization cannot 
occur.”263 Max Weber also captures this point; “people may submit (to authority) from {...} 
helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative”264 This is circuitously claimed by 
Prezworski when he says that sitting regimes can only lose legitimacy if there is a suitable 
substitute. Also, he claims that when there is not an alternative “nothing much” happens towards 
threatening the sitting status quo. Theorist critical of democracy claim that the “absence of an 
alternative may substitute for legitimization in stabilizing a political order.”265 This substitution 
is what Hopf calls “normalization.” Societal structures that are de facto accepted as legitimate 
due to the lack of any options perceived as being possible.  Whether a particular form of 
hegemony is legitimized or naturalized is a function of deliberation in which a particular 
variation was consensually chosen over other candidates. Naturalization is when there is no 
decision to be made due to a lack of choices. Naturalization is a social process by which 
politically contestable outcomes, policies, or practices come to be regarded as given.266,267,268 In 
Hopf’s analysis both legitimization and normalization buttress the current societal structure and 
lower the likelihood of collective action towards replacing the status quo. Here, in addition to 
Hopf’s conception, the view is that normalizing buttresses against a negative hope confidence 
slide, while, on the other hand, legitimizing is the fuel pushing positive hope confidence 
movement.  
In Hopf’s research one outcome of normalization is the post-Soviet transition toward liberal 
market capitalism. He asked, “How this (liberal market capitalist) alternative became the 
presumptive future? The answer lies not only in each country’s particular context, but also in 
their shared past. This common history is the socialist alternative represented by the Soviet 
Union. But this potential alternative literally collapsed. There is no alternative because the 
alternative has been delegitimized, albeit to varying degrees in each post-Soviet state {…} Social 
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theorists would suggest that alternatives to the present are delegitimized through the operation of 
the power of present realities. So, at the macro level, economic and political power is so arranged 
as to render consideration of alternative arrangements fanciful. And at the micro level, the 
individual would never consider raising any alternative, as he or she never hears it being treated 
seriously, and so it is not a natural part of conversation. In this way naturalization operates as a 
social structure that impedes public deliberation”269  
 
Hopf conceptualized a set of questions (to which he put to focus groups in Ukraine, Estonia and 
Uzbekistan) that could indicate likelihood that any particular population would be neutral, 
positive or negatively inclined towards the idea of transitioning to market capitalism. The 
answers to the questions indicate whether a group is legitimizing/delegitimizing, or, 
naturalizing/denaturalizing the societal structure. Hopf assigned a (–) to answers that show 
delegitimizing or denaturalizing and a (+) to answers that show naturalization or legitimization. 
If the final tabulation of the particular group is a minus then they are negatively inclined towards 
accepting the push towards market capitalism. The farther negative the score the more 
disinclined the population is. The same is true for positive score concerning inclination towards 
the neo liberal structure. 270   
Hopf placed the following questions at the center of his research.  
1. Who won? 
2. What gains? 
3. Who lost? 
4. Who is to blame? 
5. What is the solution? 
Who won? For who is the societal structure making positive gains towards a safer, more secure 
and economically abundant future. Who has benefitted from the societal structure? Who are the 
winners? And, are these winners deserving of the received reward? Cycles of delegitimization 
and/or denaturalization occur when the perception of the citizens is a structure that produces 
mainly unworthy winners. Legitimacy is gained when the population perceives the societal fruit 
going to the worthy.  
Examples of unworthy recipients: Politicians the elite and corporations. It is seldom these 
winners will be perceived as deserving of the spoils. Usually they are seen as unworthy. 
Unworthy winners are delegitimizing/denaturalizing. 
Examples of worthy recipients: Small business and entrepreneurs will rarely be perceived as 
unworthy winners. Deserving winners are legitimizing to the societal structure.  
What Gains? When calculating gains there are two factors material and esoteric, which can be 
equated with the two levels of self-preservation (i.e. physical and societal), also these two levels 
can be understood as being connected to the two levels of hope confidence control (i.e. control 
Economic and Safety and Security, which will be discussed later).  
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Example material answers: money in my pocket or food on the table, access to healthcare and/or 
education.   
Example esoteric answers: independence, sovereignty and personal freedom (i.e. of thought, 
speech and religion etc.), or, cementing local language as the as the state language and/or revival 
of the populations perceived nationhood.271,272 
A perception of gains (esoteric and/or material) is legitimizing. On the other hand, the perception 
of negative movement towards esoteric and/or material gains is delegitimizing/denaturalizing. 
Who lost? Who bears the brunt of any negative movement towards a safer, more secure and 
economic abundant future? And, are they deserving of their fate? Undeserving losers might 
include the working and poor class, families, the elderly, the sick or children etc. Deserving 
losers might include billionaires, politicians and the elite. Deserving losers legitimize the status 
quo, while undeserving losers delegitimizes it.  
Who is to blame? The question of blame “allows us to differentiate between a case of 
legitimization with a rejected alternative and a case of naturalization with no alternative. If a 
process of legitimization were under way, we should record conversations which justify the 
transition vis-a-vis some alternative futures.”273 On the other hand, naturalizing discourse can be 
understood in three ways: (1) inevitability and time; “a process whose pain will end in some 
indeterminate time in the future”, 274 (2) as a “depersonalized structure; there is never any locus 
of responsibility or authority to whom one could appeal.” 275, and, (3) “imagery of a turning 
point, a rubicon, a threshold, an entry into a new world, the crossing of a boundary or frontier. 
This imagery has great power, for it implies there is no turning back — that which was before 
can be no more; it is unthinkable.” 276 
Naturalization is attributing “the misery of the transition to the ‘natural’ properties of the 
unavoidable transition itself, and not to the government”.277 Naturalization is occurring if the 
answer is nobody is to blame. That the downturn is “a temporary condition” that “maybe in fifty 
years these problems will not exist.” Or that “it is inevitable {...} that it is life {...} Time {....}”278 
Legitimization is happening if the answer is that the present congress, parliament, King, Emperor 
or president is to blame. Both (legitimizing and naturalizing) buttress the sitting societal 
structure. Though as noted: Naturalizing is a buttressing against a negative hope confidence 
slide. On the other hand, legitimizing is the fuel pushing positive hope confidence movement. 
Hopf’s conception of transition is similar to hope confidence. His questions and system of +/- 
value assessment can be fitted to tracking hope confidence.   
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All the themes discussed in the above chapter are part of the patchwork that operationalizes the 
frame being developed. Purposefully left out of this section was in depth discussion of how these 
pieces fit to bring the frame together. The next chapters will give will explain the frame, its 
functioning and how the themes above fit together in operationalization.  
 
Chapter 2 Summary: fleshed out were the concepts used in constructing this analytical frame 
through looking at the current literature. Starting with a discussion of the present views on 
expansion. First, forcible expansion followed by voluntary integration. After this the overarching 
components (geopolitics and identity) were discussed. Under geopolitics discussed was regional 
political order, which included a discussion of borderlands and cultural faultline theory. After 
geopolitics, identity was discussed. Following the two overarching components the underlying 
synthesizing components were discussed. These were: Populational Manipulation and 
Populational lobbyists, Emotions-Hope and Fear-, Societal Attention Spaces, Collective 
Memory, Power-Soft and Hard, Power Through Ideas, Power in Ideas, and, Framing Legitimacy. 
 
 
III. Chapter 3 - Analytical Typologies 
The frame being devised has 4 sets of analytical typologies, 2 that pertain to geopolitics 
(geopolitical viability and proximate faultline typologies) and 2 that pertain to identity (identity 
viability and identity typologies). Each of these analytical typologies pertains to different levels 
of the analysis (i.e. regional analysis, analysis of expanding power and analysis of populations 
being expanded upon). We start with the geopolitical viability and then identity viability, 
followed by identity typologies and proximate faultline typologies. Lastly, the chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of hope confidence  
 
A. Geopolitical Viability 
The first assumption taken concerning the likelihood of expansion is that the higher the 
associated costs of the expansive move the lower the likelihood that it will be enacted. This 
means that forcible expansion due to the costs associated with military campaigns and 
occupation) will always be less likely than amenable expansion due to the fact that (forcible 
expansion always has higher associated costs than amenable.  
 
This assumption leads to geopolitical viability, which functions based on expected associated 
costs to be levied on the expanding power by other geopolitical actors and coalitions in response 
to any expansive move. Geopolitical viability is the main determining factor affecting the 
likelihood that a specific expanding power will not enact programs of expansion.  It is based 
solely on the expanding power’s perception of the international arena and relative balance of 
power. Is based on the perception that another geopolitical actor is willing and able to, if not 
outright derail the expansion (amenable or forcible), is able to raise the associated costs 
rendering expansion too expensive to be a viable move.  
 
No Geopolitical Viability: when the expanding power perceives an opposing geopolitical force 
that necessarily has the will and capability to raise associated costs of the expansive move past 
the threshold of a favorable cost benefit analysis, thus rendering the expansive move (in the end) 
a losing one.  
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Geopolitical Viability: when the expanding power’s perception is that the expansion will not 
necessarily engender an opposing geopolitical force with both the will and ability to raise the 
associated costs of the expansive move past the cost analysis threshold. 
 
The difference between the two is the word necessarily. The difference between the two is 97% 
of players. A rational player will not undertake any program if it is perceived to necessarily in 
the end be a losing move that in the end will be more expensive than it’s cost. On the other hand, 
if a program is not necessarily perceived to (in the end) be a losing move, to be in the end be 
more expensive than its cost, then any player to may decide to pursue said program. It is 
assumed that the international arena is running a rational player bell curve (with outlying 1.5% 
irrational actors and 1.5% cornered rational actors) making the expectation that expansion 
without Geopolitical Viability is an available option for 3% of the players, while expansion 
under Geopolitical Viability is an available option to 100% of the players, a difference of 97%. 
Therefore, no Geopolitical Viability results in a very low likelihood of expansion, while 
Geopolitical Viability raises the likelihood from low to a (case by case) possibility (not 
likelihood). Thus, no geopolitical viability means that 97% of the players are expected to not 
expand, with only 3% willing to consider expansion. On the other hand, 100% of the players 
might decide to expand when there is Geopolitical Viability. Therefore, the absence of 
Geopolitical Viability is much more telling than its presence. As such, analytically, geopolitical 
viability is most useful in projecting likelihood of expansion when a state of no geopolitical 
viability is determined. 
 
Geopolitical viability is dealing with an assumption about perceptions. It deals with the analyst’s 
perception of the geopolitical balance of power and the analysts reading of the leaders of the 
expanding powers perception of the balance of power. This fact can, at times, cause incorrect 
assessments. There are two places where the analyst could be wrong: 1) their reading of the 
present balance of power, or, 2) the reading of the perception of leaders of the expanding power 
concerning the balance of power. The assumption is that there is, at any given time, a collective 
assumption concerning the balance of power, and that, this collective assumption most of the 
time is representative of how the real balance of power is. Also, that the perception of the leaders 
of rational actors concerning balance of power will mirror the collective perception. Most of the 
time is not always. The system can be rigged and gamed to induce rational actors to make unwise 
decisions. Saddam believed that he was invading Kuwait under Geopolitical Viability. Saddam 
was a rational player and would not have invaded Kuwait had he believed that it would engender 
such a grand coalition against. Before invasion, Saddam was told by U.S. Ambassador April 
Glaspie “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with 
Kuwait.’ The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had ‘no special 
defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”279 Effectively the U.S. tricked Saddam into 
believing that he had geopolitical viability to invade Kuwait, when in reality he did not.   
 
One key word when dealing with Geopolitical Viability is “might.” Under Geopolitical Viability, 
100% of the actors might, at some time, under certain circumstances undertake expansion. The 
key to gauging the likelihood of expansion when there is geopolitical viability is through 
applying conditional if and when statements. If, and when A happens then actor B will have a 
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higher propensity to take advantage of geopolitical viability and enact programs of territorial 
expansion. Conditional if and when statements vary greatly in regards to the variables that may 
affect the propensity to take advantage of geopolitical viability.  Though, these variables are 
almost always linked a change in the amount of power that is currently being held. This can be a 
change in the domestic power of the ruling party or leader, or, to the position that the country 
occupies in the context of the international/regional balance of power.  This change in power can 
be actual or perceived and it can be a decline or gain. When there is a perception that a move 
towards territorial expansion will increase the power held or mitigate against a loss in power 
there is a rise in propensity of an actor taking advantage of geopolitical viability and enacting 
territorial expansion.  Some examples in regards to the situation in which A has geopolitical 
viability to expand on actor B: 1) If and when huge reserves of oil are found in the territory of B 
the likelihood that A will expand rises. In this case expansion is a function of the gain in power 
that will be achieved from controlling these oil reserves. 2) If and when the ruling party of 
country A is experiencing increased domestic opposition against their rule the propensity that 
they will expand rises. In this second case the expansion is mitigation against a potential decline 
in domestic power. Expansion is used as a distraction against growing opposition and a way to 
vent excess populational energy in non-domestic setting. 3) If and when actor A perceives that 
their rival C is considering expansion into B the propensity that A will expand rises. In this case 
expansion would be at once a move towards a gain of international power and mitigation against 
a decline. A will gain position relative to their rival C and mitigate against the loss of position if 
C were to expand first.  
 
B. Identity Viability 
First will be an explanation of identity viability followed by a discussion of European identity 
viability in the context of further potential European Union expansion.  
 
Identity viability is the main factor in determining whether an expanding power has the option to 
expand amenably. Due to the high associated costs of forcible expansion amenable expansion is 
always the preferable choice. Therefore, if amenable expansion is an option an actor will never 
expand forcibly.   
 
Identity viability is the perceptual identity relationship between the expanding power and 
populations being expanded upon. How does the population being expanded upon view the 
projected identity of the expanding power? And how does the Expanding Power view the 
identity of the populations being expanded upon? 
 
Full Identity Viability-when the identities of joining populations and the expanding power accept 
each other as being culturally close enough that integration can begin without delay; i.e., the 
unification of East and West Germany.280 Full Identity Viability indicates that amenable 
expansion is likely and forcible expansion impossible because one cannot forcibly expand upon a 
population who already wishes to join. 
 
Positive Half Identity Viability-when only the joining population has the perception that the two 
identities are close enough to begin integration without delay. Positive half identity viability 
indicates that expansion is possible but not necessarily probable. Here again, the population in 
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question wants to join the expanding power, which means that any expansion (if it transpires) 
will necessarily be amenable. When positive half identity viability exists, the expanding power 
will defer the decision to an application process designed to identify necessary changes that the 
population being expanded upon must make in order to be considered fully viable. 
 
Negative Half Identity Viability- (the opposite of positive half identity viability) when only the 
expanding has the perception that the two identities are close enough to be integrated. Negative 
Half Identity Viability indicates that the populations being expanded upon do not accept the 
projected identity of the expanding power and do not want to be expanded upon. In this case any 
expansion will necessarily be forcible.   
 
No Identity Viability- when both the Expanding Power and the Populations expanded upon 
agrees on the perception of incompatible identities. No identity viability indicates a low 
likelihood of expansion; here amenable expansion is impossible for one cannot amenably expand 
upon people who do not want to be expanded upon. Therefore, if against likelihood expansion 
does happen it will necessarily be forcible. 
 
Positive half identity viability grants a superior bargaining position to the expanding power. This 
superior position comes from the fact that the expanding power has total control over who is 
accepted and who is rejected. This superior position is showcased during the ascension process. 
Official “candidates” will be accepted according to their ability to implement changes based 
upon stipulations and concessions demanded by the expanding power. EU demands and 
stipulations are delivered in a document called the Acquis, which outlines the shortcomings of 
the candidate and necessary steps to become considered acceptable. Once the applicant meets 
these demands they will be considered as having full identity viability and integration begin 
without delay. Even before official “candidacy” is granted the expanding power has made an 
initial evaluation as to the compatibility of populations wishing to join the Empire (or Union). 
There are two outcomes of this evaluation: Incompatible or Compatible. 
 
Incompatible Identities- perceived as lacking the potential to be sufficiently altered into full 
identity viability. Incompatible identities are known by the expanding power to not be eligible for 
amenable ascension into the Union. 
 
Compatible Identities- if a population is not found to be incompatible then it will be considered 
as de facto compatible. Compatibility does not guarantee acceptance. Compatibility means that 
the population in question is perceived as having the potential (through stipulations and 
concessions) to be altered into full identity viability. All populations that amenably ascend to the 
Empire will have been deemed compatible. But not all compatible populations will ascend. 
Compatibility can be thought of as the period in which the expanding power ascertains whether 
the potential to sufficiently alter the population can be achieved. Demands put to the “compatible 
candidate” are aimed at alteration through ization (i.e. Americanization, Europeanization, 
Sovietization). 
 
There are only two outcomes are that the population is sufficiently altered into full identity 
viability, or, realization that the population cannot be sufficiently altered, and, thus relabeled as 
incompatible. A logical assumption would be that incompatible populations be rejected and only 
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compatible considered official “candidates.” This would be a wrong assumption. Incompatible 
identities are not always rejected outright. Sometimes incompatible populations are accepted into 
official “candidacy” to take advantage of the “candidates” want to join and willing naiveté (e.g., 
Turkey’s EU candidacy). Stipulations put to the incompatible “candidate” are aimed at taking as 
much as possible without tipping off that that the process is a sham and the outcome 
predetermined against. So long as the official incompatible “candidate” believes there is a chance 
of acceptance they will (in hopes of reaching membership status) jump through infinite “last 
hoops.” 
 
European Identity Viability 
Assad (2002) claims that there is an “anxiety expressed by a majority of Western Europeans 
about the presence of Muslim communities and Islamic traditions within the borders of Europe”, 
281 which results in a European structure that is: 1) “ideologically constructed in such a way that 
Muslim immigrants cannot be satisfactorily represented in it.”282 A construction in which they 
(Muslims) “are included within and excluded from Europe at one and the same time in a special 
way”283, and, 2) buttresses  a pervasive perception of Islam as “Europe’s primary alter”, which 
through an “alleged antagonism to Christians {…} represents an early attempt to destroy 
Europe’s civilization from outside”, 284 and, the association of Islam with “a corrupting moral 
environment that Europe must continuously struggle to overcome from within.” These points, 
when taken together, have become “crucial to the formation of European identity.”285 This is 
illustrated by a 1992 survey that indicated that that 2/3 of the French population feared the 
presence of Islam in their society.286  
 
European Union Identity Viability is strongly connected to the Christian/Muslim ratio of any 
specific EU applicant. Since at least the first crusade Europe has been a Christian club and is 
likely (for the foreseeable future) to remain a Christian Union for Christian states. European 
Identity for centuries has been built on being a bastion of Christianity defined by their struggle 
against the Muslim “other.” As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and successful 
partitioning of the Middle East into nation states that could be played against one another, this 
“clash of civilizations” (between European Christendom and the Muslim other), for most of the 
20th century, fell into respite. The anarchist, fascist and Soviet communist replaced Europe’s 
Muslim “other.” Eventually, all these 20th century “others” were defeated287 only to have the 
Muslim regain pre-eminence as the primary European “other.” Savage (2004) affirms this 
writing: “following the fall of the Berlin Wall, an older, revived version of the Muslim threat at 
home and abroad seems to have replaced the Communist threat in Europe.”288 In 1995 this 
revival of the threatening Muslim “other” was made clear by the sitting Secretary General of 
                                                      
281 Asad, Talal. pg. 209, Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam? na, 2002. 
282 Ibid 
283 Ibid 
284 Asad, Talal. (2002), pg. 217 
285 Ibid 
286 Hargreaves, Alec. pg. 119, Immigration, ‘Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France. Routledge, 1995. 
287 Fascism, as of late, is undergoing a revival.  
288 Savage, Timothy M. pg. 46, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing." The Washington 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 25-50. 
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NATO, Willy Claes, when he declared, “since the end of the cold war {…Islam} has emerged as 
perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western security."289 
 
The shape of this Muslim “other” is no longer a state sponsored (Ottoman) army lurking in the 
shadows of the borderlands attempting to snatch Christian European lands. Instead it is rogue 
groups of Muslim “terrorists,” and hordes of refugees. Unlike the Ottomans (a uniformed state 
sanctioned army) the Muslim “terrorist” primary goal is not to conquer European lands rather 
than to attack European culture and way of life. This new “Muslim invasion” is spread among 
the faceless mass of flooding refugees who are considered to be much more insidious and 
dangerous than an invading uniformed army. For an occupying army tends to strengthen the 
resolve and makeup of the occupied culture, make it more robust, as it is used as a means of 
resistance against the invading army. On the other hand, an “invasion” of Muslim refugees is 
perceived as diluting and bastardizing (rather than strengthening) European Christian culture. An 
invading army is intent on occupation while this new invasion is intent on changing the 
fundamental makeup of European culture and society, and most frightening, voting 
demographics. The threat is not an occupying force that can be gloriously expelled. Rather it is 
demographic shifts in the citizenry and fundamental changes in what it means to be German or 
French - to be European.290   
 
Muslims lost their place as the primary European “alter” for about two generations (from the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire (1914) –to- (1989) the end of the Soviet Union). This is not 
enough time for a society to lose centuries of conditioning towards viewing a certain group as the 
threatening “other.” For over 1500 years’ European Identity was created through the lens of 
opposition to the threatening Muslim “other.” A sentiment deeply ingrained into the European 
identity, collective memory, psyche and narratives. It is deeply ingrained in EU governmental 
structures; it is systemic. Individual mindsets are quicker and easier to change than the collective 
mindset or underlying bias ingrained into the societal structure. Therefore, individual 
protestations of European openness towards welcoming of Muslims are insignificant and hold 
little attachment to what the collective mindset, memory, identity, psyche, and narratives have 
programmed into societal system and structure.  It is this reason that almost immediately after the 
Soviet “other” disappeared the Muslim “other” was slid in as a replacement. Thus, making 
Muslims the new primary factor in configuring European Identity and European identity 
viability, and therefore the primary mechanism which determines who is eligible to be fall under 
the fold of EU amenable expansion. Therefore, any country that holds a large population of 
Muslims has low likelihood to be accepted into the EU. Below we apply EU identity viability to 
the Balkans and Turkey 
 
Balkans 
All the countries in the Balkans that have a high Christian/Muslim ratio have either been 
                                                      
289 Pipes, Daniel. pg. 245, Militant Islam Reaches America. WW Norton & Company, 2003. 
290 Shifting voting demographics is the most insidious of situations to be wrought with.  If EU voting demographics 
lean Muslim Europeans will be forced to abandon at least one of their defining tenants. Either they will have to 
eschew being foundationally Christian, or, they will have to eschew being foundationally democratic. For logic 
dictates that they cannot keep both in the face of voting changing demographics connected to a growth of the 
European Muslim population. 
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admitted,291 or, are in ascension talks to be admitted to the EU.292 Balkan countries that are still 
considered “potential candidates” have non-favorable Christian/Muslim ratios (excepting 
Macedonia which while having a positive Christian/Muslim ratio is still 35% Muslim, and, the 
Christian population is Orthodox not classical “European Christian.”)293 Balkan Muslim 
countries have a higher likelihood of gaining EU entry than other Muslim populated countries. 
This because denying these Balkan countries potentially drives them into the arms of factions 
that wish to perpetrate ill on the EU. A problem magnified by the fact that these countries are 
geographically located in what is now considered “Europe.” The thinking is that it will be easier 
to control and regulate these Muslim populations if they are under EU jurisdiction (keep your 
friends close but your enemies closer). Second, accepting these Muslims would help placate the 
political correctness that societies need, belief that they are not racist and bigoted, and, to 
convince the rest of the world the same. Being openly labeled as racist would certainly hurt the 
EU brand. This belief of a non-bigoted discriminatory EU is a necessary lie that is as much as a 
part of the modern European Identity as is the truth of Europe not being for predominantly 
Muslim populations. Therefore, the EU may ultimately accept these Balkan Muslims, but only 
after dragging out the process as long as possible. Optimally the EU would like keep these 
Balkan Muslims countries in a perpetual state of candidacy: a state where they are not accepted 
but still kept under an official and agreed upon EU watchful eye.  
 
Turkey  
Turkey is an example of an incompatible population being accepted as an “official candidate” to 
be taken advantage of. The EU has never had any intention of accepting Turkey - only of taking 
advantage of Turkish naiveté. 
 
Originally, Turkish integration was born of European fears of the Soviet Union. Turkey is the 
gateway to the backdoor of Europe. This gateway falling under “Red” influence would have 
meant the Soviets expanding to European contiguity. Protection against this possibility was 
Turkish/European integration. Shortly after WWII this integration began: 1949 Turkey became a 
member of the Council of Europe, 1961 they joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and in 1973 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). Europe and Turkey had very different ideas about the nature of their 
relationship during the Cold War. For Europe, Turkish integration was driven by fear of the 
Soviets.  It was nothing more than a tactical security driven alliance. While the Turks understood 
the tactical aspect behind the alliance, they mistook the membership opportunities and economic 
integration as Europe accepting the Turkish Identity as being European. The Turks wishfully 
believed protestations that Europe and Islam are compatible and hence have willfully been 
played by the Europeans. Turkey is still being strung along in an integration process that has, 
since the beginning been predetermined against them. Presently, the EU is using hopes of 
ascension to pressure Turkey into stopping the flow of refugees. Though Erdogan is pushing the 
Turks to wake up to the fact that the EU has, for decades, been playing and taking advantage of 
Turkish naiveté.  
 
                                                      
291 Greece (1981)- 96% Christian, 4% Muslim; Croatia (2013)- 86% Roman Catholic, 1.4% Muslim; Slovenia 
(2004)- 75% Christian, 2.5% Muslim; Romania (2013)- 92% Christian, .03% Muslim 
292 Serbia- 91% Christian, 2% Muslim; Montenegro- 74% Christian, 19.11% Muslim 
293 Bosnia-51% Muslim, 46% Christian; Albania- 56% Muslim, 16% Christian  
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The likelihood that Turkey will be accepted into the EU is miniscule at best. The main predicting 
factor is that they are a majority Muslim country. 
 
The belief here is that EU expansion has surpassed its apex. What are the populations that the EU 
could potentially expand upon? Disregarding the question of Geopolitical and Identity Viability 
the answer is any population that is contiguous to the current Union; i.e., Turkey, Balkan states 
(that have not yet been integrated), Belorussia and Ukraine. Above has been discussed European 
identity viability, which indicates Turkey is unlikely to be accepted and Balkan countries still 
outside of the EU may be accepted (against identity viability) as a result of geopolitical strategy. 
Turning to Ukraine and Belorussia the observation is two countries, which potentially have 
identity viability but certainly do not have geopolitical viability. The Russians can and will 
commit the necessary resources to stop a move towards European expansion into Ukraine and 
Belorussia. This is evidenced by the fact that the present conflict in Ukraine was inspired by the 
Russians in response to the EU making inroads towards Ukrainian integration.  The indication is 
that the EU has reached the apex of its expansive potential, which indicates a cycle of 
fragmentation is not far off. In fact, fragmentation has already begun; e.g., BREXIT. 
 
Next, we will discuss hope confidence 
C. Hope Confidence 
Hope confidence is centered on populational perception of societal movement. Is the current 
status quo perceived as fostering positive, negative or neutral gains towards a safer, more secure 
and economically abundant future? There are three possible answers to this question; a 
population can have positive hope confidence (i.e. the belief that the current status quo is 
creating positive movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future). 
They can have negative hope confidence (i.e. the belief that the current status quo is creating 
negative movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future), or neutral 
hope confidence (i.e. the belief that (for the moment) the current status quo is able to hold steady 
a “good enough” quality of life).  Each answer has different effects concerning the likelihood of 
an identity shift and whether a population’s collective pressure will be aimed at altering, further 
institutionalizing, or replacing the current status quo, and, if the societal attention space is 
waxing or waning, which is directly correlated the number of populational lobbyist who 
potentially have the clout to catalyze collective action. 
 
Here hope confidence is conceived as envisioned in past quantitative studies concerning hope. In 
measuring hope Zetterberg (2005) suggests asking “Do you think that the children who are 
growing up today will have it better or worse than you have it, when they are your age?”294 
Gallup International surveying for “optimism” and “pessimism asked: “As far as you are 
concerned, do you think that 2018 will be better, worse or the same as 2017?”295 
 
Hope confidence is a natural cycle, forever traveling through peaks and troughs, across a 
landscape of empires and nation states, monarchies, “democracies” and dictatorships. The cycle 
                                                      
294 Cited in Swedberg, Richard. pg. 13, “The Sociological Study of Hope and the Economy: Introductory Remarks." 
Paper presented at the The Hope Studies Conference, 2007.\ 
295 http://www.gallup-international.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017_Happiness_Hope_Economic-
Optimism.pdf Last accessed Jul. 13, 2018 
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is parsed into four levels based on whether perception of societal movement is negative, positive 
or neutral.  The parsing of hope into delineated aspects as a way of understanding how it (hope) 
affects a population’s outlook is not a new idea. The book “The Sociography of an Unemployed 
Community” (2017) talked about unemployed in relation to hope. In the study, the authors 
parsed the unemployed families into three categories “unbroken,” “resigned” and “broken.” The 
conclusion was that the unbroken still had hope, the resigned had no hope, and the broken felt 
hopeless.296 
 
Below is a diagram depicting the hope confidence cycle.  
 
 
 
 
 
Positive hope confidence levels: 
 
Newly Committed populations have positive “hope confidence” held in movement towards 
overturning the status quo. The populational belief is that implementation of a newly chosen 
replacement status quo will usher in a safer, more secure and economically abundant future (as 
compared to the sitting status quo). Here “hope confidence” is not only attached to the want to 
overturn the sitting status quo but also to a conception of a replacement frame. The necessity of 
the newly committed having a concomitant conception of a replacement frame throws back to 
Prezworski’s claim (mentioned above) that sitting regimes can only lose legitimacy if there is a 
suitable substitute. 
 
Committed populations have positive “hope confidence” held in the belief that the newly 
implemented status quo has already implemented and facilitated positive gain, and that further 
institutionalization will continue to create positive societal movement towards a safer, more 
secure and economically abundant future.  
 
                                                      
296 Jahoda, Marie, Paul F Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel. Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community. 
Routledge, 2017. 
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While both (above listed) phases have positive hope confidence they show collective pressure 
towards opposite ends. The collective pressure of the newly committed will be aimed at 
overturning the sitting status quo, while the collective pressure of the committed population will 
be towards institutionalization of the newly created status quo. The collective pressure of the 
newly committed pushes towards coalescence behind a singular replacement status quo, as 
coalescence progresses the intensity behind the hope confidence increases, as intensity increases 
societal attention spaces close until only one potential alternative replacement status quo remains 
as a viable alternative. This singular viable alternative is then elevated as the official replacement 
status quo. On the other hand, the push towards institutionalization coming from the committed 
population will naturally result in a hope confidence slide towards neutral. This because the 
hopeful expectations of a new status quo (pre-implementation) will always fall short of actual 
results. This hope confidence slide towards neutral coincides with a wane in hope confidence 
intensity, which results in the opening of the populational attention spaces.   
 
A closing attention space indicates a minority of populational lobbyist gaining market share at 
the expense of the majority. As the game progresses a decreasing number of lobbyists have 
increasing control of the attention space. These successful lobbyists either absorb or sideline the 
less successful, resulting in only a few lobbyist groups with the enough attention space market 
shares to effectively (through manipulation) catalyze collective action towards societal change. 
On the other hand, an opening attention space sees the major lobbyist groups losing market share 
to up and comers. As market share diversifies into the hands of many players the likelihood of 
societal change lessens. This because, although there are more lobbyist groups manipulating 
none of them have reached the market share threshold necessary to effectively manipulate 
societal change into being.  Before societal change can happen open attention spaces must close 
thus affording a particular lobbyist group enough market share so as to (through manipulation) 
be able to catalyze collective action.  
 
Neutral hope confidence levels (0): 
 
Non-Committed populations have neutral “hope confidence.” The belief is not in the system 
being able to create positive societal movement (towards a safer, more secure and economically 
abundant future) rather than the belief that the system can indefinitely maintain the “good 
enough life.” Neutral hope confidence is the threshold between negative and positive hope 
confidence. There are only two options for the non-committed population: 1) give the sitting 
status quo a chance to adjust the internal policies in way that reignites positive movement 
towards a safer, more secure and economic abundant future, or, 2) accept that the sitting status 
quo cannot, or, will not create this better future and to start to actively searching for a 
replacement status quo.  Populations are inclined towards trying option 1 before moving to 
option 2. Therefore, the collective pressure of neutral hope confidence will be (most of the time) 
aimed at “fixing” or “updating” sitting status quo towards positive movement. The population 
will continue to support option 1 so long as the lobbyist behind the status quo can convince the 
population they are sincerely working towards “fixing” “systemic problems”.  
 
Neutral hope confidence is where the populational lobbyist behind the out of synch system gain 
the most and the whole of the population loses the most. The trick becomes convincing the 
population that the status quo has not been delivering positive societal movement due to design 
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flaws, which can be fixed. When the reality is that that the status quo cannot be “fixed” because 
it is not broken, for the negative societal movement is a function of an out of synch system doing 
exactly what it was designed to do (i.e. create gains for a subpopulation at the expense of the 
whole). Neutral hope confidence is the preferred position for lobbyist behind out of synch 
systems because there is not the necessity of creating actual gain for the whole of the population, 
there is only the necessity of creating the mirage that they are attempting to create solutions, 
attempting to make sincere and meaningful adjustments to “complicated problems.” This ruse is 
made easier by the natural tendency of the population to attempt to “fix” the status quo (option1)  
before abandoning it (option 2). 
 
Neutral hope confidence has more open attention spaces than the newly committed or committed 
populations. 
 
Negative hope confidence levels (-): 
 
Consciously looking populations have negative “hope confidence.” The populational perception 
is that the current status quo is leading a less secure, safe and economically abundant future. The 
population is actively looking for a replacement status quo, which, when found will lead the 
transition to being newly committed. Here there is a lessened percentage of societal pressure 
being exerted on the system due to the fact that most of the pressure is being exerted and diverted 
towards finding and cultivating a replacement status quo. This phase has the most open attention 
spaces.  
 
Hope confidence is designed to gauge the likelihood that a population will undergo an identity 
shift, and/or, that said population will exert their collective pressure towards altering, replacing, 
or further institutionalizing the current status quo.  Also, the cycling of hope confidence is 
connected to the opening and closing of societal attention spaces, which is directly correlated to 
the number of populational lobbyist who potentially have the clout to catalyze collective action. 
Negative hope confidence pushes the spaces open with the search for the replacement while 
positive hope confidence closes the spaces as it galvanizes a rally around a chosen replacement. 
Hope confidence is the mechanism that populational lobbyist leverage to facilitate the 
acquiescence of their vision of the societal structure. Hope confidence has mechanisms of control 
that can be manipulated to slow or speed the transition from one phase to another. These 
mechanisms of control will be discussed later in the text. 
 
Using hope confidence as an analytical variable depends on being able to determine the hope 
confidence level of a given population. The most obvious way of determining whether the 
trajectory of a population’s hope confidence is to ask them. One could use quantitative fieldwork 
involving surveys and interviews, though this method has barriers (it is expensive), limitations 
(often access is restricted by authoritarian governments) and analytical problems (answers can 
never be assumed true to be due to possible coercion and pressure from authoritarian 
governmental and/or cultural societal structures). Here there was never the chance to press up 
against problems of restrictive access or coerced responses, as barrier # 1, money, was the foiling 
hurdle. Considering hope confidence is such a pivotal piece of this research the inability to 
undertake a quantitative study to determine hope confidence trajectory presented a major 
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challenge. As such, there was the need to create an alternative method of determining hope 
confidence.  
 
This alternative method rests on the connection between hope confidence and societal movement 
towards or away from egalitarianism. The connecting assumption is that movement towards 
egalitarianism is related (for the majority of a given population) to a society becoming safer, 
more secure and economically abundant (i.e. positive hope confidence trajectory) while 
movement away from egalitarianism is related (for the majority of a given population) to 
becoming less secure, safe and economically abundant (i.e. negative hope confidence trajectory). 
Therefore, this assumption creates a link between movement towards egalitarianism and a 
positive hope confidence trajectory, and, a connection between movement away from 
egalitarianism and negative hope confidence trajectory. Discussed above was that in synch 
systems created movement towards egalitarianism and out of synch systems away. Also 
discussed was that in synch systems were a product of legitimate manipulation and out of synch 
systems a product of illegitimate manipulation. Therefore, it can be claimed that if a status quo 
was legitimized through illegitimate manipulation then the expectation is that it will show an out 
of synch system, which will lead away from egalitarianism and produce a negative hope 
confidence trajectory. On the other hand, a status quo legitimized by legitimate manipulation will 
show an in-synch system, which will lead movement towards egalitarianism and produce a 
positive hope confidence trajectory.  Therefore, determination of hope confidence trajectory can 
be ascertained through determination of whether the particular status quo was legitimized by 
legitimate or illegitimate manipulation.  On the surface, this is a hard point to discern. For the 
whole point of illegitimate manipulation is to fool the population into believing that it 
(illegitimate manipulation) is in fact legitimate. Here we have devised a way in which to discern 
between the two. Legitimate manipulation is based around and built on concrete events, while 
illegitimate manipulation is based around and built upon non-concrete events.  
 
Below we will discuss concrete vs. non-concrete events and why it is that we assume concrete 
events to be attached to legitimate manipulation and non-concrete attached to illegitimate. 
 
D. Concrete vs. Non-Concrete events 
Events refer to the points that populational lobbyist use to back any specific program of 
populational manipulation. Events (concrete and non-concrete) can be drawn from the past or 
future. Past concrete events are pinpointed factual happenings (i.e. attack on Pearl Harbor or 
Apartheid). Future concrete events are things that, as proven by repetition and precedence, can 
with high confidence be expected to happen (i.e. the next American Presidential Election).  
Non-concrete events are events that, when being intellectually honest, did not happen (i.e. Gulf 
of Tonkin)297 or do not have a likelihood of coming to pass (i.e. Sharia law being implemented in 
                                                      
297 On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox (U.S. destroyer) was conducting a DESOTO patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin 
when it reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats from the 135th Torpedo Squadron. 
This concrete event was used by the Johnson administration to pass resolution 1145, 1964, which authorized the 
president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The attack in question 
had an exact date and time it happened, there were transcripts of radio communications as well as statements by 
witnesses describing the incident.  In reality, the attack in the USS Maddox never happened. It was a hoax, a staged 
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the U.S.), or are linguistically modified rhetorical concepts that definitionally cannot exist (i.e. 
Cold War).298  
The point of the non-concrete event is to convince a population something happened when it did 
not happen, or that something is going to happen when likelihood states the opposite, or 
linguistically manipulate to create a concept that definitionally cannot exist, all of which involve 
intellectually dishonest discourse. Intellectually dishonest discourse, by definition, cannot be an 
“honest conversation” and therefore is precluded from being considered legitimate manipulation. 
Also, the assumption is that the necessity of the intellectually dishonest discourse is a function of 
trying to sell a system that is aimed at gain for a subpopulation at the expense of the whole. For 
if the aim were gain for the whole then the lobbyist in question would engage in “honest 
conversation,” which would preclude the need to create an intellectually dishonest non-concrete 
event.  
The important part is plausible connection between any event and the policies being sold, for 
populations will reject policies that have no plausible connection to an event (concrete or non-
concrete). Specificity found in concrete events limits plausible connection to closely related 
objectives, which limits the availability of the concrete event to lobbyist who are pushing action 
towards closely related objectives. The farther away the objective from the event the less likely 
that said concrete event would be enough to induce sanctioning of collective action. The 
specificity of the concrete event (unlike a non-concrete event) means that it cannot be moved to 
accommodate objectives that are not closely related. This inability to move the concrete event to 
accommodate non-related objectives is an intrinsic resistance to being used in programs of 
illegitimate manipulation.  
 A concrete event: B attacks A. There is plausible connection between the attack and the 
suggestion that A should counter attack or levy sanctions against B. There is even the chance that 
A’s population might be convinced of enough plausible connection to launch an attack or levy 
sanctions against C. For B and C are so close that the potential of them being in cahoots is quite 
high. It may even be possible to convince A’s population the same concerning D. The more steps 
that are taken away from the actual event (attack by B) the more tenuous the connection 
becomes. The more tenuous connection the harder it is to (individually and collectively) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
event that was concocted and created by the Johnson administration to be used as a concrete event so as to spurn 
collective action towards sanctioning the use of offensive US military force in Vietnam. The American public 
learned about it being a hoax through declassified documents (nearly 2 decades after the hoax had served its 
purpose). Why create a hoax concrete event? Because collective action driven by concrete events is the path of least 
resistance in convincing a population to act, Johnson and his Cronies wanted to be able to use offensive military 
force in Vietnam, but using only non-concrete events they could not convince a majority of the citizenry that 
Vietnam was a threat. So, they invented a non-concrete concrete/concrete event, which succeeded in spurning their 
desired collective action. 
298 According to Robert L. Scott the Cold War was a "rhetorical construction…{that} seems strange, even 
inappropriate. Can a war be cold? … It is an oxymoron.” {J. M.  Hogan, cited in Medhurst. (2000), pg. 138) 
Webster defines war as a state of armed conflict. Therefore, a war that is “cold” indicates an absence of armed 
conflict between the belligerents. An absence of armed conflict is a state of non-war. Therefore, if a war is “cold” it 
by definition cannot be a state of war and therefore is a state of non-war.  A “cold war” is a linguistically 
manipulated scenario that definitionally cannot exist. A “cold war” by definition is a state of non-war. But a state of 
non-war is not useful in manipulating collective action towards war like policies. Therefore, the idea of a “cold war” 
was invented so as to be able to manipulate populations in a state non-war to accept war like policies.  
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convince a majority of the population to act.  Populational lobbyist using the attack by B as the 
premise for collective action against C, D, or E will encounter a steadily lowering likelihood of 
success. Populational Lobbyist using the attack by B as the premise towards inducing action 
against F-Z are unlikely to be successful because the space of between reality and plausible 
connection with the attack by B is becoming too large.  
Concrete events (as opposed to non-concrete events) push towards resolution, which mean that 
they are not good candidates to be used in long-term manipulation (long term manipulation is a 
tool of illegitimate manipulation). The problem of concrete events pushing towards resolution for 
programs of illegitimate manipulation is that is unlikely that one will be able to convince a 
population to continue collectively acting after the resolution of the event that was the premise of 
the collective action in the first place. It is this reason that why populational lobbyist looking to 
implement out of synch systems prefer not to use specific wars as the locomotion behind 
collective action.  
To help the readers understanding between concrete and non-concrete events we will discuss 
9/11 (a concrete event) in relation to the invasion of Iraq vs. Afghanistan.  9/11 is considered a 
past concrete event that was perceived to affect most Americans. Thus, there was (inspired by 
the uncertainty of being attacked and the fear that another attack may be imminent) a reactionary 
cohesion of the citizenry towards collective action aimed at alleviating the generating source of 
the threat, the generating source of the fear.  A strong plausible connection between 9/11, al-
Qaeda, Afghanistan and the Taliban was laid out. Policy suggestions based on this strong 
plausible connection included the invasion of Afghanistan. Espoused objectives of this invasion 
were capturing Bin Laden, destruction of al-Qaeda and the removal of the Taliban. The invasion 
of Afghanistan was sold to the American public based off a concrete event (i.e. 9/11).  
Conclusion: Concrete events in likelihood are used in programs of legitimate manipulation, 
which push towards egalitarianism. Therefore, if the invasion of Afghanistan was based on a 
concrete event (9/11) then we can also claim that (in likelihood) it was an in-synch system 
achieved through legitimate manipulation. Therefore, we can also claim that the expectation 
should have been societal movement towards egalitarianism. Many will argue that the invasion 
of Afghanistan has not resulted in societal movement towards egalitarianism rather than 
movement away.  Here we agree with such an argument. That the war in Afghanistan has pushed 
away from egalitarianism. Does this fact disprove the theory? For i according to the theory have 
created movement towards egalitarianism.  The answer to this is that the invasion of Afghanistan 
was originally based on a concrete event.  But the basis for the war around the time of the push 
towards an invasion of Iraq was changed to become based on the “war on terror,” which is 
considered a non-concrete event, considered a linguistically manipulated concept that cannot 
definitionally exist. Therefore, the expectation of movement towards egalitarianism shifted to an 
expectation of movement away from egalitarianism when the basis of the war shifted from the 
concrete (i.e. 9/11) to the non-concrete (i.e. “war on terror”).  
In 2002 clan Cheany/Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld began manipulating to convince the American 
citizenry to invade Iraq. They tried very hard to base the necessity of this invasion on 9/11 
(concrete event). This attempt failed because there was no plausible connection between 9/11 
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and Iraq, which the public recognized.299 Clan Cheany/Wolfowitz knew that their objective of 
invading Iraq was not related to 9/11. They knew that their suggested policy of invading Iraq was 
going to be rejected if sold with 9/11 as the only backing event. At this point the Bush 
administration fabricated 3 non-concrete events to back the invasion of Iraq: 1) a past non-
concrete event- That Saddam still had weapons of mass destruction left over from the 90’s and 
that he had been trying to develop nuclear weapons, as proven by his attempts to buy yellowcake 
uranium from Niger. Both points were verifiably false, and the Bush administration knew it. 2) A 
future concrete event- that the invasion is necessary because it was perilous to “wait for the final 
proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud,"300 and, 3) the 
linguistically manipulated concept of the “war on terror.”301 It was these non-concrete events that 
were ultimately used in manipulating the American citizenry into supporting the invasion of Iraq.  
Conclusion: The necessary intellectual dishonesty of non-concrete events precludes them from 
being part of programs of legitimate manipulation. They can only be associated with programs of 
illegitimate manipulation. Illegitimate manipulation results in out of synch systems, which push 
away from egalitarianism.  If one accepts the premise that the invasion of Iraq was sold on the 
back of non-concrete events then one must also accept that the result was an out of synch system 
implemented through illegitimate manipulation, and that the expected outcome should be 
movement away from egalitarianism.  
                                                      
299 Vice President Dick Cheney on Meet the Press December 9, 2001 claimed that Iraq was harboring Abdul 
Rahman Yasin, a suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Cheaney repeated the statement in another 
appearance on September 14, 2003, saying "We learned more and more that there was a relationship between 
Iraq and al-Qaida that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s, that it involved training, for 
example, on BW and CW, that al-Qaida sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems that are 
involved. The Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the al-Qaida organization, we know, for 
example, in connection with the original World Trade Center bombing in '93 that one of the bombers was Iraqi, 
returned to Iraq after the attack of '93. And we’ve learned subsequent to that, since we went into Baghdad and 
got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably also received financing from the Iraqi government as 
well as safe haven."  Once again in an interview with National Public Radio in January 2004 Cheany stated that 
there had been "overwhelming evidence" of a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda based on evidence that 
included Iraq's purported harboring of Yasin. In the same interview Cheney implied a connection between Iraq 
and Mohamed Atta; "The Czech interior minister said today that an Iraqi intelligence officer met with 
Mohammed Atta, one of the ringleaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, just five 
months before the synchronized hijackings and mass killings were carried out", and, "With respect to 9/11, of 
course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohamed Atta, the lead 
attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we’ve never 
been able to develop any more of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know." 
These claims were doubtful to the Intelligence community, which the CIA told president Bush, VP Cheany and 
Rumsfeld directly. V.P. Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated a secret program to 
re-examine the evidence and marginalize the CIA and its Director George Tenet. The questionable intelligence 
acquired by this secret program was "stovepiped" to the vice president and presented to the public. In some cases 
Cheney’s office would leak the intelligence to reporters so that outlets such as The New York Times would 
report it. Cheney would subsequently appear on the Sunday political television talk shows to discuss the 
intelligence, referencing The New York Times as the source to give it credence.  
300 George W. Bush October 6, 2002 Cincinnati, Ohio 
301 The only way that a war can be a concrete event is if it is specific in its time, place, and belligerents involved. 
The “war on terror” has none of these specifics. Hence it is a linguistic manipulation to say that we are at “war 
with terror.” One could be concretely at war with a specific group, in a specific country, at a specific time. A war 
against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the beginning of 2002 would be a concrete event. But a “war on terror” or 
“communism” or “drugs” can never be a concrete event and should always be considered a non-concrete event 
that is part of a program of illegitimate manipulation.  
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Differentiating between non-concrete and concrete events, like much of this treatise, is a 
subjective process. The above text attempts to give guidelines and examples to help the reader 
understand the process of differentiation. But it is likely that users of this system may come to 
different conclusions about the same event.  Here we make the statement (a statement that will 
be repeated many times) that it is not the point of this research to argue over the subjective 
readings of the framework being proposed. Rather the goal is to lay out the framework and let 
each user worry about their own subjective input factors. 
Hope Confidence Control 
Hope Confidence has two levels of control: (1) economic and (2) perceived safety and security 
(to the physical and societal self). Perceived safety and security is easier to manipulate than the 
economic factor. It is easier to convince a population that their physical safety is in imminent 
danger by a covert, unseen enemy than to convince them that they have invisible food on the 
table and money in their pockets.302  
 Perceived physical safety and security is more easily linked to national territorial integrity. 
While economic confidence is more easily linked to “material forces.” Generally, economic hope 
(“material forces”) is more related to affecting positive hope confidence and safety and security 
affecting negative movement. The threat of negative movement due to safety and security 
concerns held against a result of neutral movement will be perceived as an accomplishment, 
while the promise of positive economic hope confidence that results in neutral movement will be 
perceived as a failure. In the context of implementing an out of synch system the preferred lever 
of control is safety and security with the economic lever being necessary to create a minimum 
amount of stability to deploy the threat of safety and security. The opposite holds true for the 
implementation of an in-synch system where safety and security is a concern in the context of 
creating enough stability so as deploy the economic lever towards positive societal movement.  
Hope confidence can be a useful tool in understanding the way in which populations are 
manipulated towards certain types of societal structuring over others. Though, this is not the 
function of hope confidence in the context of the frame being devised. As such, an illustration of 
how hope confidence is manipulated by populational lobbyist is not contained in the main text. 
Annex 1 contains an illustration of how the Authoritarian manipulates the control mechanisms in 
their quest to reach authoritarian stability. 
E. Identity Typologies 
Rogers Smith (2004) has noted that there is an emerging consensus that identities are “among the 
most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics”303 yet Abdelal 
(2006) claims that “social identity scholarship suffers from two sets of problems: conceptual 
issues and coordination gaps. The main conceptual questions that the field has yet to answer 
satisfactorily are: (1) how can we compare different types of identities; and, (2) how can we 
                                                      
302 While it is more difficult to manipulate economic hope, it is not impossible. This has been shown recently with 
the ARM mortgage bundling scam that activated a bubble in the U.S. housing market, which, in the end resulted 
in the economic crisis of 2008.  
303 Smith, Rogers M. pg. 32, "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science." Perspectives on Politics 2, 
no. 2 (2004): 301-12. 
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exploit theoretical advances in operationalizing identity as a variable?”304 Analytical identity 
typologies in the context of borders can explain when it (identity) is expected to be an ally to 
territorial expansion and when a hindrance. Such information will make it possible to bypass 
conceptual issues, close the coordination gaps, allow for the comparison of different identities, 
and exploit the theoretical advances in operationalizing identity as a variable. Below are 
proposed identity typologies. These typologies are used in the analysis of the expanding power.  
 
Bordered identities are, by definition, contained; they exist inside an accepted and recognized 
box and hence are not easily offered to those outside the box.  Bordered identities are not 
expansive or inclusive and are first and foremost concerned with the territory inside their 
borders. Safety and security concerns are managed through a hardening of the box. Over time 
bordered identities move towards internal exclusion through immigration and social policies 
aimed at “othering” certain groups (creating an internal enemy) to justify the hardening of the 
box. 
 
There are two types of bordered identities: (1) national, and, (2) ethnic. Ethnic Identities are 
bound by the fact that one is or is not Russian, Chinese or French etc. An ethnic Russian could 
never choose to be ethnically Chinese nor could a French ethnic identity be offered to an ethnic 
Russian. On the other hand, international recognized borders box in national identities. 
Citizenship cannot easily be offered to populations living outside of the national territory. An 
ethnic identity may also have an attached national identity and vice versa, though the two are in 
and of themselves exclusive. Bordered national identities are more flexible than ethnic identities 
(inclusively and exclusively). Inclusively: an ethnic Frenchman has the potential to be a Chinese 
citizen but not the potential to be an ethnic Chinese. Exclusionary: It is not possible to exclude a 
Frenchman from being ethnically French, though the French government could possibly revoke 
citizenship of an ethnic Frenchman.  
 
When bordered identities expand past agreed upon boundaries they will (necessarily) be 
perceived as an aggressor trying to take what does not belong to them and be met with automatic 
resistance. 
 
Border transcendent identities are not boxed in by present nation state and ethnic borders and 
can be easily offered to new populations. Border transcendent Identities, opposite to bordered 
identities, are programmed to be expansive and inclusive. There are two types of Border 
Transcendent Identities: (1) ephemeral, and (2) structured. 
 
Ephemeral identities can be thought of as an idea, ideology or belief system. An idea or belief 
has no borders and is available to anyone, anywhere, at any time. Anyone, at any time may 
decide to convert to Islam or subscribe to Communism. Ephemeral Identities do not create 
territorial expansion but rather increase the number of subscribers across disparate geographic 
areas and populations. Ephemeral Identities create population expansion (as opposed to territorial 
expansion) because any idea, ideology or belief (via the Internet) has a global reach into an 
                                                      
304 Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. pg. 18, "Identity as a 
Variable." Perspectives on politics 4, no. 4 (2006): 695-711. 
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immense population of possible converts. Ephemeral Identities and their disparate pockets of 
coalescence will have varying amounts of commonality and connection with one another, but 
they cannot create meaningful territorial expansion because an idea, belief, or ideology cannot 
control an apparatus (government) with which to govern or hold territory. Yet, it is possible that 
a government can have an ephemeral identity as a means of locomotion for its legitimizing frame 
towards domestic (or international) power consolidation.  
 
Structured border transcendent identities are connected to a physical space and have an 
apparatus that can hold territory, govern and exact territorial expansion. Structured border 
transcendent Identities have co-opted into their founding tenants an ephemeral identity; i.e., 
“Democratic”/Capitalist America, Islamic Iran, Communist CCCP.305 
 
The Soviet Union had Communism and Iran has Islam, but we must separate the two. America, 
for over 50 years, was at war with Communism but never at war with the Soviet Union. Israel 
may go to war with Iran but will make clear they are not at war with Islam. Once an ephemeral 
Identity is co-opted into the framework of a governing apparatus, it is no longer an ephemeral 
identity but becomes part of a structured identity.  
 
Expansion under Bordered identities is harder and has higher costs than expansion under Border 
Transcendent identities. If Turkey territorially expands under a Turkish Identity they will be 
perceived as an aggressive nation state stepping outside of their defined and recognized borders, 
while at the same time they will be unable to offer the populations being expanded upon a 
Turkish Identity (e.g., it is impossible for an Azerbaijani to accept a Turkish Identity). On the 
other hand, a Neo-Ottoman identity can be potentially offered to a much larger geographical 
space. Expansion under a Neo-Ottoman identity will not necessarily be perceived as an 
aggressive nation state stepping outside of where it belongs. It may be perceived as an attempt to 
reunite different parts of a long-separated family. 
 
From here we move to the last typology involved in the frame of expansion being devised. 
Below is a discussion of proximate fault line typologies.  
 
F. Proximate Faultline Typologies 
Proximate faultline typologies are used (mainly) during the regional level of analysis. Built on 
the idea of the cultural faultline with an added assumption that proximity of faultlines to one 
another affects expected behavior, and, that this expected behavior could be extrapolated to help 
project likelihood of territorial expansion. Below the typologies and their expected behavior are 
discussed.  
 
Contiguous-when two or more fault lines become so close that they can be thought in contact 
with each other. Contiguous fault lines manifest as (1) hard borders, or, (2) the front lines of 
conflict. 
 
                                                      
305 Two structured Identities that have co-opted the same ephemeral Identity will not necessarily be ‘friends’ (i.e. 
Maoist China and the Soviet Union.) Sometimes two structured Identities will be friends across ideological lines 
to the detriment of another structured Identity with the same ephemeral Identity (i.e. Iran backing Christian 
Armenia in a war with Muslim Azerbaijan).   
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Neighboring-two or more fault lines that are geographically separated by a middle territory 
called a borderland. Following the logic of the security dilemma neighboring powers are driven 
to expand into borderlands by a compulsion to insulate geographically against their neighbors 
before they are insulated against.  Past the compulsion towards buffering against other neighbors 
the prime concern of any neighbor is to prevent an opposing neighbor from expanding to 
contiguity. 
 
Borderlands-were already discussed in chapter 2. A recap of the characteristics of the 
borderland:  
 
1) Comprised of “weak states” that are economically underdeveloped, and are perceived to be 
internally fragmented in the context of race, language, religion, and nationality. 
2) The borderland regions themselves are also perceived as being fragmented. Borderland states 
are often “mutually antagonistic, leaving them unable or unwilling to cooperate economically, 
politically, and militarily.” The result of these first two points is conflict internal to the 
borderland states and conflict between borderland states.306  
3) Borderlands are the sites of considerable external military and economic involvement by two 
or more competing geopolitical powers.  
4) Borderlands do not fall under the purview of the spheres of influence of major powers, yet at 
the same time, they are accessible to the major powers, thus creating overlapping spheres. Also, 
the borderland is a field of competition that does yet have a dominant player.  
5) Borderlands offer (more or less) an even playing field for major powers to gain a footing. 
Thus, more than one major power must have an ally, military presence, or strong patron-client 
relationship in the area. The presence of multiple major powers suggests a competitive aspect to 
the region.307 
 
Borderland populations will, to varying degrees, have connection to all of the neighboring 
powers. Connection (Identity Viability) is very much related to “cultural ruination” and may 
come in many ways: cultural, historical, ethnicity, living memory, architecture, language (written 
and spoken) and relics of Empire left behind.  Fanning the flames of connection will be the way 
in which surrounding fault lines will justify and sell the territorial expansion to borderland 
populations -- the way that expanding powers will meet identity demand conditions.  
 
Ephemeral - when any specific fault line is not geographically close to another specific fault line 
i.e. US/Russian line. 308 
 
Neighboring lines are the most likely to enact expansion because they are contiguously located 
next to borderlands. Borderlands are the most likely typology to experience expansion because 
they are caught in between two or more geopolitical rivals, who all want to use the borderland as 
a buffer against rival neighbors before rival neighbors use the borderland to buffer against them. 
                                                      
306 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl, pg. 6, "Testing Empirical Propositions About Shatterbelts, 1945–76." Political 
Geography 13, no. 1 (1994): 33-51 
307 Hartshorne, Richard. "The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past." 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 29, no. 3 (1939): 173-412. 
308 While the ephemeral line is a proximate faultline, and may be necessary in certain analyses, it is not necessary in 
this specific analysis.  
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Contiguous lines are the least likely typology to either experience or enact expansion because 
contiguous predicates two lines that are (essentially) touching each other, and that each line has 
an attached identity that considers itself different from that of the second line. The indication is 
that there is no open space or identity viability between contiguous lines. As such, there is no 
prospect for amenable expansion, only forcible.  Forcible expansion has a lowered likelihood of 
coming to pass due to higher associated costs. If against likelihood military expansion across 
contiguous lines occurs expected movement will be relegated to the border regions separating the 
two. The deeper the expansion across contiguous lines the higher the associated costs. Therefore, 
deep expansion across contiguous is less likely than expansion into the border regions, and, if 
against likelihood deep expansion comes to pass it is considered less sustainable than expansion 
into border regions. As a rule, to be sustainable, deep expansion across contiguous lines requires 
an erasure of the contiguous faultline, which is accomplished through genocide, forced migration 
and settlement programs. Attempts at erasing a contiguous faultlines generally have very high 
costs, therefore deep and sustainable expansion across contiguous faultlines have a low 
likelihood of coming to pass.309 
 
Chapter 3 Summary: Laid out were 4 analytical typologies that are used to operationalize the 
frame. Two typologies derived from the geopolitical component (geopolitical viability and 
proximate faultline typologies) and 2 derived from the identity component (identity viability and 
identity typologies). Also included in this chapter was a discussion of Hope Confidence  
 
Geopolitical viability is the main determining factor in projecting likelihood that a specific 
expanding power will not enact programs of expansion.  It is based solely on the expanding 
power’s perception of the international arena and relative balance of power. Is based on the 
perception that another geopolitical actor is willing and able to, if not outright derail the 
expansion (amenable or forcible) is able to raise the associated costs rendering expansion too 
expensive to be a viable move.  
 
Identity viability is the main factor in determining whether an expanding power has the option to 
expand amenably. Identity Viability is the perceptual identity relationship between the 
Expanding Power and populations being expanded upon. How does the population being 
expanded upon view the projected identity of the Expanding Power? And how does the 
Expanding Power view the identity of the populations being expanded upon? Included in the 
discussion of identity viability was as application of it (identity viability) to the likelihood of 
further EU expansion. 
                                                      
309 Extremely low likelihood events still statistically happen. Two examples of programs of faultline erasure: 1) 
American westward expansion across Native/American contiguous line. US westward expansion necessitated 
being forcible because it was across a contiguous faultline. Manifest destiny demanded that said expansion be 
deep, sustainable, long-term. The only way to achieve such expansion is through an erasure of the contiguous 
line being crossed (in this case Native American). The tactics required to erase a contiguous fault line are 
settlement programs, forced migration and genocide. The US government used these tactics, erased the Native 
contiguous faultline, and, achieved deep, long-term and sustainable westward expansion. 2) Israeli expansion 
into Palestine crosses a contiguous faultline. As such, said expansion necessitates being forcible. Israel wants to 
achieve deep, long-term and sustainable expansion into Palestine. Achievement of such expansion requires an 
erasure of the Palestinian contiguous faultline. Tactics required to achieve this erasure are settlement programs, 
forced migration and genocide. The Israelis have used the first two tactics but (thus far) have stopped short of 
perpetrating genocide.  
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Hope confidence is the mechanism that determines whether a population being expanded upon is 
likely to collectively act towards overturning the present status quo. Populations likely to 
collectively act towards overturning the present status quo are also more likely of accepting the 
proposition of being amenably expanded upon. Included in this discussion were the levels of 
hope confidence and how using a legitimacy frame analysis in conjunction with concrete and 
non-concrete events can be used to determine what level of hope confidence a population 
inhabits. Also, there was a tertiary discussion of the mechanisms of hope confidence control, 
which populational lobbyist can use to exploit and manipulate the hope confidence cycle.  
 
Identity typologies are the mechanism which projects whether an expanding power is likely to be 
successful in marketing a projected identity to the populations they are interested in expanding 
upon.  The ability to project a compatible identity to populations being expanded upon is a 
crucial component in being able to expand amenably.  
 
Proximate faultline typologies are built on the idea of the cultural faultline with an added 
assumption that proximity of faultlines to one another affects expected behavior, and, that this 
expected behavior can be extrapolated to help project likelihood of territorial expansion. 
Proximate faultline typologies are mainly used in the regional analysis to show the location of 
borderlands.  
 
The next chapter explains the frame and how it functions.  
 
IV. Chapter 4 - Frame of Expansion 
The proposed frame uses a tiered analysis based on (and accounting for) the region, expanding 
power and populations being expanded upon. These three levels of analysis incorporate the 
analytical typologies (and hope confidence) discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Regional Analysis-Proximate Faultiness 
Analysis of the Expanding Power- Identity Typologies 
Analysis of the Populations being expanded upon 
Compatibility of offered Identity 
Likelihood of an Identity shift (as determined by hope confidence) 
              
Each level of analysis is separate from the other two, and, each level deals solely with a single 
component; i.e., region, expanding power or populations being expanded upon. Unique 
analytical tools allow each level of analysis to judge whether expansion is more or less likely for 
its specific component. 
 
The Regional analysis indicates which geographical areas should be considered borderlands. The 
analysis of the expanding power indicates whether the chosen expanding power is more or less 
likely to enact programs of expansion. The Analysis of populations being expanded upon 
indicates two things: (1) whether the population is likely to experience expansion in a general 
sense, and, (2) whether a particular actor is more or less likely to undertake expansion on the 
population designated as being expanded upon.  
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The above frame is an open template; the analysis may be tailored towards the specific needs and 
interests of the researcher. Therefore, A is the expanding power, B is the populations being 
expanded upon and the Region would be the surrounding landmass where these countries are 
located. If the analyst is mainly interested in the expanding power then they should adjust the 
equation by choosing different populations to be expanded upon until they find an equation that 
signifies on all three levels likely expansion. If the interest is the population being expanded 
upon then they should adjust the expanding power. 
 
Results may vary according to level. Analysis may suggest a region is likely to experience 
expansion while the specified expanding power is deemed less likely to expand or vice versa. 
The more levels of the frame that indicate expansion the more likely that the advanced scenario 
will result in expansion.  
 
We begin with the regional analysis.  
 
A.    Regional Analysis 
The primary goal of the regional analysis is to determine the location of borderlands. A regional 
analysis requires that the proximate typologies be overlaid on any specific region. The example 
region used here is the Euro-Asian continent (West of the Chinese Pacific coast to the Atlantic 
excluding East Asia and Africa). Each of the shaded areas represents a distinct cultural faultline; 
e.g., European, Turkish/Islamic Secularism, Arab Sunni, Iranian/Persian/Shia, Indian/Hindu, 
Chinese, Tribal/extreme Islam, and the Russian Federation. Once cultural faultlines have been 
overlaid determination of the location of contiguous and neighboring faultlines can be made, 
which then indicates the location of borderlands (represented by purple shaded areas) 
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. This regional analysis indicates the following contiguous lines: 
 1) European/Russian Federation 
 2) European/Turkish 
 3) Turkish/Arab Sunni 
 4) Turkish/Iranian-Persian-Shia 
 5) Iranian-Persian-Shia/Arab Sunni 
 6) Iranian-Persian-Shia/Tribal extremist 
 7) Tribal Extremist Islamic/Indian 
 8) Indian/Chinese  
 9) Chinese/Russian 
 
 Expected behavior of contiguous faultlines suggests a low likelihood that any party of one of the 
above pairs will expand into the territory of the other. As such, Russia is not likely to expand into 
Europe or China; Europe is not likely to expand into Russia or Turkey; Turkey is not likely to 
expand into the Arabian Peninsula, Europe or Iran; Iran is not likely to expand into the Arabian 
Peninsula or Pakistan/Afghanistan; Members of the Arabian Peninsula are not likely to expand 
into Turkey or Iran; Afghanistan and Pakistan are not likely to expand into Iran or India; India is 
not likely to expand into Pakistan, Afghanistan or China; China is not likely to expand into India, 
Russia, Afghanistan/Pakistan. 
 
 In any of these cases, if against likelihood, there is expansion it will be forcible and contained to 
border regions. If against likelihood deep expansion is undertaken then the expectation is that the 
expanding power will have to attempt to erase the contiguous line, which is even less likely.  
 
The overlay also shows the location of 4 borderlands and identifies their neighbors: 
 
1) Ukraine/Belorussia-neighbored by Russia and Europe 
2) The Caucuses-neighbored by Iran, Turkey and Russia 
3) Central Asia-neighbored by Russia, China, Tribal extremist, India, Iran, Arab Sunni and 
Turkish lines 
4) Mongolia-neighbored by Russia and China 
 
 Expected behavior of proximate faultline typologies suggests that these borderlands are likely to 
see one or more neighbors move towards policies of territorial expansion. 
 
Not all borderlands have an equal likelihood of experiencing expansion. Therefore, it is 
important to assess which borderlands are more likely and which less. This assessment requires 
understanding certain borderland intricacies.  
 
Borderland Intricacies  
Likelihood of expansion into any borderland is affected by the following three factors: (1) size of 
the borderland, (2) number of neighbors, and, (3) whether the borderland is spread across areas 
of water. 
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Number of Neighbors 
The more neighbors the higher likelihood that there will be expansion. Borderlands with two 
neighbors have the lowest likelihood of expansion. As the number of neighbors increases so does 
likelihood of expansion. 
 
More neighbors increase the likelihood of expansion due to the simple fact that more neighbors 
mean more actors that may decide to expand. Number of neighbors is directly related to 
likelihood of Geopolitical Viability. The fewer number of neighbors the lower the likelihood that 
Geopolitical Viability will be available. If there are only two neighbors, and one expands, the 
other neighbor will only have one opposing actor to account for in their decision to attempt to 
stop the expansion. As the number of neighbors increases the number of actors that need to be 
accounted for in the decision to commit resources to stop expansion also increases, the more 
potential combatants to a conflict the more likely that the situation will snowball into a multi-
party quagmire. Therefore, a lower number of potential combatants to a conflict translates into a 
higher likelihood that any neighbor be willing to commit to stop an opponent from expanding. 
The higher likelihood that an opponent will commit resources to stopping another’s plans for 
expansion translates into a lower likelihood of geopolitical viability being available.  
 
On the other hand, when there are multiple potential participants to the conflict there is lowered 
likelihood that any neighbor will commit their resources towards stopping the expansion of an 
opposing neighbor rather than committing these resources towards their own expansive measures 
on unclaimed parts of the borderland. The result is a higher likelihood of expansion.  
 
“East Asia is a crowded neighborhood, which includes Russia, India, and Japan in addition to 
China and the United States. Alignments among these states might also increase China’s need 
for buffers by increasing China’s perception of encirclement by major powers on multiple 
strategic fronts.”310 
Size 
Size of a borderland is directly related to sensitivity towards a neighbor’s expansion, which is 
directly related to Geopolitical Viability, which is directly related to associated costs of 
expansion, and hence, likelihood of expansion. 
 
A larger borderland has a higher likelihood to experience expansion than a smaller borderland. 
This is a function of the fact that as neighboring lines converge they become more sensitive to 
expansion by opposing neighbors. Sensitivity increases as borderland space decreases. Increased 
sensitivity translates into a lower likelihood of Geopolitical Viability for any expansive move. 
When considering size of a borderland it is important to remember that of utmost importance to 
any neighboring line is the prevention of any other neighbor expanding to contiguity. 
Neighboring lines will with a high degree of certainty (assuming presence of ability) commit the 
necessary resources to prevent an opposing neighbor from expanding to contiguity. As such, any 
expansion to contiguity will very rarely be Geopolitically viable and hence always have a 
lowered likelihood.  
 
 
                                                      
310 Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 517  
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Note: Water 
Expected behavior of cultural faultlines changes when they exist over areas of water; i.e., South 
China Sea, Kuril Islands and much of Southeast Asia. It is not the goal of this research to 
establish exactly how faultlines behave when existing over areas of water. There is no attempt to 
further explain, only to make the reader aware of this water caveat. This is an area of research 
that needs to be explored. 
 
When applying borderland intricacies to determine likelihood of expansion the first 
differentiating factor is number of neighbors. The delineation is between borderlands with two 
neighbors versus more than two neighbors. The Euro-Asian continent has two borderlands with 
two neighbors: Mongolia and Ukraine/Belorussia, and, two borderlands with more than two 
neighbors: Central Asia and Caucuses. As explained above, borderlands with two neighbors have 
a lower likelihood of expansion than borderlands with more than two neighbors. Therefore, 
Central Asia and Caucuses have a higher likelihood of being expanded upon than Mongolia or 
Ukraine/Belorussia. Past this initial assessment it can be further deduced which borderland in 
each pair is more likely to experience expansion. Which is more likely to experience expansion: 
Caucuses or Central Asia? Mongolia or Ukraine/Belorussia? 
 
Two Neighbor Borderlands 
Determining whether the Mongolian or Ukraine/Belorussian borderland is more likely to 
experience expansion is connected to the variation in size of geographical buffering between 
neighbors of each borderland. This size effect is a direct result of which way has the borderland 
been shrinking, which neighbor has been more successful in enveloping the borderland. If the 
ratio of geographical buffer between the two neighbors is equal, expansion becomes less likely. 
The more one sided the ratio the more likely is expansion. 
 
Ukraine/Belorussia 
After the fall of the CCCP the Eastern European borderland was large enough that the Russian 
Federation was not so sensitive to EU expansion that they were willing/able to commit the 
necessary resources, and accept the consequences, of attempting to stop EU expansion into the 
post-Soviet space. This translated into EU Geopolitical Viability. EU amenable expansion has 
pushed the borderland towards contiguity with the Russian Federation. All that is left of the 
borderland is Ukraine and Belorussia. EU (or NATO) expansion into Ukraine or Belorussia 
would result in expansion to Russian contiguity. In fact, it was EU movement towards Ukrainian 
integration that was the cause of the current crisis. In 2014 Ukraine was set to sign a set of trade 
deals with the EU. These trade deals were perceived by Russia as paving the way for the EU to 
push towards to contiguity. Russia stopped the deal by buying off (then) Ukrainian President 
Yanukovych, who quickly dropped the deal with the EU and signed one with Russia. A majority 
of the population supported the deal with the EU. As such, the about face by Yanukovych 
spurned a revolution. The Russian federation took advantage of this revolution by supporting and 
encouraging separatist movements in eastern Ukrainian oblasts where there is a high 
concentration of ethnic Russians.  Therefore, Russian perceived EU movement towards further 
eastward amenable integration catalyzed Russia to commit the necessary resources to stop said 
expansion.  
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On the other side of the coin, Europe is much less sensitive to Russian expansion into Belorussia 
and Ukraine than is Russia to EU expansion. This lower sensitivity is a function of the fact that 
since the fall of the CCCP European expansion has been shrinking the borderland eastward 
towards Russia. Europe has been very successful in enveloping the Eastern European borderland, 
while Russia, has until recently (Crimea) enveloped none of it. Europe has a large geographical 
buffer zone while Russia essentially has none. As such, Russian expansion into Ukraine or 
Belorussia would not be to European contiguity rather than becoming contiguous to the 
European buffer zone. Contiguity to a buffer zone is not such a huge deal as that is the function 
of the buffer zone-to stand in-between you and an opposing neighbor. 
 
At this point many readers may be thinking this is wrong. That Eastern Europe is part of the EU; 
part of Europe and therefore Russian expansion into Ukraine and Belorussia would be expansion 
to contiguity. Technically (much of) Eastern Europe is part of the EU, but one must understand 
that the underlying reason that Eastern European integration took place was a security measure to 
secure a buffer zone against their unruly Ruski neighbor. One must remember that it is Western 
Europe (Brussels) that is in charge of EU policy, and having Eastern Europe between Russia and 
Western Europe offers tranquility to Brussels. If the seat of EU power was located in Krakow 
(for example) then it would be a different story, the EU would be very sensitive Russian 
expansion into Ukraine and Belorussia, and, would consider such expansion to contiguity, which 
would mean that the Krakow power based EU would be ready and willing put all necessary 
resources into preventing said Russian expansion. But this is not the situation. EU power is held 
in Western Europe, which has a buffer zone (Eastern Europe) between Brussels and the 
Belorussian/Ukranian borderland, which means Russian expansion into the 
Ukranian/Belorussian borderland is only to contiguity with the buffer zone, not the 
“motherland.” The indication is that the EU will not be willing to commit the necessary 
resources to stop Russian expansion into Ukraine or Belorussia. For expansion to contiguity with 
a buffer zone is not the same as expansion to contiguity with the “motherland.” 
   
The insinuation is that the neighbor with the geographical buffer (Europe) will not have 
Geopolitical Viability to expand any further as this expansion will push to contiguity because the 
second neighbor (Russia), who has no buffer zone, will commit all necessary resources to stop 
said (European) expansion. On the other hand, the neighbor with little (or no) buffer (Russia) 
will have Geopolitical Viability to expand because the first neighbor (Europe) will not be willing 
to commit resources at any cost to stop the expansion because this expansion will only push to 
contiguity with the buffer zone, not the “homeland.” 
 
Mongolia  
The neighbors to the Mongolian borderland (China and Russia) both have an equal amount of 
geographical buffer (Mongolia). Neither neighbor has been more successful than the other in 
enveloping the Mongolian borderland, which has remained static for over 50 years. Any 
expansion by either neighbor will be expansion to contiguity. Therefore, both neighbors will be 
willing to commit whatever resources necessary to prevent the other from expanding. Therefore, 
the expectation is that neither neighbor will possess Geopolitical Viability. Both neighbors 
(China and Russia) realize that expanding into Mongolia is not geopolitically viable, and, both 
being rational actors means that neither will expand without geopolitical viability. The outcome 
is a tacit agreement to accept Mongolia as a shared status quo buffer zone. This tacit agreement 
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is not likely to be violated due to the spiraling ramifications that would follow. It is this reason 
that the Mongolian borderland has remained static for so long and why it can be expected to 
remain static.  
 
Conclusion: Ukraine/Belorussia has one neighbor with geopolitical viability while none of the 
Mongolian neighbors hold geopolitical viability. Therefore, the assessment is that 
Ukraine/Belorussia is more likely to experience expansion than Mongolia. 
 
Borderlands with more than two neighbors   
Likelihood of expansion between multi-neighbor borderlands is a simpler analysis than between 
two neighbor borderlands. Likelihood is purely based on size and number of neighbors. The 
more neighbors the higher the likelihood of expansion and the larger the borderland the more 
likely expansion. Here the analysis is straight forward as Central Asia is both larger and has 
more neighbors than the Caucuses and therefore more likely to experience expansion.  
 
The Regional analysis of the Euro-Asian continent has found four borderlands. The determined 
likelihood of expansion is described in the following list (most to least likely): 
 
(1) Central Asia 
(2) The Caucuses 
(3) Ukraine/Belorussia 
(4) Mongolia 
 
It is important to remember that the Regional analysis is only the first level of the analysis, that it 
only deals with Geopolitical Viability based on expected behavior of proximate faultlines. The 
main function of the regional analysis is to locate borderlands and then gauge which borderlands 
are most likely to experience expansion. A regional analysis does not touch on Identity Viability. 
It also does not assess (other than borderland determination) which populations (within any 
specific borderland) are more likely to experience expansion, these other assessments are 
provided by the next two levels of analysis. 
 
B. Analysis of the Expanding Power 
The hinge factor here is whether Identity is an ally or hindrance, which is directly related to 
whether the expanding power is operating under a bordered or border transcendent Identity. The 
goal of the expanding power analysis is to ascertain whether the chosen expanding power is 
currently operating under a bordered or border transcendent identity. So long as an expanding 
power is projecting a bordered identity then likelihood of expansion is lowered. If the chosen 
expanding power is projecting a border transcendent identity then the likelihood of expansion is 
raised. This raised likelihood is a function of the fact that projection of a border transcendent 
identity offers the possibility of amenable expansion while bordered identities (for the most part) 
preclude the option of amenable expansion. When an expanding power is setting preparatory 
groundwork to move towards amenable expansion they will begin an institutional shift away 
from defining their societal structure using a bordered identity towards an internalization of a 
border transcendent identity. This shift requires a massive, and overtly public propaganda 
campaign, as well as changes to educational curriculum. Such a shift should be visible to 
researchers.  
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Not all neighbors to a borderland have equal likelihood of being able to create and bring to 
market an acceptable border transcendent Identity. Achieved in the next level of analysis will be 
the analysis of the populations being expanded upon, which should shed light on which 
expanding powers are more likely to be able to bring to market an acceptable identity option to 
which borderland populations.  
 
C. Analysis of Populations being expanded upon 
There are two analytical points used in the analysis of populations being expanded upon: 1) 
Likelihood of undergoing an identity shift, and, 2) Compatibility of offered identity.  
 
Likelihood of undergoing an Identity shift  
Is directly related to which hope confidence level is the population occupying. Positive hope 
confidence (i.e. newly committed or committed) has the lowest likelihood of an identity shift, of 
abandoning the present status quo, of collective action towards integrating with the expanding 
power. Positive hope confidence precludes identity shifts, for the population has confidence that 
the present identity/societal structure will usher in a safer, more secure and economically 
abundant future. Neutral hope confidence breads the possibility (not likelihood) of an identity 
shift. Populations with Negative hope confidence are most likely to undergo an identity shift, of 
abandoning the present status quo, of collective action towards integrating with the expanding 
power.  
 
Compatibility of Offered Identity  
Amenable annexation and integration requires an expanding power to supply an acceptable 
supra-national hope generating identity to fill the demand of hope generation in the societal 
attention spaces.  Therefore, supply conditions equal the ability of the expanding power to 
promote and bring to market an acceptable identity to a population with either neutral or negative 
hope confidence. An assessment of compatibility of offered identities is how one ascertains the 
likelihood that an expanding power can market and sell an acceptable identity to the population 
being expanded upon. This assessment includes a comparison of the shared history, language, 
culture, religion, memory, “cultural ruination” and relics of Empire.  
 
Language is the most impactful of these factors because language, the ability to communicate 
with one another, historically, has been a major factor in determining the extent with which 
groups interact with each other. The closer the language the more interaction there will be. More 
interaction means more sharing of culture and religion. Therefore, closeness of language 
(generally) has a direct effect on closeness of culture and religion, which results in a higher 
likelihood that an expanding power will be successful in offering a compatible and acceptable 
identity. In general, a population will have deep reservations of accepting an identity of a people 
who speak a completely different language. The lesser amount of viable communication between 
the two groups increases the feeling that the other group is an outsider who does not belong. A 
Kyrgyz might not see the Turkish as complete outsiders because Kyrgyz can (to an extent) 
communicate to Turkish speakers (Kyrgyz is a Turkic language). On the other hand, Kyrgyz 
cannot understand at all Chinese and will therefore see the Chinese as more foreign. 
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Do the expander and population being expanding upon speak the same language? If not, how 
close are the two languages? Do they have the same root? (I.E. Italian/Spanish, 
Turkish/Azerbaijani, Ukrainian/Russian) or are they from completely different families? (I.e. 
Chinese/Russian). 
 
The larger the language overlap between expander and populations being expanded upon the less 
foreign the expanding power will be perceived. The larger the language overlap the higher the 
likelihood that the expander and the populations being expanding upon will have similar culture 
and religions, as such, the closer the languages the higher the likelihood that the expanding 
power will be successful in offering a compatible and acceptable Identity. Closeness in language, 
religion and culture does not guarantee or preclude amenable expansion. History and shared 
memory can override or magnify closeness of culture, religion and language. Positive shared 
history and memory is a boon to expansion while negative shared history and memory a 
detraction. 
 
Positive shared history and memory: If the populations being expanded upon and expander have 
in the past been allied to defeat an invading enemy. If the two were together part of an historical 
empire that is perceived to have been civilized and learned. If this learned and civilized shared 
empire exists in living memory it will have a stronger affect than a purely historical example. If 
the living memory of said empire is remembered as being better than the current life the result 
will be positive likelihood towards identity viability.  
 
Negative shared history and memory: If the expander and populations being expanded upon have 
warred upon each other in the past (the more recent the war the stronger negative the effect). If 
the expander is perceived to have (in the past) perpetrated ill upon the populations being 
expanded upon (i.e. Genocide) or capital exploitation (i.e. slave trade or being colonized), if the 
two have been in a union or empire together that exists in living memory but the life is 
remembered as being worse than the current life.  
  
Conclusion 
Analysis of populations being expanded upon involves two points: Likelihood of an identity shift 
and Identity viability. Likelihood of an identity shift is essentially a measure of hope confidence. 
Populations with positive hope confidence are least likely to willingly undergo an identity shift, 
followed by populations by neutral hope confidence; populations with negative hope confidence 
are most likely to willingly undergo an identity shift.  Identity viability is a measure of how 
likely an expanding power is to being able to promote an acceptable border transcendent identity. 
Likelihood of populations accepting an offered identity from an expanding power necessitates 
that the population being expanded upon be likely to undergo an identity shift (i.e. have negative 
hope confidence), and, that the expanding power have the ability to offer an acceptable and 
compatible identity (i.e. there must be identity viability). 
 
Chapter 4 Summary: This chapter explained how the frame functions. Explained was that the 
frame is tiered and includes an analysis of the region, expanding power and populations being 
expanded upon, and, that each of these levels of analysis operate independently of each other. 
Also, each of the levels of analysis uses different combinations of the analytical typologies 
discussed in chapter 3. These three levels of the frame (analysis of the expanding power, 
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populations being expanded upon and regional analysis) were discussed and explained.  Though 
only the regional analysis was included complete in this chapter. The included regional analysis 
applied cultural faultline theory and proximate faultline typologies to the Euro-Asian continent 
(West of the Chinese Pacific coast to the Atlantic excluding East Asia and Africa). The 
application indicated that the region has 4 borderlands (i.e. The Caucuses, Central Asia, 
Ukraine/Belorussia, and, Mongolia). After this indication, it was discussed that to determine 
which borderlands were more likely to experience expansion one must apply borderland 
intricacies. These intricacies were discussed and then applied. The resulting list of borderlands 
ranked from most to least likely to experience expansion is as follows: (1) Central Asia, (2) The 
Caucuses, (3) Ukraine/Belorussia, and, (4) Mongolia.  
 
The next chapter will apply the frame to Central Asia.   
 
V. Chapter 5 - Application of the Frame-Central Asia 
In the Regional analysis above Central Asia was identified as being the most likely borderland to 
experience expansion.  The populations being expanded upon (thanks to Stalin) are divided into 
5 distinct societal structures (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) 
that could be potentially expanded upon by any of the neighboring fault lines (i.e. Russia, China, 
Turkey, Iran, Fundamentalist Islam and Arab Sunni). There are two components to the analysis 
of populations being expanded upon. (1) Likelihood of an identity shift, which is determined by 
hope confidence level of the population being expanded upon, and, (2) Compatibility of offered 
Identity, which is determined through cross referencing the identity that the expanding power is 
offering, or could possibly offer, against the historical, cultural and religious leanings of the 
population being expanded upon.  
 
This is not the first, second, or even third time that the Central Asia has been a borderland (i.e. 
caught between the rivalry of geostrategic players). It is worthwhile to compare and contrast the 
way in which the Central Asian borderland game has been played in the past vs. the way in 
which is being presently played. It has been decided to relegate said comparison to the annexes. 
This decision was made so as to avoid interrupting the flow of the main text and keeping the 
reader from losing focus of the main point of the research. The comparison of the Central Asian 
borderland iterations can be found in Annex 2.  
  
A.    Likelihood of an Identity shift 
Likelihood of an identity shift is correlated to hope confidence movement. Negative hope 
confidence leads likelihood of an identity shift. Positive hope confidence insinuates that there 
will be no identity shift. Neutral hope confidence projects not a likelihood of an identity shift 
rather than a potential that should be judged on a case-by-case basis. The most obvious way of 
determining the trajectory of a population’s hope confidence is to ask them. But, as discussed 
above, there is not always the possibility of quantitative fieldwork. Therefore, here, we have 
devised an alternative method of determining hope confidence trajectory. This method was 
discussed earlier in the text, but shall in summary be repeated below.  
 
This alternative method rests on the connection between hope confidence trajectory to societal 
movement towards/away from egalitarianism, which is a function of whether the societal status 
quo was built through legitimate or illegitimate manipulation, which can be determined through 
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an assessment of whether said status quo was legitimized using concrete versus non-concrete 
events. Therefore, the non-concrete/concrete dichotomy can through Euclid’s first common 
notion (“Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other”) determine hope 
confidence trajectory. The determination as to whether a societal status quo is built on concrete 
or non-concrete events is achieved through a legitimacy frame analysis.  
 
It is important to note that the below legitimacy frame analyses are summary analyses. Full 
legitimacy frame analyses for each Central Asian republic can be found in Annex 3. The choice 
to only include in the main text summary analyses and put the full analyses as an annex was 
made so as to help the narrative to flow unhindered.  
 
Kazakhstan 
With Kazakhstan we could just rely on the Gallup (2017) Institute’s survey on Happiness, Hope 
and Economic Optimism to determine the populations hope confidence level. According to the 
survey Kazakhstan can be considered as having positive hope confidence. The country scored 
positive numbers in every category and was ranked in the top 10 happiest countries with a total 
score of +74. Also, Kazakhstan scored a +35 on the hope index and a +11 on the economic 
optimism index.311 Though we could rely on this survey in regards to Kazakhstan the rest of the 
Central Asian countries were not included in this survey. Even though we could rely on this 
survey we choose to also evaluate Kazakhstan using a legitimacy frame analysis.  
 
Nursultan Nazarbaev is the leader and founder of the populational lobbyist conglomerate Clan 
Nazarbaev. Clan Nazarbaev deployed a frame of legitimacy that was domestic rule based on 
international engagement, recognition and “respect.”312 Claims of legitimacy based “on external 
recognition broadcast inward to domestic audiences.”313 Olcott (1992) highlights that 
Kazakhstan “paid more attention to its international representation than any other Central Asian 
republic.”314 The main pivot to hope confidence trajectory is whether this “international, 
engagement and respect” is a concrete event. In this understanding, it is considered a concrete 
event. Nazarbaev in fact did achieve said international engagement, recognition and “respect.” 
The pinnacle of this was Kazakhstan receiving the OSCE chair in 2010. Populational 
manipulation centered on concrete events will push towards egalitarianism, which in turn creates 
positive hope confidence. Therefore, Kazakhstan can be considered to have Positive hope 
confidence trajectory, and, therefore holds a low likelihood of undergoing an identity shift.  
                                                      
311 http://www.gallup-international.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017_Happiness_Hope_Economic-
Optimism.pdf 
312 Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence." Foreign Affairs. 71 (1991): 108. 
313 Schatz, Edward, (2006) pg.270 
314 Nazarbaev traveled more frequently and met with more international leaders than all his Central Asian 
counterparts: August 1991-British Prime Minister Thatcher, February 1992-Indian Prime Minister, February 
1992-Pakistani President, May 1992-US President Bush, September 1992-German Chancellor, October 1992-UN 
General Secretary, February 1993-the Austrian Chancellor, April 1993-Turkish President, October 1993-Iranian 
President, September 1994-Pope John Paul II, February 1994-President Clinton, February 1994-French 
President, April 1994- Empress of Japan, April 1994-Chinese Premier of the State Council, September 1994 
Saudi King, August 1995-Pakistani Prime Minister, September 1995-Chinese President, November 1995-French 
President, December 1995-Israeli Prime Minister, April 1993-Executive Director Chevron, May 1994-Japanese 
businessmen  July 1992-Nazarbaev attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki. 
October 1992-addressed the UN General Assembly, November 1995-given an award by the UNESCO General 
Director. 
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See Annex 3 for full Kazak legitimacy frame analysis. 
 
Uzbekistan  
Islam Karimov lead Clan Karimov in domestic power consolidation into authoritarian stability. 
The most prominent master frame exploited by Clan Karimov was ideology. Karimov and the 
ruling party constructed and transmitted to the population an ideological feedback loop called the 
“Ideology of National Independence.” According to the framework an ideological feedback loop 
has not the potential to be based on concrete events. As such, an ideological feedback loop is 
precluded from being able to create positive hope confidence. Ideological feedback loops 
produce negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by the hard-repressive transmission of 
the feedback loop. A situation which is expected to, at any particular moment, have a low 
likelihood of an identity shift, while at the same time, at any non-particular moment (over time) 
have a high likelihood of undergoing an identity shift. 
 
See Annex 3 for full Uzbek legitimacy frame analysis. 
 
Turkmenistan 
In Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov lead domestic clan power consolidation into authoritarian 
stability. Here, as in Uzbekistan, ideology was exploited as the master frame and an ideological 
feedback loop constructed and repressively transmitted. Ideological feedback loops have not the 
potential to create positive hope confidence. As such, Turkmen hope confidence trajectory has 
only the potential to be a negative slide buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the 
feedback loop. Therefore, likelihood of a populational identity shift, as in Uzbekistan, is low at 
any particular moment while very high at any non-particular moment (over time).  
 
See Annex 3 for full Turkmen legitimacy frame analysis. 
 
Tajikistan 
In Tajikistan (like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) president Emomali Rahmon lead domestic clan 
power consolidation into authoritarian stability through the transmission of an ideological 
feedback loop. As such, Tajik hope confidence trajectory has only the potential to be a negative 
slide buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the feedback loop. Therefore, likelihood 
of a Populational identity shift is low at any particular moment, while very high at any non-
particular moment (over time).  
 
See Annex 3 for full Turkmen legitimacy frame analysis. 
 
Kyrgyzstan  
The countries first president Askar Akaev deployed a legitimacy frame built around 
“democratization” and liberal societal and market transformation, a frame that in 1990 could 
potentially be based on non-concrete or concrete events. This because liberalization and 
democratization of post-Soviet space was a completely new experience with no like past 
concrete events to point to, which means no repetition and precedence with which to gauge if it 
should be considered a future concrete event.  One must wait until some time has passed and 
societal movement against egalitarianism can be gauged. Many considered Kyrgyzstan by 1998 
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to be a failed state. Considering freedom of speech and press there has been great movement 
towards egalitarianism. Considering quality of life and economic security there has been great 
movement away from egalitarianism.  Negative economic movement towards egalitarianism (in 
the long term) has a bigger impact on hope confidence trajectory than positive movement 
towards egalitarianism concerning freedom of speech and press.  
 
This is a situation where the ruling party uses the positive freedom of speech and press 
movement to buttress against the negative economic quality of life movement. The functioning is 
similar to an ideological feedback loop, in which the aim is to buttress a negative hope 
confidence into neutral. In this respect, the difference between the two is the chose lever with 
which the negative hope confidence slide is buttressed. In the Kyrgyz case the buttressing lever 
was positive gains in freedom of speech and press. Unfortunately, for the purveyors of this lever, 
freedom of speech press (unlike the hard and repressive buttress of the ideological feedback 
loop) is not strong enough to offset into neutral, for any sustainable amount of time, sustained 
negative economic movement. In addition, more freedom of speech and press ultimately will 
quicken the negative slide as it allows for a multiplication of populational lobbyist with the 
freedom, ability and platform to exploit and capitalize off the negative economic movement in 
their own attempts to gain power and overthrowing the present status quo. This process is 
demonstrated by the fact that there have been two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 1990 and none 
in the other Central Asian republics. The conclusion is that Kyrgyzstan has negative hope 
confidence trajectory, and is, therefore, more likely to undergo a populational identity shift.   
 
See Annex 3 for full Kyrgyz legitimacy frame analysis. 
 
Below is a chart that tabulates the 5 Central Asian republics and their hope confidence trajectory. 
 
Country Hope Confidence Trajectory 
Kazakhstan + 
Uzbekistan =  
Turkmenistan = 
Kyrgyzstan - 
Tajikistan = 
 
 
Populations with positive (+) hope confidence trajectory are less likely to experience an identity 
shift. Populations with negative hope confidence trajectory (-) are more likely to undergo an 
identity shift. Populations with (=) have at any particular moment a low likelihood; while at any 
non-particular moment (over time) have a high likelihood of an identity shift.  
 
 
 
B. Analysis of Expanding Powers 
The first point to an analysis of the expanding power is identifying whether said expanding 
power is projecting a bordered or border transcendent identity. This point will be rolled into an 
76 
 
analysis of compatible offered identities. The analysis will first focus on the Central Asian 
borderland as a whole and then be adjusted to focus on the 5 individual Central Asian republics. 
The result will be a series of charts illustrating the variation in likelihood of expansion based 
upon compatibility of offered identities. These charts will show illustrate how connection points 
were awarded according to the following categories: language, religion, shared history and 
memory. History and shared memory can be further parsed based on removal in time, and, 
whether the memory and history are viewed as positive or negative. Each element of a category 
can be awarded a score from 2 to -2 (0 being neutral) +1 is slight push towards likelihood and + 
2 a larger push.  Conversely -1 a slight push against likelihood and -2 a larger push against. The 
higher the total the more likely the specific neighbor will be able to bring to market a compatible 
border transcendent identity to Central Asia in a general sense (in the first section) and to each of 
the Central Asian Countries (in the second section). The lower the number the less likely.  
Additionally, it will be considered whether the expanding power is projecting a bordered border 
transcendent identity. If an expanding power is projecting a border transcendent identity 1 point 
will be awarded. No points will be awarded to those powers projecting a bordered identity.  The 
expanding powers being analyzed mirrors the list of neighbors to the Central Asian borderland 
(i.e. Turkey, Iran, China, India, Fundamental Islam, Arab Sunni, India and the Russian 
Federation). 
Turkey 
Bordered versus Border transcendent-Turkey is presently projecting a nationally bordered 
Turkish identity. A projected bordered identity receives no connection points.  
 
Projected Identity Total: (0) 
 
Religious connection: Most of Central Asia is self-proclaimed Sunni Muslim.315 Much of the 
population is predisposed to the secular versus the non-secular (due to the anti-religious stance of 
the CCCP), while at the same time much of the population is predisposed to the non-secular (also 
due to the anti-religious stance of the CCCP). 
 
Awarded connection Points-The fact that Turkey is mainly Muslim gives +1 point. The fact of 
being Sunni also brings +1 point. The fact of secularism brings no points because this is a boon 
to part of the Central Asian populations while being a detraction to the other parts of the 
population, therefore equaling out at 0.  
 
 
Religious total: +2 
Note: Sunni and Islam are only awarded 1 connection each point, this because, on a macro level 
(due the Soviets Religion Policy) Central Asian populations are mostly not spiritually moved to 
claim Sunni Muslim. Rather the claim is a result of genealogy and ancestry.316 
                                                      
315 According to the pew research institute the percentage of Muslims in the Central Asian republics in 2009 were: 
Tajikistan 98%, Uzbekistan 96.3%, Turkmenistan 93.1%, Kyrgyzstan 88%, Kazakhstan 70.2%. These 
percentages for the most part represent Sunni. Only Tajikistan has a Shia population above 1%,  which stands at 
7% Shia http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf   
316 “Although the Soviet Union was largely successful in destroying Islamic learning and the knowledge of Islamic 
teachings, it did not eliminate the majority of the population's self-perception as having an Islamic identity.” 
(Gunn 2003: 391) According to Olcott, "the consciousness of having an Islamic heritage was one of the elements 
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Shared History and Memory: Due to being part of the Ottoman Empire Central Asia has 
significant shared history and memory connected to Turkey. Connection, which is not ancient 
history but also already passed from living memory. The memory of Ottoman times does not 
evoke strong feelings pro or con of a better life or atrocities being levied on the Central Asian 
populations. Yet one can still hear people talking about how their grandparents wrote in the 
Arabic script due to the Ottomans. 
 
Shared History and Memory Connection Points-The fact of the Ottoman shared history and 
memory brings one connection point. Only 1 point because this memory is not super palpable 
anymore and does not evoke strong emotions.  
 
Shared history and memory total: +1 
 
Language Connection: Four out of five of the Central Asian languages are Turkic rooted  
 
Language Connection Points- +1 connection is awarded due to the root language connection, but 
not a full point because only 4/5 (80%) of the Central Asian countries share this root.  
 
Language total:  .8 
 
Consolidated Turkish Connection Points: 3.8  
 
Iran 
Bordered versus Border transcendent- Iran could decide to project a semi border transcendent 
Shia identity, or, could decide to project a nationally bordered Iranian identity. In the case of 
Central Asia projection both of these identities should be considered bordered. The Iranian 
identity is bordered because Central Asians are not Iranian. A Shia identity should also be 
considered bordered because the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian populations are 
Sunni.  
 
Projected Identity Total: (0) 
 
Iranian Religious connection: Most of Central Asia are self-proclaimed Sunni Muslims, while 
Iran is mainly Shia.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
which for the Central Asians continued to define their identities - even if a particular individual knew almost 
nothing about religion and observed none of its tenets" (Olcott 1995:21). “Being a "Muslim" is widely 
understood as constituting an integral part of the identity of the majority of Central Asia's population.”  (Gunn 
2003: 391) "Virtually all indigenous Central Asians consider themselves Muslim, although a large number of 
Central Asians have only a vague idea about what that implies. Most Central Asians simply observe that being 
Muslim distinguishes them from [Christians] and that to be a Muslim means to live in their traditional style and 
to practice rituals related to their beliefs" (Gleason 1997:42) “The Muslims of the region think of Islam as being 
a part of their social identity in a way similar to how they conceive of their ethnicity, family, and mother 
tongue.” (Gunn 2003: 391) 
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Iranian Religious Connection Points- The fact that Iran is mainly Muslim gives 1 point. The fact 
being mostly Shia is a -1 against the Sunni character of Central Asia.  These points cancel each 
other out. 
 
Iranian Religious total: 0 
 
Iranian Shared History and Memory:  For the most part (excepting Turkmenistan) Central Asia 
did not fall under the dominion of the Persian Empire. This does not mean that there is no shared 
history and memory. The idea of the Silk Road is principal to the Central Asian identity. This 
Silk Road memory cannot be held without recognizing a shared past that is intertwined with the 
Persians and their culture. But this shared past and memory is far removed pushing towards time 
almost forgotten. The almost mythical role that the Silk Road has taken on in the context of 
Central Asia means that these times cannot be remembered as good or bad, though the myth 
pushes positive. 
  
Iranian Shared History and Memory Connection Points- One point is awarded for the ancient 
memory of the Persians that is intertwined into the history of the Silk Road. One point is 
awarded to the fact that the almost mythical nature of the “Great Silk Road” pushes positive this 
forgotten memory. 
 
Iranian Shared history and memory total: +2 
 
Iranian Language Connection: 1 out of 5 of the Central Asian languages (Turkmen) is a dialect 
of Persian and therefore share the same root as Farsi, the major language of Iran.  
 
Iranian Language Connection Points-One connection point is awarded due to the root language 
connection, but not a full point because only 1/5 (20%) of the Central Asian countries share this 
root.  
 
Iranian Language total:  .2 
 
Consolidated Iranian connection points: 2.2 
 
China 
 Bordered versus Border transcendent- China is presently projecting a nationally bordered 
Chinese national identity. Therefore, no connection points are awarded.  
 
Projected Identity Total: (0) 
 
Religious connection: Central Asia has no religious connection with China 
 
Chinese Religious total: 0 
 
Chinese Shared History and Memory: The Central Asian populations have thousands-year-old 
relationship with the Chinese, a story of two different peoples, in Empires together, but in a 
master/conquered relationship with both peoples playing both parts over the millennia. This 
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history, when remembered highlights not being able to live together as one, not of compatible 
identities. This is a negative when held against compatibility of identities and being able to live 
together under one roof.  
 
Chinese Shared history and memory total: -1 
  
Language Connection: There is negative language connection between Central Asia and 
Chinese. Chinese is about as far from the Central Asian languages that one can get.  
 
Chinese Language total:  - 2 
 
Consolidated Chinese Connection Points: - 3 
 
Fundamental Islam 
Bordered versus Border transcendent-Fundamentalist Sunni Islam is a fully transcendent identity 
without a concomitant governing societal structure. This means that, at the moment, expansion 
will not be territorial but Populational. Territorial expansion is not possible until the moment 
when a structure is created, coopted or taken by force (Isis is the most prominent example of the 
Fundamental Islamic fault line creating a concomitant structure with which to exact territorial 
expansion).317 Fundamental Islam is considered a border transcendent identity but the fact that 
they do not control concomitant societal structure means that only a half a point is awarded.  
 
Fundamental Islam Projected Identity Total: (.5) 
 
Fundamental Islam Religious connection: Fundamental Islam is for the most part Sunni. Across 
Central Asia a majority perception is negative towards the fundamental aspect, though there are 
in places (to varying degrees) an undercurrent of fundamental sympathizers. Though (in Central 
Asia as a whole) the negative pressure from the majority outweighs the minority level of 
sympathy.  
 
Fundamental Islam Religious Connection Points-One point is awarded here for the Sunni aspect 
and one for Islam. The fact that the negative pressure against the fundamental aspect outweighs 
sympathy results in a negative point.   
 
Fundamental Islam Religious total: +1 (Sunni) +1 (Islam) – 1(fundamental)= 1  
 
Fundamental Islam Shared History and Memory: Only since 1990 (since the fall of CCCP) has 
there been an open relationship between Central Asia and extreme types of Islam. This is not 
enough shared history and memory to gauge an effect; as such we apply a zero.  
                                                      
317 There may be analyst who argue this situation is one in which Pakistan and Afghanistan have coopted the 
fundamental ideology as locomotion for their societal structures. Here we do not take this view. We do not 
accept the view that either the present Pakistani or Afghani government has been co-opted by fundamental Islam. 
Here we do subscribe to the view that many individuals in these governments are fundamentalist sympathizers 
but as of yet they have not been able to co-opt the governments. The view here is that the Taliban, when 
governing Afghanistan, was a situation in which fundamental Islam had co-opted a government. But the Taliban 
no longer controls the Afghani government. 
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Fundamental Islam Shared history and memory total: 0 
 
Language Connection: Arabic has a connection to Central Asia both through it being the 
language of the Koran and the fact that Arabic script was used during Ottoman times. People 
remember that their Grandmothers wrote in Arabic script. Also, it has a connection through the 
self-proclaimed majority Islamic nature of the populations. The idea of learning Arabic has a 
positive and non-foreign connotation. Also, many across the region already speak Arabic. As 
such one connection point is awarded. 
 
Fundamental Islam Language total:  +1 
 
Consolidated Fundamental Islam connection points: 2.5 
 
Arab Sunni 
  Bordered versus Border transcendent-The Arab world is projecting a regionally bordered Arab 
identity. The reach of the regional transcendence of Arab does not extend into Central Asia. 
Central Asians are not Arabs; they can never be Arabs. As such, no connection point is awarded. 
Arab World has tried to project a border transcendent Sunni identity. The result has been 
populational expansion of the Sunni religion. But this projection has been made with an 
underlying understanding that, the purveyors of this Sunni projection are Arabs, while the 
recipients of this Sunni projection are not Arab. This imbedded distinction essentially decouples 
the Sunni identity projection from the Arab state apparatus, making the Sunni projected identity 
not an ephemeral bordered identity. Which means that it is unlikely that this projection will result 
territorial expansion, rather than Sunni populational expansion, and that this populational 
expansion is not necessarily connected or controlled by the Arab states.  
 
Arab Sunni Projected Identity Total: 0 
 
Arab Sunni Religious connection: One point is awarded here for the Sunni aspect and one point 
for the Islamic aspect of the Arab projected identity. 
 
Arab Sunni Religious total: +2 
 
Arab Sunni Shared History and Memory: The shared history and memory concerning the Arab 
Sunni line is not a direct connection. The shared memory history and memory is one of two 
peoples being part of a larger conquering Empire (i.e. Ottoman). This is not a direct Empire 
connection as with Turkey (Ottoman Empire) or Iran (Persian Empire). The result is that a score 
of zero is applied. 
 
Arab Sunni Shared history and memory total: 0 
 
Arab Sunni Language Connection: Arabic has a connection to Central Asia both through the fact 
that Arabic script was used during Ottoman times. People remember that their Grandmothers 
wrote in Arabic script. Also, it has a connection through the self-proclaimed majority Islamic 
nature of the populations. The idea of learning Arabic has a positive and non-foreign 
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connotation. Also, many across the region already speak Arabic. As such one connection point is 
awarded. 
 
Arab Sunni Language total:  +1 
 
Consolidated Arab Sunni connection points: 3 
 
India 
  Bordered versus Border transcendent -India is projecting an Indian national bordered identity. 
Therefore, no connection points are awarded.  
 
Indian Religious connection: There is a superfluous Muslim connection due to the fact there are 
172 million Muslims in India, but these Muslims are part of a societal structure that has coopted 
Hinduism, as such half a connection point is given. 
 
Indian Religious total: +.5 
 
Indian Shared History and Memory: There is limited history and shared memory due to the 
natural barrier of the Himalayas, but India, like Iran, is part and parcel of the legacy of the Silk 
Road legacy. Though, the Indian presence in this (now almost mythical) legacy is less than that 
of the Persians, as such a half a connection point is applied.   
 
Indian Shared history and memory total: + .5 
 
Indian Language Connection: Hindi is as foreign to Central Asia as Chinese is. Therefore, 
negative two points are applied 
 
Indian Language Connection total: -2 
 
Indian consolidated connection points: -1 
 
Russian Federation 
Bordered versus Border transcendent–Here there is a federational structure, which makes Russia 
the only neighbor whose structure is not bordered either nationally or ethnically. Not nationally 
bordered because a federation can always invite others to join in a way that a nation state cannot. 
Also, Russia already has over 150 ethnicities within the federation. The result is that the identity 
being projected by the Russian Federation is a regionally transcendent with the potential to 
include Central Asia. Therefore, one connection point is awarded. 
 
Russian Projected Identity Total: +1 
 
Russian Religious connection: There is no religious connection coming implicitly from the 
Russian federational structure, though the Russian Federation does include several Muslim 
republics. The fact of having Muslim republics is worth half a connection point. 
 
Russian Religious total: +.5 
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Russian Shared History and Memory: Central Asia has two distinct memories and histories 
concerning Russia. (1) Imperial Russia, and, (2) Soviet Russia. 
(1) Imperial Russia is still remembered for their harsh treatment of the Central Asian 
populations including what some call a genocide of Kyrgyz and Kazaks in 1916.  
Imperial Russia, like the Ottoman Empire, is not so far removed in time to be ancient, yet 
already passed from living memory. The remembrance of Imperial Russia is negative, but 
Imperial Russia was overthrown with the Bolshevik revolution in 1918. Imperial Russia 
is not necessarily counted as being connected to the modern Russian Federation. 
Therefore, (-.5) is applied for the shared memory and history of Imperial Russia.  
(2) The Soviet Union is very much still contained in the modern memory of the population. 
The Central Asian populations (generally) considered themselves happy under Soviet 
rule. In fact, at the time of the collapse not a single Central Asian Republic wanted to 
leave the Union. They all tried to stay in the Union rather than opting for independence. 
The quality of life provided by the independent republics (for the majority of the central 
Asian populations) has dramatically fallen compared to life in the CCCP.  The Soviet 
Union has become the memory of what the “good times” used to be like. Good times, 
which the independent republics cannot seem to replicate. Therefore, two connection 
points are awarded.  
 
Russian Shared history and memory total:  +2 (CCCP)-.5(Imperial Russia) = 1.5 
 
Russian Language total: Thanks to CCCP Russian is understood and spoken relatively well 
across the Central Asian Populations.318 Therefore, two connection points are awarded: 
 
Consolidated Russian Federation connection points: 5 
 
(a) General Central Asian Identity Compatibility Tabulation  
 China India Iran Fundamental 
Islam 
Arab Sunni Turkey Russia 
Projected 
Identity 
0 0 0 .5 0 0 1 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 0 1 2 2. .5 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 1 1 .8 2 
Shared History 
and Memory 
-1 .5 2 0 0 1 1.5 
Total: -3 -1 2.2 2.5 3 3.8 5 
 
                                                      
318 According to A.L. Aref’eva (2012) in the period 2009-2012 the percentage of the Central Asian populations who 
were fluent in Russian was: Kazakhstan 84%, Kyrgyzstan 49%, Uzbekistan 41%, Tajikistan 33%, Turkmenistan 
18%  
 
 
83 
 
Compatible Identities held against specific Central Asian Republics 
 
China, India and Arab Sunni 
China, India and Arab Sunni numbers do not change from the general sense to the context of 
specific Central Asian Republics. 
 
Iran 
The only modification to the Iranian numbers concern language connection and Turkmenistan.  
Turkmen is a dialect of Persian. Therefore, concerning Turkmenistan Iran receives 1 language 
connection point (versus .2 points against Central Asia as a whole).   
 
Turkey 
Turkish numbers must be modified concerning language connection and Turkmenistan.  
Turkmen is the only Central Asian language that is not Turkish rooted, therefore, when talking 
about Turkmenistan Turkey loses the +1 language connection point it received against Central 
Asia as a whole. Also, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have a much more spiritual 
belief in Islam than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. As such the secular nature of the Turkish line 
is expected to be a minus when talking about these three republics. Therefore, turkey loses a 
religion connection point when concerning Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
 
Fundamental Islam 
Fundamental Islam enjoys more support among the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen populations than 
it does in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan. Increased support is believed to be a function of 2 
mechanisms. (1) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan all-share borders with either Pakistan 
or Afghanistan, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan do not.  Populations that have shared borders 
are more easily accessible than populations without. (2) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan are all structured by ideological feedback loops. Fundamental Islam is also 
powered by an ideological feedback loop. Therefore, the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen populations 
are already predisposed to this kind of ruling ideology. Kazak and Kyrgyz are not ruled by 
ideological legitimacy frames and thus less disposed.  In this case Fundamental Islam receives an 
extra religious connection point when talking about Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.  
 
Russia 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are (as opposed to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) more 
spiritually (rather than genealogical) prone to claiming Islam. This more spiritual connection 
means that the history of being part of the CCCP takes less positive view as it is more likely to 
be remembered in the sense of stifling and being an enemy of the Islamic faith. This takes away 
one shared history and memory connection point from Russia when talking about Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.  Also, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have a much lower 
Russian language penetration and proficiency than in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. As such one 
language connection point is deducted. 
 
Below are the country specific connection point tabulations. 
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(b) Kyrgyzstan 
 China India Iran Fundamental 
Islam 
Arab Sunni Turkey Russia 
Functioning  
Identity 
0 0 0 .5 0 0 1 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 0 1 2 2. .5 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 1 1 .8 2 
Shared 
History and 
Memory 
-1 .5 2 0 0 1 2 
Total: -3 -1 2 2.5 3 3.8 5.5 
 
 
(c)  Kazakhstan 
 China India Iran Fundamental 
Islam 
Arab Sunni Turkey Russia 
Functioning  
Identity 
0 0 0 .5 0 0 1 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 0 1 2 2. .5 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 1 1 .8 2 
Shared 
History and 
Memory 
-1 .5 2 0 0 1 2 
Total: -3 -1 2 2.5 3 3.8 5.5 
 
(d) Uzbekistan  
 China India Iran Turkey Arab 
Sunni 
Russia Fundamental 
Islam 
Functioning  
Identity 
0 0 0 0 0 1 .5 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 0 1 2 .5 2 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 .8 1 1 1 
Shared 
History and 
Memory 
-1 .5 2 1 0 1 0 
Total: -3 -1 2 2.8 3 3.5 3.5 
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(e) Tajikistan  
 China India Iran Turkey Arab 
Sunni 
Russia Fundamental  
Islam 
Functioning  
Identity 
0 0 0 0 0 1 .5 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 0 1 2 .5 2 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 .8 1 1 1 
Shared 
History and 
Memory 
-1 .5 2 1 0 1 0 
Total: -3 -1 2 2.8 3 3.5 3.5 
 
 
(f) Turkmenistan  
 China India Turkey Arab 
Sunni 
Russia Fundamental 
Islam 
Iran 
Functioning  
Identity 
0 0 0 0 1 .5 0 
Religious 
Connection 
0 .5 1 2 .5 2 0 
Language 
Connection 
-2 -2 0 1 1 1 2 
Shared 
History and 
Memory 
-1 .5 1 0 1 0 2 
Total: -3 -1 2 3 3.5 3.5 4 
 
The above section conflated an analysis of the expanding power (concerning whether a bordered 
or border transcendent is presently being projected by each borderland neighbor) with the 
compatibility of offered identity concerning the populations being expanded upon. The result is a 
numerical value that represents the potential that each central Asian neighbor will be able to 
bring to market a compatible border transcendent identity to the populations of Central Asia. The 
higher the number the higher the likelihood that a specific expanding power will be able to bring 
to market a compatible border transcendent identity, the higher the number the larger the 
likelihood that a specific expanding power will be able to reach identity viability with the 
populations being expanded upon. 
 
Some might consider the above analysis threadbare and claim that any analysis trying to quantify 
culture, language and historical connection demands a much more in depth reading. The 
response to this criticism is agreement with the statement and reminder that the point of this 
treatise is not depth of the analysis rather than the example of how to use the frame to make the 
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analysis. Therefore, the fact that the analysis is threadbare in its depth does not affect its 
relevance towards the intended goal (i.e. an example application of the frame). The suggestion is 
that anyone using the frame should dig deeper into the quantification and comparison of the 
connection points. But again, here, we are not using the frame rather than just giving an example 
analysis to show it functions.  
 
The following section continues with the expanding power analysis and looks at Central Asian 
geopolitical viability. 
 
C. Central Asian Geopolitical Viability 
The question here is which Central Asian neighbors can be considered having geopolitical 
viability, and which ones considered holding no geopolitical viability.  
 
No-Geopolitical Viability  
Turkey and Arab Sunni 
Arab Sunni and Turkish lines can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. This is due 
the fact that both Arab Sunni line and Turkish do not directly border the Central Asian 
borderland. Any expansion by Arab Sunni or Turkish lines requires going over or through Iran or 
Russia. There is no geopolitical viability in going through another neighbor. While going over a 
neighbor towards expansion is a weakened position and is almost always not geopolitically 
viable. Going over means that the territory being expanded upon will be isolated from potential 
reinforcements. This raises the cost exponentially for the expanding power while lowering the 
costs to bordering neighbors who want to render the move a losing one. Going over a neighbor 
towards expansion is only a viable option when there is a significant power gap in favor of the 
expanding power in relation to the neighbor skipped over. In the case of Turkey and Arab Sunni 
lines there is no significant favorable power gap in the context of Iran or Russia. Therefore, the 
Arab Sunni and Turkish lines have no geopolitical viability concerning territorial expansion into 
Central Asia. Therefore, unless Turkey or the Arab Sunni lines are considered to be non-rational 
or cornered-rational actors then the likelihood is very low of expansion into Central Asia.  Also, 
both Turkey and the Arab world are predominately Sunni, which means that any expansion into 
Central Asia would be seen as an extreme threat to the predominately Shia Iran. It is probable 
that Iran would be willing to commit the necessary resources raise the associated costs of a 
Turkish or Arab expansion past the point of being a viable move.  
 
India 
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability towards Central Asian territorial 
expansion. This is due to the rivalry with Pakistan. Any Indian territorial expansion into Central 
Asia will certainly be seen by Pakistan as an aggressive move. Pakistan is probable to commit 
necessary resources to render any Indian expansion into Central Asia too expensive to be a 
viable move. Also, the rivalry with Pakistan consumes India in an obsessive-compulsive way 
preventing it from imagining an attempt to expand into Central Asia.  
 
Iran 
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. Any Iranian expansion into Central Asia 
will be pushing towards increasing contiguity with the Fundamental Islamic neighbor. Expansion 
to contiguity will almost always induce a response that is likely to render the expansive move too 
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expensive. Also, The Arab Sunni line (like India with Pakistan) is obsessively consumed with 
Iranian power moves. Any move by Iran to gain influence anywhere will be met with Arab Sunni 
and (probably Turkish) interference to stop it. It was Iranian gains in Iraq that pushed the Arab 
Sunni governments to allow for and help create ISIS.  
China 
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. This lack of geopolitical viability is partly 
a function of having the lowest score (-3) concerning compatibility of identities. Such a low 
score means that opposing neighbors will get more distance out of resources aimed at ultimately 
rendering the expansion a losing move.  
 
All the above listed neighbors, along with the reasons listed above; also, must deal with a high 
potential that Russia will be willing and able to commit the necessary moves to derail any 
programs of Central Asian expansion from any and all of the neighbors. Russia feels that Central 
Asia is their sphere of influence. Russia is not likely to let any of the other neighbors gain 
influence that is not approved by the Kremlin, especially any kind of territorial expansion. 
Therefore, all the above listed neighbors also hold no geopolitical viability because Russia is 
likely to be willing and able to commit the necessary resources to raise the associated costs of 
any expansive move by any of the Central Asian neighbors past the threshold of being worth it.  
 
Neighbors with Geopolitical Viability  
Russia 
Russia is the only neighbor that can expand into Central Asia and not push to contiguity with 
another neighbor. Russia can expand into Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan without pushing to 
contiguity with any neighbor (excluding China). Contiguity with China is excluded because of 
China’s -3 identity compatibility score held against Russia’s 5.5. What this means is that in the 
event of Russian expansion China will get diminishing returns on its effort to derail. For if 
Russian expansion is amenable and China attempts to derail, the perception will be a neighbor 
with no compatibility interfering with wanted Russian expansion. The point is that the -3 score 
on identity compatibility severely limits China from derailing Russian expansion, which the 
Chinese understand. Therefore, it is likely that China would look past any Russian expansion in 
the knowledge that, in this case, attempting to derail the expansion is likely to be a loss to China, 
and not necessarily raise the associated costs past the threshold necessary to make it a losing 
move for Russia.  
 
Fundamental Islam 
Can be considered to have geopolitical viability because this is a fully transcendent identity with 
no attached structure. The implication is that there is no expanding structure for any opponents to 
rail against and no connected structure to bear the increased costs. Derailing the spread of an 
ideology is an extremely hard and impractical undertaking. Once there is an attached structure, 
then it can be railed against and expansion pushed past the cost threshold, but until then there is a 
de-facto geopolitical viability that comes along with fully transcendent identities lacking a 
structure.  
 
Geopolitical Viability Tabulation  
Below is a tabulation of the geopolitical viability of the Central Asian neighbors.  
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Iran N 
China N 
Turkey N 
India N 
Arab/Sunni N 
Russia Y 
Fundamental Islam Y 
 
Actors without geopolitical viability (i.e. Iran, China, Turkey, India and Arab Sunni lines), if 
they are part of the rational actor bell curve, have a low likelihood of undertaking programs of 
expansion. Actors with geopolitical viability (i.e. fundamental Islam and Russian Federation) do 
not have a likelihood of expansion rather than the potential of expansion, which must be 
determined on a case by case basis using conditional if and when statements.   
 
Concerning Fundamental Islam: A fully transcendent identity cannot create territorial expansion 
only populational expansion. Therefore, fundamental Islam will not enact programs of territorial 
expansion into Central Asia. If and when fundamental Islam is coopted into the governing 
structure of one of the Central Asian neighbors they will have the ability to enact territorial 
expansion but will cease to have geopolitical viability. For Russia will commit the necessary 
resources to derail such an expansive move. Therefore, in the event that a Central Asian neighbor 
coopts fundamental Islam as the locomotion behind it societal structure it still will not be likely 
to enact programs of expansion, unless this new fundamental Islamic state is considered to be 
outside the rational player bell curve. It is possible that fundamental Islam will coopt directly 
into Central Asia. That there will be a revolution in one of the Central Asian republics and a 
fundamental Islamic group comes out on top. Such a case would be territorial expansion into 
Central Asia by fundamental Islam in a way that bypasses the issue of geopolitical viability. In 
this scenario, the expectation is that any further expansion past the borders of the coopted 
republic would not be geopolitically viable, and therefore low in likelihood.  
 
Concerning the Russian Federation: The Russian Federation is likely to move towards territorial 
expansion into Central Asia if and when they feel that it is to their geopolitical advantage to do 
so. The Russian federation is likely to move towards geopolitical expansion if and when they feel 
that they are losing their geopolitical viability. Russian movement towards expansion into 
Central Asia is likely when they feel that their influence is declining to the point that they no 
longer hold a decisive advantage over the other neighbors.  
 
D. Central Asian Frame Conclusion 
According to the frame Russia is the most likely power to expand into Central Asia and 
Kyrgyzstan the most likely of the Central Asian Republics to look for and invite in an expanding 
neighbor.  
 
Though, as stated many times, the main point here is not the answers posited rather than the 
construction of the frame and the example analysis given. Again, it will be reiterated that the 
above analysis is not the only way to view the situation. The analysis is based on many 
subjective readings of pieces of the puzzle. It is possible that another analyst may read the 
underlying components in a completely different light than viewed above. The point is not to 
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argue about the different subjective measures used to operationalize the frame rather than to 
create the frame so that that it could be operationalized to begin with. Again, we quote Fargrieve, 
who was one of the first scholars to write about borderlands in the context of territorial 
expansion:  
 
“some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but the 
correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that statement or 
view. 
 
Chapter 5 Summary: Starting with the analysis of populations being expanded upon, which 
encompasses two analytical components. 1) Likelihood of an identity shift, which is solely 
determined by looking at the population being expanded upon, and, (2) Compatibility of offered 
Identity, which is determined through cross referencing the identity that the expanding power is 
offering, or could possibly offer, against the historical, cultural and religious leanings of the 
population being expanded upon. First addressed was likelihood of an identity shift, which is 
correlated to projected hope confidence trajectory. As discussed in chapter 3 the method being 
used to determine hope confidence trajectory is a legitimacy frame analysis, which is referenced 
against concrete/non-concrete events. The indication from this analysis (which was applied to 
each of the 5 Central Asian republics) is as follows: Kazakhstan is holding positive hope 
confidence trajectory making it the lease likely to undergo an identity shift. Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and, Turkmenistan are all holding negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by 
hard transmission of an ideological feedback loop, which means that these three republics have 
at any particular moment a low likelihood of undergoing an identity shift, but at any non-
particular moment (over time) they have a high likelihood of undergoing an identity shift. 
Kyrgyzstan is holding negative hope confidence trajectory and thus more likely to undergo an 
identity shift.  
 
Next the chapter addressed an analysis of compatibility of offered identities in the context of the 
five potential expanding powers (i.e. the neighbors to the Central Asian borderland; i.e. Turkey, 
Russia, Iran, Extreme Islam, Arab Sunni and China).  In this analysis connection points were 
awarded to each potential expanding power on the basis of language, religion, shared history and 
memory. Also included in this analysis was the analysis of the expanding power (i.e. whether 
each expanding power is projecting a bordered or border transcendent identity). Points were 
awarded (from -2 to +2) according to the variables listed and depending on whether the variable 
had a negative or positive connection to the population being expanded upon. These points were 
then tabulated. The lower the number the less likely that the expanding power would be 
successful in being able to bring to market a compatible and acceptable identity. First the 
tabulation was done against Central Asia as a whole and then against the 5 independent Central 
Asian republics. If looking at Central Asia as a whole the list of expanding powers from most to 
least likely to be able to successfully offer a compatible identity is as follows: 1) Russia, 2) 
Turkey, 3) Arab Sunni, 4) Extreme Islam, 5) Iran, 6) India, and, 7) China.  
 
Following the analysis of the populations being expanded upon (Central Asia) was a geopolitical 
viability analysis in the context of the seven potential expanding powers. The indication is that of 
these seven powers 5 do not have geopolitical viability (i.e. Turkey, Arab Sunni, Iran, India, and 
China) and 2 have geopolitical viability (Russian and Fundamental Islam).   
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VI. Chapter 6 - Application of the Frame-Ukraine 
According to the above Regional Analysis Ukraine/Belorussian borderland is a two-neighbor 
borderland (neighbors: EU and Russian Federation) and was assessed to be (next to Mongolia) 
the least likely borderland to experience expansion. Here we focus on Ukraine. We start with an 
analysis of the populations being expanded upon, which (as noted above) has two components 
(1) likelihood of an identity shift, and, (2) compatibility of offered identities. We start with 
likelihood of an identity shift.  
 
Likelihood of an Identity Shift (Analysis of Populations being expanded upon) 
The current Ukrainian conflict is a function of different sectors of the population having already 
undergone identity shifts. Having already placed positive hope confidence in competing ideas of 
future societal structuring. Hope confidence has already been placed in either the Russian 
Federation or the EU. Therefore, the analytical point here is to determine which Ukrainian 
populations have placed positive hope confidence in the EU and which populations in the 
Russian Federation.  Identifying the populations that have placed hope confidence in the Russian 
Federation allows deducing which populations have placed hope confidence in the EU. There are 
two pivot points that can be used to locate populations holding hope confidence in the Russian 
Federation. Many claim that primary Russian speaking populations are likely to have hope 
confidence in the Russian Federation. Such a view of Ukraine looks like this. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Others claim that it is Ethnic Russians that are likely to have positive hope confidence in the 
Russian Federation. Such a view of Ukraine looks like this.  
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There is a stark difference between the geography covered by primary Russian speakers versus 
ethnic Russians. Populations of ethnic Russians are contained to less than 10% of the country 
with largest concentrations being in the far-east border regions with Russia (3 oblasts, Donetsk 
Luhansk, and Crimea), while concentrations of primary Russian speakers are contained in about 
50% of the country (7 oblasts, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odessa 
and Crimea). The difference between the two views (whether one thinks ethnic Russians or 
Primary Russian speakers hold hope confidence in the Russian federation) directly affects the 
assessed reach of Russian soft power, and, the size of the (perceived) population who wish to see 
the societal structure push towards the Russian Federation.  Ethnicity as the pivot point relegates 
likely Russian expansion to the Ukrainian/Russian Federation border areas (10% of the country 
and 3 oblasts), while language as the pivot relegates likelihood of Russian expansion much 
deeper (about 50% of the country and 7 oblasts). Below it will be argued that ethnicity is the 
more reliable pivot point in regards to populations who have placed positive hope confidence in 
movement towards the Russian Federation.  
 
Conclusion: The populations of the Ukraine hold positive hope confidence, albeit, in different 
and competing versions of imagined societal structuring. Even so, the answer is still, that the 
populations of the Ukraine (due to the positive hope confidence) are not likely to shift away from 
backing either movement towards the EU or the Russian Federation. The implication is that both 
the EU and Russian Federation have likelihood to expand upon the portions of the populations, 
which have placed positive hope confidence in the respective neighbors (i.e. Russian Federation 
or EU).   
 
Country Hope Confidence 
Ukraine  + 
 
A.  Expanding Power analysis    
There are two points that are discussed here; (1) Whether the expanding powers are projecting a 
bordered or border transcendent identity, and, (2) Compatibility of offered identities.   
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Expanding Power Projected Identity 
Russian Federation 
If the pivot point being used as a gauge is Russian ethnicity, then the Russian Federation does 
not necessarily have to project a border transcendent identity to accomplish amenable expansion. 
In fact, if marketing to primarily ethnic Russian populations it may be advantageous to project an 
ethnically bordered Russian identity rather than a regionally transcendent federational identity. 
On the other hand, if the pivot point being used is Russian language speakers, then projecting a 
regionally transcendent federational identity likely will be more effective. To this point, the 
Russian Federation can project either. The advantages of a projected federational identity versus 
an ethnic Russian identity are dependent on the audience being projected to (i.e. Russian 
speakers vs. ethnic Russians).  
 
European Union 
 A union identity is always regionally transcendent, for the Union can always offer its neighbors 
the option to join. The European identity (as opposed to a European Union identity) has since the 
fall of the CCCP become a regionally transcendent identity that keeps being redefined by those 
populations that are offered Union membership. Brussels, on a macro scale has done a good job 
of conflating being European with being offered EU membership. On a micro scale, not all the 
classically considered European populations buy into this conflagration. One does hear micro 
grumbling that some of the admitted EU populations should not (outside of the technicality of 
being part of the EU) be considered European.  Despite this, Brussels markets to interested 
parties that becoming part of the EU (technically) will result in becoming European. The 
marketing is one in which a regionally transcendent Union identity brings with it the 
transformation to becoming European. The EU is projecting to (non-Russian) Ukrainian 
populations the idea that moving towards the Union is movement towards becoming European.  
 
A. Compatibility of Offered Identities 
Compatibility of offered identities, in the context of Ukraine, is held against four sub-
populations. Ethnic Russians, Russian Speakers, Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian Speakers. 
These groups also happen to be (in the context of Ukrainian national territory) concentrated 
along Eastern/Western geographic divide. Ethnic Russian and Russian speakers concentrated in 
the East and Ethnic Ukrainian and Ukrainian speakers in the west. Below we discuss the 
compatibility of EU and Russian Federation offered identities held against these 4 Ukrainian 
sub-populations.   
 
Russian Federation 
Russian Speakers   
While all ethnic Russians can be considered primary Russian Speakers not all Russian Speakers 
can be considered Ethnic Russians. As displayed by the above maps there is a much larger 
concentration of Russian primary speakers in Ukraine than there are ethnic Russians. Russian 
speakers (as a group) are comprised of one or more of the other ethnicities that make up the 
Ukrainian population. Therefore, any Russian speaker could be Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, 
German, Polish, Moldavian, Romanian, Belarussian, Greek, Bulgarian, Tartar, Romani or 
“other.” This mix makes it very hard to judge the compatibility of any Russian Federation 
offered identity concerning the amalgamated group “Russian Speakers.” Therefore, the only 
certain positive connection area that the Russian Federation holds in the context of primary 
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Russian speakers is language connection. Though this language connection is easily undermined 
and weakened by other negative connections (i.e. religious, shared history or memory). In 
addition, the language connection is potentially undermined by the fact that primary Russian 
speakers do not necessarily speak only Russian. Many of these primary Russian speakers may in 
fact also speak Ukrainian. Excluding language (as it has already been established that we are 
talking about primary Russian speakers) let us take a cursory glance at the ethnicities that make 
up the category “primary Russian speaker” and the connection point categories in the context of 
the Russian Federation.  
 
Jews-have a different religion than Orthodox Christianity, and a shared history and memory 
involving both Imperial and CCCP in which persecution is a recurring theme.319,320,321  
 
Ukrainians-may or may not be Orthodox and have a shared history and memory with the CCCP, 
which holds a very negative connotation.322,323,324  
 
Germans- not are likely to be orthodox, also with a likely negative perception concerning shared 
history and memory in regards to CCCP and Imperial Russia.325 
 
Polish-Most likely not orthodox with a likely negative perception of the shared history and 
memory of the CCCP.326,327 
 
Belarusians-more likely to be Orthodox and with a less negative shared history and memory 
concerning CCCP.328,329 
 
Moldavians-likely to be Orthodox with a likely negative perception of shared history and 
memory of the CCCP.330,331 
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Greek-likely to be orthodox, here it is important to remember that their countrymen were not in 
the CCCP rather than being part and parcel of the opposing team (the West), as such, their view 
of the CCCP likely to be skewed negative. 
 
Bulgarians-likely orthodox with a negative perception of the shared history and memory of the 
CCCP.332 
 
Tartars-probably not orthodox with a likely negative perception of the shared history and 
memory of the CCCP.333,334 
 
Romani-not likely to be orthodox with a shared history and memory of the CCCP in which 
persecution was a recurring theme.335,336 
 
A cursory glance indicates a majority of the ethnicities that make up the population of primary 
Russian speakers have negative shared history and memory concerning the Russian Federation. 
Negative shared history and memory which is expected to overshadow any positive religious and 
language connection. The indication is that the Russian Federation will have an upward battle in 
marketing a compatible identity to Primary Russian speakers who are not Ethnic Russians.  
 
Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as not having identity viability 
concerning primary Russian speakers. 
 
Ethnic Russians  
Among the four Ukrainian sub-populations Ethnic Russians are expected to be the group with 
which the Kremlin is most likely to be successful in being able to offer a compatible identity. All 
connection areas are expected to be positive. Russia offering a compatible identity to ethnic 
Russians needs no in-depth explanation. What does need mentioning is that in many ways this 
connection is de-facto rather than a choice. For ethnic Russians are not Asian, nor Arab. They 
are not Persian or Indian, and they are not European. They are different from all surrounding 
neighbors. As such, Ethnic Russians have very few available identity choices (other than what 
the Kremlin is offering or some religious conversion as an identity i.e. Muslim). Therefore, the 
indication is that being ethnically Russian means de facto accepting the identity projected by the 
Kremlin.   
 
This de-facto relationship was tested after the fall of the Soviet Union. Would the ethnic Russian 
living in the different Soviet Republics (i.e. Ukraine) be accepted as national brethren who 
belong?  The more complex answer is that result varies depending on which post-Soviet republic 
is being discussed. But generally, the uphill battle of ethnic Russian acceptance in the post-
Soviet space is self-imposed discrimination in which Ethnic Russians living in Ukraine have 
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refused to view themselves as part of the Ukrainian family.337,338,339 “Russian resistance persists 
even in the general absence of exclusion on the basis of ethnicity. Why is that?” 340 According to 
Chinn & Kiaser this is a result of the status of ethnic Russians going from dominant minority 
(during CCCP) to simple minority (post CCCP).341  
 
The question of whether Russians are European has been pondered upon for many centuries. In 
the 17 and 1800s the Russian aristocracy thought they were accepted by Napoleon and the 
French as European, this was Russian Naiveté combined with French trickery. Some argue that 
the Russians are European because of the even starker differences between Russians and their 
other neighbors (i.e. Asians, Persians, Indians and Arabs). That when viewed in this context 
Russians seem to be close to Europeans. Also, some argue that many Russians view themselves 
as being part of the European family. These points may be so. But they do not matter.  In the end, 
what matters is whether or not Europe accepts Russians as being part of the European family, 
which they do not.  In fact, the view here is that the Europeans also do not view the Ukrainians 
as part of the European family. Though in a geopolitical move, to spite the Russian Federation, 
they (Europe) is willing to hold their noses and look past this and accept Ukrainians as European.  
 
Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having full identity viability in 
regards to Ethnic Russians. Ethnic Russians should be considered as having limited identity 
choices other than the Russian Federation. 
 
Ethnic Ukrainians  
The strong religious and language connections that the Russian Federation has with Ethnic 
Ukrainians are overshadowed by an extremely negative shared memory and history, which 
indicates little chance ethnic Ukrainian populations will consider any identity projected by the 
Russian Federation. Any push to project any type of power (identity or otherwise) onto Ukraine 
by the Russian Federation is likely to be perceived (by Ethnic Ukrainians) as aggression, which 
is likely to catalyze stronger resistance against.  
 
Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having an absolute lack of identity 
compatibility concerning ethnic Ukrainians.  
 
Primary Ukrainian speakers   
Here there is a mirror situation as the above analysis with Primary Russian speakers. A situation 
in which all Ethnic Ukrainians can be considered Primary Ukrainian speakers, though not all 
Primary Ukrainian speakers can be considered ethnic Ukrainians. Therefore, the amalgamated 
group “Primary Ukrainian Speakers” is comprised of multiple ethnic subgroups (i.e. Bulgarian, 
Belorussian…etc.). Already, above, there was a cursory analysis if these ethnic subgroups and 
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their projected predisposition towards accepting an identity projected by the Russian Federation. 
The conclusion was that all of these ethnic sub populations (excepting Ethnic Russians) are 
likely to be negatively predisposed towards a Kremlin projected identity.  
 
Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having no identity compatibility 
concerning primary the Primary Ukrainian speaking populations.  
 
Russian Federation identity viability tabulation  
 
Ethnic Russians + 
Primary Russian Speakers  - 
Ethnic Ukrainians - 
Primary Ukrainian Speakers - 
 
No identity Viability (-) 
Identity Viability (+) 
 
The conclusion is only 1 (Ethnic Russians) out of the 4 Ukrainian sub-populations holds identity 
compatibility towards a Kremlin projected identity. If only ethnic Russians have identity 
compatibility with a Kremlin projected identity then the implication is that only those areas 
heavily populated by Ethnic Russians are likely to place positive hope confidence in the Russian 
Federation. Therefore, the implication is that the maximum amount of territory of the Ukraine 
that could potentially wish to see Russian expansion plateaus at about 10%, or, the three border 
oblasts of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk.  
 
 
European Union 
Primary Russian Speakers  
As stated above primary Russian Speakers do not necessarily only speak Russian, chances are 
that they speak more than one language. Said second language can bridge the language 
differences with the EU. Also, the EU unlike the Russian Federation does not have an 
overarching and official language, rather than having a myriad of nation state languages. As far 
as shared history and memory the assumption here is that a majority of the groups that make up 
primary Russian speakers in Ukraine do not have an intimate experience with the European 
Union. Some of these groups can draw from the EU experience of their homeland countrymen. 
Germans, Polish, Greeks and Bulgarians who all have homelands that are part of the European 
Union, and thus are (for the most part) assumed to have a positive shared history and memory, at 
least positive enough that their countrymen amenably ascended into the EU. Moldova is at the 
moment in ascension talks. Hence the assumption is that they also have a positive enough shared 
memory history and memory to want to be amenably expanded upon by the EU.  Tartars and 
Belarusians here are considered to not have intimate shared history or memory concerning the 
EU, and so can be considered to be neutrally disposed. Of all of the groups that make up the 
Primary Russian speakers, only the Romani can be considered to have a negative shared history 
and memory concerning the EU, this due to their living on the fringes of society and feelings of 
being “othered” and persecuted. Though, this negative shared history and memory is not specific 
to the EU. The Romani people have negative shared history and memory in the context of all the 
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places in which their brethren live.  Therefore, Romani negative shared history and memory 
should be viewed in a relative way. When Romani negative memory and shared history is held in 
a relative view it becomes less negative as compared to the shared memory and history with the 
CCCP.   
 
Conclusion: It is hard to judge how much being primary Russian speakers affects the 
population’s attitude towards the EU. Therefore, the claim is that the EU has the potential (rather 
than likelihood) of identity viability concerning primary Russian speakers. 
  
Ethnic Russians  
Among the four Ukrainian sub-populations Ethnic Russians are expected to be the group with 
which the EU is least likely to have identity viability. Europe has (at least since the end of 
WWII) defined itself through an othering opposition towards Russia. An “othering” of a 
population precludes identity compatibility. Aside from the language divide Russians have a 
shared history and memory in which Europe (and the larger Western world) were enemies on the 
verge of ushering in a post-apocalyptic world.   Even if ethnic Russians were open to accepting a 
European identity (which they are not) it is inconceivable that Europe would offer.  
 
Conclusion: The EU has no identity viability among ethnic Russian populations. 
 
Primary Ukrainian Speakers  
The analysis of Primary Ukrainian speakers is very close to that of primary Russian speakers. 
The differences being that the primary Ukrainian speakers are missing the primary Russian 
language connection with the Russian Federation. The lack of this connection takes away one 
main mechanism through which the Russian Federation attempts to undermine EU attempts to 
market an acceptable offered identity. The lack of this mechanism means that the EU is in an 
advantageous position marketing an acceptable and compatibility identity to primary Ukrainian 
speakers.  
 
Conclusion: A Majority of the groups that make up the primary Ukrainian speakers are 
considered to have a positive disposition towards the EU in context of shared memory and 
history. As such, the EU is considered as having identity viability concerning Primary Ukrainian 
speakers.  
 
Ethnic Ukrainians  
Ethnic Ukrainians do not have an intimate shared history and memory with the EU, though they 
have a very intimate and negative shared history and memory concerning the Russian Federation. 
Here it is proffered that the negative CCCP experience is a main contributing factor as to why 
ethnic Ukrainians have placed positive hope confidence in the EU. Pushing towards the EU is 
viewed as moving away from the Russian Federation. Moving away from the Russian Federation 
is seen as putting behind traumatic times in which the CCCP attempted to destroy the Ukrainian 
culture, a time in which the Ukrainian people suffered genocide and persecution.  Ethnic 
Ukrainians have already decided that the EU can offer a compatible identity. The question 
becomes whether the EU deems Ukrainians as being compatible. Or, is the EU pushing towards 
integration with Ukraine simply to spite Russia. Is the EU playing the Ukrainians the way that 
they have been playing the Turks? Are they pushing the idea of integration on a population that 
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they know is not compatible? Pushing the idea of integration so as to take advantage of the 
ethnic Ukrainians willing naiveté? The fact that ethnic Ukrainians have placed positive hope 
confidence in moving towards the EU indicates that there is (at the very least) half positive 
identity compatibility. Whether the EU chooses to fully exercise this compatibility is a question 
that at this point in time cannot be answered.  
 
Conclusion: The EU should be considered as holding identity viability concerning ethnic 
Ukrainians 
 
EU identity viability tabulation  
 
Ethnic Russians - 
Primary Russian Speakers  = 
Ethnic Ukrainians + 
Primary Ukrainian Speakers + 
 
No identity Viability (-) 
Identity Viability (+) 
Neutral identity viability (=)  
 
The overall conclusion concerning identity viability and Ukraine is that the Russian Federation is 
considered to hold positive identity viability in only 1 (Ethnic Russians) out of 4 of the identified 
Ukrainian sub-populations. On the other hand, the EU is considered to hold positive identity 
viability with 2 (Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian Speakers) out of 4 of the identified Ukrainian 
sub-populations, also the EU holds neutral identity viability with 1 (primary Russian speakers) 
out of 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations, while holding negative identity viability 
with only 1 (ethnic Russians) of the 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations. An important 
note to remember is that a precursor to having positive hope confidence in an identity is having 
positive identity viability. Negative identity viability precludes the ability to hold positive hope 
confidence in a projected identity narrative.  Therefore, the overall take away is that Ukrainian 
hope confidence divide between the EU and RF is not the often claimed 50/50 east/west split. 
Instead it is closer to 90/10 divide in favor of the EU. A divide in which EU identity reach spans 
almost the whole of Ukraine and the Russian Federation identity reach is contained to 3 oblasts 
to the far east, one of which (Crimea) has already been annexed.  
 
B. Geopolitical Viability 
Russia is viewed as having geopolitical viability concerning Ukraine. This geopolitical viability 
is connected to the direction that the borderland has been shrinking over the past decades, which 
(as discussed above) is connected to sensitivity to possibility of a neighbor’s expansion to 
contiguity. As an actor expands it gains a buffer against rival neighbors, with this buffer comes a 
lessened sensitivity to expansive moves of any rival geopolitical power. Actors are not so 
sensitive to rivals expanding to contiguity to with a buffer zone than they are to rivals expanding 
towards contiguity with the homeland. As an actor gains a buffer zone they become less likely to 
be willing to commit the necessary resources to stop expansive moves of any rival geopolitical 
rival. On the other hand, loss of buffer zone space leads to increased sensitivity to expansion of 
any geopolitical rival. As a rival’s expansion continues the closer to reaching contiguity with the 
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homeland this rival becomes. As proximity to contiguity increases so does sensitivity to further 
expansion. As sensitivity increases so does the likelihood of being willing to commit necessary 
resources to stop this rival’s expansion.  
 
When this rule of sensitivity is applied to the borderland between Russia and Europe one can see 
that Europe has made great strides in expansion. The borderland between Russian and Europe 
has been shrinking almost exclusively eastward towards reaching contiguity with the Russian 
Federation. Europe has gained great swaths of buffer against Russia, while Russia has lost great 
swaths of buffer to the EU. Therefore, Russia is (at this point) much more sensitive to further EU 
expansion than the EU is to potential Russian expansion. Added to this is that any further EU 
expansion (into Ukraine or Belorussia) will be to contiguity with the Russian Federation, which 
as noted is something that rival neighbors want to avoid (at almost any cost). The indication is 
that Russia has a high likelihood of being willing to commit necessary resources to stop any 
further EU expansion, while the EU is not likely to be willing to commit (at almost any cost) the 
necessary resources to stop potential Russian expansion.  
 
Putin has already amenably expanded into Crimea. The frame posits that this expansion could 
have happened under two circumstances: 1) Putin and Russia are rational actors that enacted this 
expansion perceiving that they had geopolitical viability to do so, or, 2) Putin and Russia were an 
irrational or cornered rational actor who expanded into Crimea under no-geopolitical viability. 
The view here is that Putin and Russia are not irrational or cornered, which leaves only the view 
that Putin is a rational actor who expanded onto Crimea under perceived geopolitical viability. 
He did not perceive that the balance of power contained any actor (or coalition of actors) who 
had the will and capability to necessarily render the move a losing one. There are many actors 
who are currently, through sanctions, trying to raise the associated costs of the Crimean 
annexation. The jury is still out as to whether they will be able to push the cost of the annexation 
of Crimea past the threshold of being worth it. Though the outcome is not the important part, the 
important part is Putin’s perception of the balance of power concerning geopolitical viability at 
the time of Crimean expansion.  
 
Following the frame and its rule of sensitivity concerning the direction that the borderland has 
been shrinking indicates that that Putin has, and, perceives having geopolitical viability 
concerning further expansion into the Ukraine. The implication is that Putin’s perception of the 
international balance of power is that there is no actor or coalition of actors that have both the 
will and capability to commit the necessary resources to necessarily render further Russian 
expansion into the Ukraine a losing move.  
 
As noted geopolitical viability does not project a likelihood of expansion rather than potential of 
expansion that must be judged on a case by case basis using conditional if and when statements. 
Here the view is that the potential for Russian expansion into Ukraine is inexorably connected to 
further EU expansion and the potential of Ukrainian NATO membership. If and when Ukraine 
becomes part of the EU or NATO two things happen: 1) Russian geopolitical viability 
concerning Ukraine shifts to no geopolitical viability, and, 2) Europe will have expanded to 
contiguity with the Russian Federation. These are two things that Russia will (at almost any cost) 
prevent from happening. Therefore, there is a threshold of movement towards economic 
integration with the EU and talks of NATO membership that once past will trigger Putin to 
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expand into the Ukraine. If the goal of NATO and the EU is to induce Russian expansion into 
Ukraine then they will continue to push towards EU integration and NATO membership. If their 
goal is to lessen likelihood of Russian expansion into Ukraine then they will lessen such 
integrative conversations.  
 
 In fact, there is a very strong argument to be made that the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 
was precipitated from NATO pushing strongly towards admitting Georgia. 342 Russian President 
Dimitry Medvedev recently said in an interview (essentially) that Russia is ready, able and 
willing to commit all necessary resources and take any action to derail any potential admittance 
of Georgian membership to NATO.343  
 
Conclusion: Russia currently has geopolitical viability concerning Ukraine. The if and when 
mechanism which pushes the potential of Russian expansion to a likelihood is further EU and 
NATO pressure towards Ukrainian integration.  Lastly, it is the belief here that it is the EU and 
NATO that are responsible provoking the current Ukraine crisis, and, who have the ability to 
push the conflict further or bring about de-escalation. Both outcomes are directly related to 
whether or not the EU and NATO continue to push for integration/admittance of Ukraine. See 
Mearsheimer (2014) for a detailed argument as to why he agrees that the current Ukrainian crisis 
is almost completely the fault of the west and their “liberal delusions,” and that the outcome of 
this crisis hinges on freeing themselves from said delusions.344 
 
C. Ukraine Conclusion 
 
Identity Viability  
The EU has identity viability with three out of four of the identified subpopulations, while the 
Russian Federation has identity viability with only one of four. Furthermore, the geographic 
breakdown of these sub-populations suggest that EU identity viability covers roughly 90% of the 
Ukrainian geography, while the Russian Federations identity viability only about 10%, which is 
located along the Russian/Ukrainian border. The take away is that the commonly cited 50/50 
east/west divide is an inaccurate reading of the situation. An accurate reading of the situation is a 
far east/western divide, a 90/10 divide in favor of the EU.  If judged on identity viability alone 
the EU would be considered in a superior position with a larger likelihood of enacting deep 
territorial expansion. Unfortunately for the EU, Identity viability is not the only factor that must 
be considered.  
 
Geopolitical Viability  
 The EU does not have geopolitical viability. This means that if one considers the EU to be a 
rational actor then there is minimal likelihood that they will seriously engage with the idea of 
expansion into Ukraine. If one considers the EU to be an irrational or cornered rational actor, 
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then there is at least some likelihood that they might push towards territorial expansion. The 
view here is that the EU is a rational actor therefore the projection is that they will not seriously 
engage the idea of territorial expansion. The same holds true for Ukrainian NATO membership. 
The expectation is also that the EU will mess with the Russian Federation by putting on a show 
of seriously engaging with the idea of Ukrainian integration and NATO membership with the 
goal of keeping the Russian Federation off kilter. This is a dangerous move that can quickly 
backfire and push Putin to invade.  
 
The Russian Federation has geopolitical viability. As noted above geopolitical viability does not 
affect likelihood of territorial expansion rather than making it a possibility. What affects the 
likelihood of expansion when there is geopolitical are if and when statements. If and when Putin 
believes that Russia is close to losing geopolitical viability due to steps towards Ukrainian 
integration into the EU or NATO membership then Russian expansion becomes more likely. 
 
The Ukrainian borderland is a (relatively small) two-neighbor borderland, which means 
(according to expected behavior of proximate faultlines) there is, from the get go, a lowered 
likelihood of either EU or RF expanding past perspective border regions. There is an even 
lowered likelihood that the EU will seriously attempt (past theatrical gestures to keep the Russian 
Federation off kilter) territorial expansion since the EU does not hold geopolitical viability.  On 
the other hand, the Russian federation holds geopolitical viability which means that there is a 
heightened likelihood of Putin moving towards expansion, especially in areas in which he holds 
identity viability (Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea), for this would mean amenable expansion 
(rather than forcible) and amenable expansion holds low associated costs (compared to forcible). 
The likelihood of any expansion by Putin (either amenable into Luhansk, Donetsk or Crimea or 
forcible deeper expansion) is directly related to how strongly the EU (or NATO) theatrically or 
seriously engages Ukraine in integration talks and deals.  
 
These talks and deals will bring Putin to expand, first amenably, in geographic areas where he 
holds identity viability. If this amenable expansion puts an end to EU (and NATO) integrative 
movement then Putin will not expand further. If the EU (or NATO) continues Putin will then 
expand more, forcibly if necessary. For the Russian Federation knows that now they hold the 
advantage, that no actor or coalition of actors has the will or resources to necessarily make an 
expansive move a losing move.  Putin understands that the political and societal structuring of 
the West does not facilitate the ability to outright confront Russia in Ukraine. He also knows that 
this dynamic will shift when EU/Ukrainian integration is fully underway or when Ukraine 
becomes part of NATO. Putin will commit to a full-scale invasion before he lets this happen. For 
this would mean the European fault line has pushed to contiguity, which is something that should 
be avoided at any costs.  
 
Chapter 6 Summary: This chapter turned the frame of expansion to Ukraine. The departure point 
was an analysis of the populations being expanded upon and the likelihood of an identity shift as 
determined by hope confidence. The populations in Ukraine have already undergone identity 
shifts. Different sectors of the population (ethnic Russians versus the rest of the population) have 
already placed positive hope confidence in opposing forces (Russian Federation versus EU) that 
push competing ideas of future societal structuring. Populations that have placed positive hope 
confidence in the EU are not likely to shift away from pushing society towards the EU until they 
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(EU) are perceived to have failed in creating a safer, more secure and economically abundant 
future. At such a time, the population will shift towards actively looking for a new vehicle to 
place positive hope confidence. The same is not exactly true for Ethnic Russians and hope 
confidence placed in the Kremlin, this because of the de-facto nature of the Ethnic Russian 
identity relationship with Russia and the surrounding cultures (see pg. 93).  
 
The populations of the Ukraine should be considered as having positive hope confidence. 
Though as noted above positive hope confidence can at times translate into a lowered likelihood 
of being expanded upon and at times result in a raised likelihood. The differentiating factor is 
whether positive hope confidence is placed in a domestic actor (as in Kazakhstan) or in external 
actors (as with Ukraine). When hope confidence is placed in external actors the likelihood of 
expansion is raised.  While hope confidence placed in domestic actors lowers this likelihood. 
Ukrainian populations have placed positive hope confidence in powers that are external to the 
nation state (EU and Russian Federation). Therefore, these external powers have a raised 
likelihood of undertaking expansion. As such, positive hope confidence in the case of Ukraine 
raises the likelihood that they will be expanded upon (opposite that of Kazakh positive hope 
confidence).  
 
Concerning geopolitical viability and Ukraine; the Russian Federation holds geopolitical 
viability and the EU does not. The EU has a low likelihood of expansion, unless one deems that 
the EU is an irrational or cornered rational actor.  As noted, holding geopolitical viability does 
not project a likelihood of expansion rather than the potential of expansion. To assess when 
potential becomes likelihood one must apply conditional of and when statements. The 
conditional if and when statement used in this case is: If and when Putin believes that Russia is 
close to losing geopolitical viability due to steps towards Ukrainian integration into the EU or 
NATO membership expansive potential becomes an expansive likelihood.  
 
Concerning compatibility of offered identities: Here we parsed the population of Ukraine parsed 
into sub-populations: 1) Ethnic Russians, 2) Primary Russian Speakers, 3) Ethnic Ukrainians, 
and, 4) Primary Ukrainian Speakers. These four populations were analyzed for compatibility of 
offered identity in the context of the Russian Federation and the EU. The indication projected 
was that the EU has a likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity to 2 of these 
subpopulations (i.e. Ethnic Ukrainians and Primary Ukrainian Speakers) they have the potential 
(as opposed to likelihood) of projecting a compatible identity to 1 of the subpopulations (i.e. 
Primary Russian Speakers), and negative likelihood of projecting a compatible identity to 1 of 
the subpopulations (i.e. Ethnic Russians). On the other hand, the Russian Federation has a 
positive likelihood of offering a compatible identity to only 1 subpopulation (Ethnic Russians) 
and a negative likelihood of offering a compatible identity to the remaining 3 (Ethnic Ukrainians, 
Ukrainian Speakers, and, Primary Russian Speakers). When held against a map showing the 
locations of these subpopulations the indication is that the EU holds positive identity viability in 
at least 50% of Ukraine (west), neutral identity viability between the western 40% of the country, 
and, negative identity viability in the far east (10%) of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian 
Federation holds positive likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity only in the far 
east (10%) of the country. In the rest of Ukraine (90%) the Russian federation holds negative 
likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity. 
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The indication of likely territorial expansion into Ukraine comes down to geopolitical viability, 
which in this case trumps all other aspects of the frame. Even though the EU has a larger base of 
support among the population, and even though they are likely to be able to market a compatible 
identity to 3 of the analyzed sub-populations against Russia’s 1, this does make the EU likely to 
expand into Ukraine. The fact that the EU does not hold geopolitical viability is a good 
indication that, despite the advantages it holds concerning the other factors, there is a low 
likelihood that they will expand. They will not expand because they perceive that Russia will 
necessarily commit the necessary resources to raise the associated costs past the threshold that 
they (EU) are willing to pay for Ukrainian expansion. On the other hand, Russia holds 
geopolitical viability, which means that if and when Putin perceives that the EU (or NATO) is 
making gains towards integration the Russian Federation will enact more territorial expansion. If 
there is expansion into Ukraine the most likely scenario is Russian Federation amenable 
expansion along the border regions where there is a concentration of ethnic Russians. Though, 
this expansion is only likely if the EU and NATO continue to press their integrative agenda. 
Though, this expansion is also not probable. For it is not likely that the EU or NATO will push 
seriously their integrative gestures with the Ukraine. For the EU (and NATO) understand that 
integrative moves aimed at Ukraine raises the likelihood of further Russian expansion that they 
(EU/NATO) are not able/willing to commit to stop. The best-case scenario for EU/NATO is an 
independent Ukraine that will be more under Russian influence than European. For Russia, this 
is also the premier option.  Both sides understand this, and aside from theatrical political gestures 
and grandstanding, both are likely to accept such a tacit agreement.  
 
Additionally, it is useful to look more in depth at Russian projects of soft power identity 
projection into Ukraine, and the extent to which they (Russia) have been successful. The decision 
has been made to place this topic in the annexes so as to avoid interruption of the flow of the 
main text and to prevent distraction of the reader.  More information about Russian identity 
projection into Ukraine can be found in Annex 4. 
 
 
VII. Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
The point of this research was to build and give a sample application of a frame capable of 
projecting the likelihood of territorial expansion. The frame deals with territorial expansion 
differently than it has customarily been dealt with by past studies, theories and frames. The past 
analytical approach has two issues retarding the depth and breadth of understanding that can be 
achieved concerning territorial expansion.  
 
1) In the past territorial expansion has been parsed into related, yet still, analytically 
incompatible phenomenon (i.e. forcible and amenable).  
 
2) In the past territorial expansion has been approached by focusing on the mechanisms that 
drive an actor to feel the want/need to territorially expand.  
 
The analytical approach of the past leads a number of issues:  
 
Concerning point 1: Academia has created de facto analytically incompatible amenable and 
forcible status quo. This parsed status quo has led to massive compartmentalization and creation 
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of intellectual, disciplinary and paradigmatic walls, which have allowed amenable expansion to 
(traditionally) be claimed by economics and forcible by political science. The problem is not in 
claiming that one type of expansion is better understood by one discipline over another. The 
problem is that a status quo that assumes amenable and forcible analytical compatibility 
precludes the possibility that there might be an approach in which compatibility can be achieved, 
which precludes the construction of a single rubric that can account for both.  This creates an 
impossibility of being able to gain a deeper and wider understanding of territorial expansion as a 
whole, which severely limits the ability to project the likelihood of territorial expansion coming 
to pass. Such a deficit negatively affects the ability to construct adaptive and forward thinking 
foreign policy concerning territorial expansion and shifting borders. The remedy to this problem 
is a starting point assumption that amenable and forcible are analytically compatible, which has 
allowed for the construction of a single rubric accounting for amenable and forcible. The result is 
a deeper and wider window of understanding that can be used to better predict the likely hood of 
shifting borders and therefore create more apt foreign policy.  
 
Concerning point 2:  Historically the approach taken when dealing with territorial expansion has 
been focused towards explaining the reasons and mechanisms driving an actors want/perceived 
need to territorially expand. This approach leads to narrow tailor-made frames only applicable to 
specific actors in specific situations at specific times. Additionally, such an approach is 
intellectually disadvantageous because it claims the preeminence of the mechanisms behind 
want/perceived need. This is a mistake. Want/perceived are factors but not the preeminent 
factors concerning whether territorial expansion will transpire. Sitting preeminently are the 
circumstances of the board of play that dictate whether said expansion is more or less likely. For 
it does not matter whether an actor has both want and need to expand if the circumstances of the 
game does allow for the expansive move to be made.  
 
Historically studies of expansion have churned out narrowly specific frames incapable of 
accounting for both amenable and forcible expansion, while we aimed towards amenable and 
forcible expansion to be accounted under a single rubric with applicability across regions, time 
periods and situational peculiarities anchored to specific actors. Such a frame will be a boon to 
authors of foreign policy when dealing with creating action plans concerning potential shifting 
borders in the future.  
 
The claim being levied is that the rubric laid out here is superior and more actionable (from a 
foreign policy perspective) than the way in which territorial expansion has been analyzed and 
dealt with in the past.  
 
 
 
Final Thoughts 
The goal was to create a tool with which to judge and create foreign policy in the face of 
potential shifting borders. This goal was achieved through an exercise in theory building and 
fashioning new theoretical pivot points towards construction and example application of a frame 
that accounts for both amenable and forcible expansion. To the best of my knowledge no one 
else has attempted such an undertaking. In any theory (even more so when dealing with new 
young theory) if one looks hard enough they will find contradictions and behavior that is 
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unexpected (according to the theory). This should not be looked as a negative. Rather, it should 
be viewed as a positive. For good theory will at once bridge the limits of our understanding while 
also highlighting previously unseen contradictions. It is through bridging these newly highlighted   
analytical contradictions that we are enabled to reach an even deeper understanding of the world 
that we inhabit.  
 
The point of this work was to design and demonstrate the usage of a frame that analyzes 
likelihood of expansion. This has been achieved! Some (even many) might not believe that it can 
accurately predict expansion, though this would only be a belief, for time and further application 
of the frame by others will be the judge as to whether this belief is correct, whether the frame is 
capable of being used to make apt predictions. The point was not to test the frame. The point of 
this work was to create the frame in a way that it can be taken and applied to different actors, 
situations, regions and circumstances. It is a design in which each individual user can tailor the 
expanding power, region and populations being expanded to their area of interest. Overall, here 
we skewed to using macro identities, though it is dealer’s choice on what identities to connect for 
analysis. As such, potentially the frame of expansion can be applied in an infinite number of 
ways to predict expansion in almost any setting.  A few of the possibilities that strike interest 
here are: political party affiliation, tribes and gangs to name a few. It is our hope that the frame 
will be, if not accepted, at least given enough interest so as to encourage others to engage with it 
and try it for themselves.  
 
Lastly, we mention and address expected criticism of the frame.   
 
1) The expectation is that some (possibly many) will write this endeavor off as an 
unsubstantiated “exercise in imagination.” When we say unsubstantiated we are referring 
to the expected criticism about places in the paper that have sparse academic sighting. 
This is because much of the frame is built on brand new theoretical pivot points. It is not 
an uncommon phenomenon that brand-new things will be sparse in the context of being 
able to find a litany of people who have commented and written on the newly minted 
subject. If there were such a litany of citations then it would not be brand new. To the 
extent that was possible, I tried to mention and cite studies and academics who wrote 
about similar and backing issues that are related to these new theoretical pivot points. To 
this being an “exercise in imagination”, well, it absolutely is! Without exercising the 
imagination we would never come up with new ideas or theories and the world (and our 
knowledge about it) would remain static.   
 
2) The frame is too subjective. Two analysts could potentially use the same points of analysis 
and come out with opposing projections. The frame is built around subjective analytical 
points because we are analyzing the relationships between people, identity, culture, 
history, societal emotions and memory. These things are subjective variables. People 
understand and relate to them in different ways depending on their own experiences and 
biases. Trying to take subjectivity out of things that are inherently subjective would 
prevent the points from functioning to operationalize the understanding being sought. 
Subjectivity can be removed but only through basing the frame on non-subjective 
variables, which would mean a return to cold war materialist political theory in which it 
was sufficient to analyze the balance of power by counting tanks and jets etc.  
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Subjectivity is part and parcel of trying to read identity compatibility and of historical 
comparison. History itself is a subjective retelling based on the whims of how the winner 
has written it. Historical fact is an oxymoron.  The only fact is that one version of an 
event has gained predominance over other versions. The only fact is that there is no way 
to tell what truly transpired unless one witnesses the event personally, and even then, 
witnessing itself can be skewed and incorrect as to what happened. Witnesses frequently 
claim to have personally seen different versions of the same event. Geopolitics is also 
subjective based on one actor’s perception of another actor’s power and ability.  Identity 
is also a subjective decision to identify as this or that, or, reject this or that identity. The 
point is that the subjectivity of the frame is unavoidable when considering the variables 
being used and comparisons being made.  
 
Lastly, it should again be noted that the point was not to argue over the reading of 
subjective points rather than to construct the frame and give an example of the way it 
functions. That is, to showcase a new tool and let each analyst use their personal 
subjective understanding of the variables involved. Again, I go back to the quote from 
Fairgrieve:  
 
“some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but 
the correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that 
statement or view.” 
 
3) It is also expected that criticism will be leveled at the fact that there is no endeavor to 
explain territorial expansion rather than focusing on the circumstances that make 
expansion more or less likely. To this we ask why do we always have to try and explain 
something? Is an explanation more valuable than an analysis of likelihood?  I think not. 
In fact, one might argue that an explanation of something is less valuable if it does not 
lead to the ability to make some sort of applicable prediction. So what if I understand 
something but that understanding does not lead to any practical applications. Practical 
applications will come from the ability to use the knowledge to predict the way in which 
something functions in the real world.  
 
If the same question is reversed we get a different answer. So what if I can analyze the 
likelihood of one outcome over another but cannot explain the mechanisms behind the 
object of prediction, in this case the so what is that predictions can be made. Being able 
to predict has an intrinsic value that is not necessarily predicated on being able to explain.  
In this regard, it seems short sighted to call it “questionable” to attempt to develop a 
frame of prediction in isolation from trying to develop a frame aimed at understanding. 
Some (many might) question if it is possible to be able to predict without being able to 
explain. The answer is yes; it is possible to identify what are the factors that make 
something more or less likely without explaining the interworking of the phenomenon 
itself.  
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Following the bibliography are several annexes with related information and topics. This 
information and topics were purposefully left out of the main text so as not to confuse the reader 
or lose focus on the main goal of development and sample application of the frame.  
 
The End! 
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Annex 1 
Mechanisms of Hope Confidence Control and Authoritarian Stability 
 
Much literature theorizes over the mechanisms behind the ability of the authoritarian to push the 
societal structure into Authoritarian stability. Some example mechanisms: The weakness of civil 
society345,346 redistribution of wealth, cronyism and economic liberalization;347 Arab 
culture,348,349 the monarchial system,350,351,352 division and manipulation of opposition 
forces,353,354,355 political institutions, parties and electoral laws, which Brownlee (2007),356 
Pousney (2002)357 and Blaydes (2011)358 claim to be the primary mechanism through which 
“authoritarian” stability is reached. The perception here is that all of the above mechanisms may 
be used to reach authoritarian stability but play a supporting/secondary role to leveraging 
populational perception of movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant 
future (i.e. manipulation of hope confidence).  
 
The sitting authoritarian is only secondarily interested in his citizenry believing that the societal 
structure will create positive movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant 
future. To the sitting authoritarian the primary concern is to create the perception of imminent 
negative movement away from a safer, more secure and economically abundant future and that 
this negative movement is being held at bay by the strength and resolve of the ruling party. That 
neutral movement is all one can hope for, that the citizenry should be happy with neutral 
movement, as it (neutral movement) is not the imminently close negative movement. Every day 
of neutral movement should bring respect for the authoritarian, as it is another day the apparatus 
has succeeded in abating bedlam.  
 
Under such a regime the most intense official implication to the citizenry should be that “it is 
unclear whether the current system will usher in a better life. On the other hand, it is perfectly 
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clear that a life without the current societal structure will breed death and destruction, brought 
upon by any one of the many economic, physical and cultural threats emanating from a regime 
cultivated and constructed group of “others.” The strategy is creation of a fear appeal (and 
hopefully) “moral panic” through convincing the population that self-preservation is under 
imminent threat. Whether it is better served to appeal to physical or societal self-preservation (or 
both) is dependent on the stability level of the authoritarian, circumstances of the societal 
structure, present populational psyche, and, the precise goal to which this appeal is being 
fostered. 
For the citizenry, the intended take-away is that the Authoritarian structure is the only protection 
against sophisticated, and evolving threats to self-preservation. This line if accepted and 
internalized will yield support for more aggressive and militaristic force,359,360,361,362 leading to 
ever constricting internal security measures. Each step of acceptance of the Authoritarian regime 
(even tacit) increases the likelihood of a next step.363,364,365  
Inglehart and Baker (2000)366 claim the slide into authoritarianism can be understood as a coping 
mechanism adopted when individuals doubt their ability to provide themselves and their families 
with the necessities of survival and inclusion. A coping mechanism is one way to look at it. 
Though it is much more fruitful to understand it as a program of manipulation of hope 
confidence to pressure the citizenry into a submissive position. From a submissive position, there 
is no ability to dare to hope for anything different.  
 
Authoritarian stability is reached by controlling hope confidence. Hope confidence is corralled 
only when both perceived physical safety and security, and, economic outlook is commanded. If 
only one of the two is controlled the population should not be considered fully submissive. 
Populations not in full submission will have regular flashes of collective resistance. Populations 
in full submission, in the short to near term, have an extremely low likelihood of collective 
action threatening the authoritarian structure- “authoritarian stability.” Populational submission 
is reached by leveraging a stable non-excessive level of populational hunger, humiliation and 
fear against hope confidence.367 There is a threshold of hunger and humiliation that when crossed 
sees the “good enough” life dissolve and a neutral population pushed negative.  
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From neutral tactically timed positive or negative hope confidence shifts are used to corral and 
direct the population into processual sanctioning an increasing institutionalization of 
authoritarianism. Periods of positive and negative movement should not be excessive in intensity 
or length (too intense of an episode will cause the population get away from the handler and 
become unpredictable, too long an episode potentially gives alternative conceptions of the 
societal structure a chance to gain a foothold). The Game is to keep the population in neutral, in a 
“good enough life,” and to constantly redefine what the “good enough life” looks like by 
leveraging fear appeals against the ability to sustain that “good enough” life.  Periodic 
(controlled) hope confidence vents residual energy that could be used in opposition and shifts the 
focus of the societal attention spaces to where the authoritarian wants the focus to be.  
ANNEX 2 
GREAT GAME OF CENTRAL ASIA 
(OLD VERSUS NEW) 
   
Above it was determined that Central Asia is a multi-neighbor borderland that is the most likely 
(of identified borderlands) to experience territorial expansion. “Central Asia is one of the most 
important regions of the world, given its impact on the politics and economics of the great 
powers,” it “is once more a key to the security of all Eurasia”368 as it "forms a buffer zone 
between great powers.”369 Duarte (2012) claims, “Whoever controls this space {Central Asia} 
will dominate the world.”370 
 
The two major players in the previous (19th century) iteration were British and Russian imperial 
powers. In this (19th century version) the “indigenous populations, local rulers and subjects 
{were} treated as subservient to the aims of these powers.”371 Imperial players are no more, 
replaced by the more numerous national players. Changing rules of the Game have allowed for 
regional nation state level actors to play. Five new states in Central Asia seek to “define their 
roles in their regions and the world.”372 New Central Asian nation states, “who are not ‘not 
cipher states’, and thus play the Game for their own advantage and for their own motives and 
interests”. 373 In addition to these new regional state actors there are also supra state players (i.e. 
NATO, UN, OSCE etc.) as well as sub and proto state actors (i.e. multinational companies and 
corporations, NGO’s, terrorist and criminal organizations to name a few.)  The last iteration was 
a “Game of high politics—a Game of colonization and military contest between the two empires 
{...} the New Great Game has nothing to do with high politics of the two imperialist powers. The 
New Great Game {…} pertains to low politics. It is about creating niches of influences in 
Central Asia by neighboring countries.”374 The last iteration of the Central Asian “Great Game” 
is widely accepted to have had 3 main phases. 
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The first phase was Imperial Russian expansion into Central Asia (late 18th-early 19th century),375 
which was particularly alarming to the British East India Company. The company successfully 
manipulated and folded a private venture worry into British Imperial safety, security and 
foreign/colonial policy, which resulted in a framework of divide and conquer that relied on secret 
agents manipulating local tribes and peoples. Following this, Wilham (mimicking British tactics 
of conquest) undertook German expansion with the aim of control of India. Then Bolshevik 
expansion “by means of armed uprisings, to liberate the whole of Asia from imperialist 
domination.”376 The Game ended with the Soviet hegemonic control over the Central Asian 
borderlands. The Soviets did not only end the Central Asian “Great Game” but also reigned 
supreme in the last Eastern European, Baltic and Caucus iterations. The Soviets enveloped and 
closed these borderlands to contiguity with neighboring fault lines. The fracturing of the CCCP 
opened these borderlands and began new iterations of these 3 games. The new Eastern European 
iteration has already concluded with the EU reigning supreme.377 The Baltic iteration is also 
essentially finished, with the EU coming out on top. New Central Asian and Caucus iterations 
are still in play.  As mentioned, tactics, number of players, types of players and geographical 
location378 may change but the fundamental driving force behind shrinking borderlands does not. 
Let us compare the last iteration of the Central Asian “Great Game” with the new. 
 
“For centuries, Central Asia has been the crossroads of Eurasia. Indeed, it is the point of 
confluence of four civilizations that have, concurrently, controlled and been controlled by the 
Central Asian peoples.” 379 
 
The New Game is two-leveled. The primary level, the international level, is where governments, 
proto state and supra state organizations (i.e. NATO, UN OSCE etc.) operate. Rumer (1993) 
claims that the primary level is directly linked to competition between the major powers in 
Central Asia.380 The secondary level is the operating level of sub state actors (i.e. multinational 
companies and corporations, NGO’s, terrorist and criminal organizations etc.). In the last 
iteration governments dominated the primary level with supra-state government organizations 
holding less sway. The new iteration has seen supra-state government organizations multiply in 
number and power. In the last iteration, the undercurrent of the secondary level was infinitely 
less than it is now. Though, the new version allows sub-state actors the ability to substantially 
affect the outcome of the primary level.  It can be argued that in the new iteration the secondary 
level of the Game has become as (if not more) important than the primary level.  
 
In the last iteration, there were (essentially) two major players (Imperial Russia and England) 
who held the same goal; i.e., gaining hegemonic control of the borderland before their opponent. 
The new iteration is a web of different types of players with a numerous variety of aims. At the 
state actor level: “the establishment of a form of neo-imperialist hegemony, the formation of 
cultural allegiances and influence and the promotion of state security concerns.”381At the non-
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state actor level: “maximization of profits, securing of contracts and dominant shares in consortia 
and the securing of local influence and politico-religious aims.”382 
 
Secret operatives at the edge of supervision and control waged the last game, where military 
force was used as an occasional accessory to buttress hegemonic control. In the New Great Game 
the overt use of military force is more restrained in the degree to which it can be used without 
justification.383 The populations over which the last iteration was played were not protected by 
the prevailing imperial status quo. They were treated as nothing but proxies. Changing and 
dissolution of state borders, as well as open manipulation and control, were permitted and 
accepted tactics. Imperial rules do not apply to the new iteration as there are now implemented 
protections enshrined in the accepted norms of international laws of national border integrity and 
sovereignty. The implication is that in the new Game “states cannot be violated, controlled, 
dissolved or destroyed in a manner similar to the past.” 384 
 
Central Asia is once again an open multi-neighbor borderland caught in a reoccurring spiral of 
territorial expansion to contiguity, and the inevitable withdrawal. Since the last inevitable 
withdrawal (of CCCP hegemony) there has been little movement of the neighboring faultlines. 
Meyer and Brysac describe Central Asia as: 
 
“Six new republics, predominantly Islamic but vibrantly distinct, are grouped around the 
Caspian Sea, the current landlords of untapped oil and natural gas reserves that rival those in 
the Persian Gulf. Pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiums, and contracts are the prizes 
of the New Great Game. India and China, each with exponentially growing energy needs, are 
vying for access, along with Russians, Europeans, and Americans. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan 
have their own political, economic, and cultural interests in the former Soviet republics, where 
slumbering rivalries have abruptly awakened among Azeris, Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, 
Turkmens, and other long-subject peoples ... it is a bloody muddle, made worse as before by 
outsiders”385 
  
The shape and tenor of this muddle is the result of number of factors: (1) legitimizing frames, (2) 
players, (3) levels of play, (4) fields of play, and, (5) board of play. 
 
Legitimizing Frames  
The legitimacy frame deployed tells what kind of hope confidence movement is expected, 
susceptibility to “external pressure,” likelihood that the regime will be repressive, likelihood of 
experiencing stretches of isolation and clues into who (if any) are the other important external 
players.  
  
Players  
Players can be divided into inside versus outside.  
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Inside players operate inside the board of play and outside players operate from outside the board 
of play. In this analysis, in the context of the Central Asian borderland, inside players are 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All other players are outside 
players.  
 
Outside players can be divided into neighboring (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, India and 
Pakistan) and a non-neighboring (US and EU). Outside players can be further distinguished into 
major (i.e. US, China and Russia), middleweight (Iran and Turkey) and minor (Pakistan and 
India). Outside players also include supra, sub state and non-governmental actors (i.e. World 
Bank, IMF, WTO and Islamic fundamental groups). 
 
These actors are playing a Game with two levels of play 
 
The levels of play (International/Domestic) are coinciding Games of power consolidation; 
international actors consolidating power in the international level of play, and, national players 
consolidating power in the domestic sphere. Players are not bound to only playing in their 
respective levels. Domestic players can try and consolidate power on the international level and 
vice versa. Players can cross play between the levels, and, can transfer momentum gained in the 
international level towards power consolidation in the domestic and vice versa.   
 
These levels of play stretch across two fields of play: 1) geostrategic (geopolitical), and, 2) 
cultural (identity). 
 
The geostrategic field of play is more connected to the international level of play and more likely 
to be a top down approach to power consolidation. On the other hand, the cultural field of play is 
directly connected to the domestic level, to the shared memories, narratives and identity of the 
populations that inhabit the desired piece of land. As such, this approach is more connected to 
the population and is more likely to be a bottom up approach.  
 
ANNEX 3 
UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS; LEGITIMACY FRAMES OF CLAN-NEOLIBERAL AND THE 
CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS 
 
For analytical purposes the Central Asian republics will be parsed using the following frame 
characteristics: Self-contained vs. non-self-contained, and, ideological feedback loop vs. not. 
Each of these points comes with expected behavior.  Also included is whether a strongman 
rollover was experienced.   
 
Strongman rollover-when the sitting Soviet strong man rolled his power over into the post-Soviet 
transition to become the new strong man of the independent republic. 
 
First will be a recap of the expected behavior of these characteristics. Then a chart illustrating 
which Central Asian republics shows which characteristics. 
 
Self-contained vs. non-self-contained legitimacy frames 
126 
 
If a legitimacy frame is self-contained there will be a higher resistance to external pressure 
towards domestic change, and, a higher likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. Also, in 
the context of domestic power consolidation there is not the necessity of discussing other 
players, for all the components for domestic power consolidation can be produced internally.  If 
non-self-contained there will be lower resistance to external pressure towards domestic change, 
and, a lower likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. Also, in the context of domestic 
power consolidation there will be other players that must be considered.  
 
Ideological feedback loop 
Ideological feedback loops are expected to show negative hope confidence buttressed into 
neutral by a hard transmission of the ideology. The ideological feedback loop has a higher 
likelihood of resulting in authoritarian stability. On the other hand, other types of legitimization 
do not have likelihood of reaching authoritarian stability rather than being a situational 
dependent possibility. 
  
Strongman rollover  
If there is a strong man roll over there is a heightened likelihood of reaching authoritarian 
stability.  The combination of the strong man and the ideological feedback loop has the highest 
likelihood of reaching authoritarian stability.  
 
Below is a chart of the Central Asian Republics concerning the above listed characteristics.  
 
 Self-
Contained 
Non-self-
contained 
Ideological 
Feedback 
loop 
Other type of 
legitimization 
Strong Man 
Rollover 
Kyrgyzstan  X  X N 
Kazakhstan  X  X Y 
Uzbekistan X  X  Y 
Turkmenistan X  X  Y 
Tajikistan X  X  Y 
 
The differences found in the tabulation can explain the different trajectories of the republics in 
question.   
 
For analytical purposes the Central Asian republics can be parsed into two groups:  Group 1) 
Central Asian ideological feedback loops-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and, Group 
2) Other Legitimization-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.386 We start with an analysis of the 
countries where an ideological feedback loop was deployed (Group 1).  Followed by an analysis 
of republics in which other types of legitimatization were used (Group 2). 
 
Group 1) Central Asian ideological feedback Loops-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan  
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First, we will discuss mechanisms of the ideological feedback loop. Followed by the 3 deployed 
Central Asian ideological feedback loops.  
 
Mechanisms of the loop 
Ideological feedback loops are designed to subordinate the whole of the domestic political 
system. The four levers used to achieve subordination are (1) Immunity, (2) Reflection, (3) 
Unification, and, (4) Goal orientation. 
 
Immunity  
Immunity is transmitted in two ways: through the state ideology, or, through the (claimed) 
strength and foresight of the sitting strongman/president. There are two levels of immunity: 
 
Ideological immunity is constructed on the idea that openings in the ideological attention spaces 
are cracks, in which “alien/foreign ideologies” find room to potentially spread in their quest 
towards “foreign/alien” domestic domination. The only way to protect from being used and 
abused by a parade of conquering “alien/foreign ideologies” is through a full market takeover of 
the societal attention space by the ideological feedback loop. 
 
Presidential Immunity is when the sitting president is sold to the population as the single driving 
factor and guarantor of such things as territorial integrity, national unity, safety, security and 
economic development. That said president is the only purveyor of a national path forward. That 
without said president the country is doomed to lose one or more of the listed items.  
 
In both cases the nation is afforded immunity (either through the state ideology or the president 
himself) from threats to their safety, security, independence, national and identity integrity as 
well as economic wellbeing. There are only two options put to the population; 1) Support the 
state ideology and/or president and be protected from all manner of bad happenings, or, 2) Do 
not support the president and/or ideological feedback loop and show oneself to be an enemy of 
the state. For not supporting the state ideology and/or president is equated with being against 
national safety, security, independence, integrity and economic well-being. Is equated with 
choosing a path that is likely to lead to the nation being be pillaged, plundered and torn asunder 
by both external and internal enemies. Clearly only an enemy of the state would choose this 
second option.  
 
For a leader or ideology to offer immunity it must be considered homegrown and be reflectively 
sold.  
 
 
Reflection 
Reflection is the process in which populational lobbyists convince the people that the ideology 
and systems being are authored by the collective rather than by the individuals driving the 
implementation. The idea is to sell the immunizing homegrown ideology/president as the 
reflection of a pre-existing “organic nation.” This is important because the indication is that the 
“organic nation” becomes the creator of the power of the president and/or ideology behind the 
feedback loop. The inference becomes that the president and/or national ideology is incapable of 
being “hijacked” to shape policies in ways that are not in synch with the needs and wants of the 
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national population.  This because the “organic nation” is incapable of creating a reflection that 
is not attuned towards pushing policies aimed at its (national population’s) best interest. This 
logic suggests that any ideology or politician that is in opposition to the wishes of the 
“homegrown” ideology/president is therefore against the wishes and needs of the nation. Only 
“alien ideologies” or saboteurs would be against the needs of the nation. Therefore, any 
opposition to the “homegrown” ideology/president is an “alien ideology” or saboteur.  The 
presence of any opposition is proof that there needs to be a harder transmission of the immunity 
coming from the chosen “homegrown” ideology/president, which reflects the needs and wishes 
of the “organic nation.”  
 
Unification 
This is the sleight of hand in which leading populational lobbyists convince the citizenry that it is 
not they (the leaders) who are implementing societal change. Rather it is the ideology, working 
through these men, is responsible for the implementation and administration of the societal 
change. In this way, the populational Lobbyist running and implementing the system divest 
themselves of any accountability, while at the same time add leverage and sustenance to their 
preferred implemented policies. In this situation, any argument towards implementing preferred 
policies of the ruling populational lobbyist holds the weight of the homegrown ideology behind 
it, which means that it is has the weight off the wants and needs of the “organic nation” behind it. 
On the other hand, if the policies fail the populational lobbyist behind said policies are not at 
fault.  Rather the ideology and organic nation all hold equal culpability. For the reflection cannot 
be faulty rather than the fault lying in the object of reflection.  
 
Goal Orientation 
This is the tactic of orienting the chosen homegrown, reflected and unified ideology towards 
generic goals. For “the logic of authoritarian political unity is only intelligible in relation to some 
collective good, the validity of which no political force can possibly deny.”387 Cliché goal 
orienting is resoundingly towards “making the nation (i.e. Trump’s America) great again,” or, 
commitment towards development through safety and security. There is no room for dissention. 
No one (who is not driven by an “alien ideology”) is against “making the nation great again” 
through development, safety and security. The nation is agreed on these goals and so there is no 
need for “competitive politics.”  
 
Goal orientation (generally) contains both fear and hope. Fear based on external threats and hope 
of internal development. Using only fear runs the risk of being a “self-defeating tactic.” For if the 
populational lobbyist is too successful at eliminating the source of fear then he deprives himself 
of his legitimizing frame. The goal of development goes hand in hand with populational 
lobbyists who are legitimizing themselves through national pride. Also, development is an 
infinite well from which to draw from, there can always be more development.  
 
Ideological feedback loops are built on the language of expertise, special knowledge, and 
“efficiency,” which are all code words for guardianship, consolidation, and the elimination of 
dissent. The point of the ideological feedback loop is to serve as an encompassing stratagem that 
uses fear of instability and inefficiency to argue away the need for politics. The point is to make 
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politics unnecessary through the presentation of a pre-determined socio-political outcome. 
 
Central Asian deployed ideological feedback loops 
Transitioning into independence Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan all deployed self-
contained feedback loops. Therefore, all three should have been expected to show negative hope 
confidence buttressed into neutral by a hard transmission of the ideology. All should have been 
considered to have a heightened resistance to external pressure towards domestic change, and a 
higher likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. All three republics also endured a strong 
man rollover, which in combination with the ideological feedback loop shows the highest 
likelihood of reaching authoritarianism. Lastly, in the context of domestic power consolidation 
the self-contained nature of the feedback loop means there is not the necessity discussing other 
players.  
 
Below will be an analysis of the three Central Asian feedback loops in the context of the above 
mechanisms.  
 
Uzbekistan 
Karimov is known “for the extent to which he has gone to legitimate his regime through an 
official state ideology— ‘The Ideology of National Independence.’”388 Clan Karimov sold to the 
Uzbek nation the logic of authoritarianism under cover of an abstract conversation of the 
necessary role of ideology in society. The “Ideology of National Independence” was constructed 
around a theoretical discussion of the ideology/societal nexus in which ideology is a “necessary 
pre-political foundation of a community that serves to fuse nation, state, goal and regime, thus 
replacing constitutionalism and procedure as the pre-political ’givens’ of the state {...} This 
conception of ideology is then developed so as to argue away the need for open, competitive 
politics by suggesting the presence of unassailable, unifying and self-evident political goals to 
which all rational Uzbeks subscribe.”389 
 
Karimov played the threat angle hard. In his most disseminated text he spent 130 pages detailing 
said threats, which included “regional conflicts, religious extremism and fundamentalism, great-
power chauvinism and aggressive nationalism, ethnic and interethnic contradictions, corruption 
and criminality, regionalism, clans, and ecological problems.”390 After highlighting all these 
threats Karimov eased the population into accepting the idea of ideological immunity. “Without 
an ideology, man, society, and the state lose their pathmarks along their route. And wherever an 
ideological vacuum arises it will naturally be filled by another ideology”391, and, “In order to 
protect our people from various ideological threats, to formulate in society an ideological 
immunity, it is necessary to arm it with an authentically humanist ideology, comprising in itself a 
powerful impulse towards the spiritual uplifting of the nation”392. Such rhetoric often concludes 
that there is only one possible “authentically humanist ideology,” which just happens to be 
controlled by the elite.  
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After Ideological immunity is transmitted reflection should be practiced.  
 
“The ideology of our society, reflecting the vital interests of the simple man, who himself is the 
pillar of that society, must become a source of strength and energy for our people in the 
attainment of a peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable life. The ideology must first reflect the 
spiritual particularity and uniqueness of the sacred traditions and aspirations of our nation, 
formulated over many centuries and millennia”393  
 
The attempt is to equate national culture with the “Ideology of National Independence,” to make 
criticism of the ideology analogous to criticism of the nation. This logic is aimed at the assertion 
the national ideology has sole claim to the national identity. The National Ideology thus becomes 
the “incarnation of the glorious values, aspirations and moral principles of its (Uzbekistan’s) 
multi-national population.”394 
 
“Irrespective of the diversity of the existing views and life positions, aspirations, and hopes of 
the various social groups prevailing in our society and of the faith and convictions of our 
individual citizens, a single ideology is called upon to unite these groups and individuals around 
a single national banner and to secure the priority of the higher interests and goals of the nation 
and the state”395  
 
Concerning goal orientation: Karimov and his cohorts are abundantly clear in the goal of the 
“Ideology of National Independence,” that it is designed “to reduce all political processes to a 
common denominator.”396 The common denominator is looped, through reflection, back to being 
the wants and needs of “organic nation.” Wants and needs that only can be achieved through 
ideological immunity offered by the “Ideology of National Independence,” an immunization that 
can only be reached through reducing the political process to one overarching denominator (i.e. 
the Ideology of National independence), which all Uzbeks agree upon unless they have already 
been indoctrinated by an alien ideology. As such, any opposition proves the existence of “alien 
ideologies,” which then justifies an even harder transmission of the “Ideology of National 
Independence.”  
 
Following this marketing of the “ideology of national independence” as being an Uzbek common 
denominator there is a concerted effort to remove the “Ideology of National Independence” from 
the political realm. This is done through a negative association attached to the word “politics,” as 
opposed to positive association placed upon the national ideology. Politics and political 
ideologies are redefined to be understood as private interests and power moves being passed off 
as “national interests.” The result is that all political ideologies are rendered as against the 
“organic Uzbek nation.” Anything against the nation is also against the national ideology; 
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anything against the national ideology should be considered an alien ideology and excluded from 
sphere of being acceptable.   
 
“The goal is the distinct, unifying, directing banner of the nation. This banner is a force 
embodying the spirit and pride of the nation, its potential and aspirations. The goal of our state, 
with its grandeur and nobility, its justice and uprightness, should become a powerful stimulus 
capable of unifying nations and peoples and transform into a force and ideology overcoming 
everything. It will be an ideology established on the outlooks and mentality of the nation formed 
over millennia, determining the future of that nation, enabling it to take its distinguished place in 
the world community, and capable of becoming a stable bridge between past and future.”397  
 
March (2003) claims “A secular nationalist has few choices in what types of goals to pursue, and 
Karimov offers no surprises: the state will be committed to the pursuit of development and 
national greatness while guaranteeing security and stability. The only thing unique is the long, 
drawn-out mystification of these banal goals through the discourse on “ideology.” The general 
strategy being employed is thus to define the entire state in relation to common goals, to define 
the goals and aspirations as virtually constitutive of the nation as such, and to equate the regime 
with the proper articulation and realization of those goals through the state apparatus. These 
circular definitions, woven together theoretically by the concept of “ideology,” ensure that the 
acceptance of one claim implies the acceptance of all of them and, more importantly, that 
opposition to one of the parts can be treated as opposition to all of them.”398  
 
Turkmenistan 
First president (and strong man rollover) Saparmurat Niyazov took control of a country that was 
“psychologically, institutionally and economically ill-equipped for independence.”399 
Turkmenistan was as Metternich once said if Italy, only a “geographical expression.”400  “The 
people had no common story of a fight for independence from Moscow; no common enemy; no 
shared story of clandestine nation-building as a counterpoise to Soviet rule.”401 “Saparmurat 
Niyazov, recognized that securing his own position would require some kind of ideological glue 
to replace that afforded by Soviet power.” 402 Such a state of affairs offered the president a “fairly 
wide scope to shape the terms, if not the complete content, of national identity production in the 
early post-Soviet period.”403 Turkmenistan was a blank canvas that needed a history, an ideology 
as well as a vessel to impart this history and ideology. The face of the vessel is much easier to 
procure, and disseminate into populational internalization than is the creation and transmission of 
a history or an ideology.  
 
A face needs only to be aggressively pushed into the public spaces. The first resolution passed by 
the new Turkmen congress (1992) sanctioned the unlimited production of state portraits of the 
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new president. This law allowed Niyazov to envelop the top layer of the public space (the things 
you hang on the physical landscape i.e. posters, billboards, placards etc.) as well as the physical 
landscape itself, which is reclaimed by renaming (airports, street cities etc.) and building 
(monuments, parks and grand buildings). In 1992 local leaders and officials began “requesting” 
permission to start renaming the physical space after Niyazov. The culmination of this 
Niyazovification of the landscape was the 1998 installation (in the capital Ashgabat) of a 60-ft. 
golden statue of Niyazov that rotates so that the memorialized president always faces the sun.  
 
Post landscape saturation Niyazov created an ideology mashed together with a produced version 
of Turkmen history- a historlogy that was intertwined and connected to him personally through a 
“mythic like” personal biography and bloodline.  The outcome of this project was publishing of 
the (2000) Ruhnama (“The holy book of all Turkmen”, “a blend of pseudo-history, genealogy, 
homily, memoir and loosely articulated political analysis” in which Niyazov emerged as “'the 
architect of national independence.”404 In it he (Niyazov) describes how he (Niyazov) channels 
(from the “historical” past) the aggregated force of all Turkmen wants and needs to positively 
shape the future. Using a metaphor of oarsmen in a galley the Turkmen population is urged that 
believing in and doing what they are told to do is the only way to safely reach a better future; “If 
all the oarsmen obey one captain, and row in accordance with the orders of the captain, the ship 
will be put out to sea.”405  Niyazov pushes the population to internalize himself (Niyazov) as 
being responsible for the plight of all Turkmen and as a sells himself and his internalization of 
the responsibility for the plight of all Turkmen, as a “mirror of the national soul {...} making the 
heart wiser and kinder”406 and “a source of power and striving to reach the targets of Turkmen's 
Golden Age.”407 
 
As Niyazov’s image was aggressively inserted into the Turkmen public space the Ruhnama was 
aggressively inserted into the Turkmen private space. Becoming a required in almost all aspects 
of life, from university exams to obtaining drivers licenses. Police officers could stop one at 
random and ask questions about the Ruhnama, which, if not satisfactorily answered could result 
in a fine or being arrested. Niyazov “eliminated other available histories. Other scholarly works 
not approved by him personally were either not allowed to be published or, in at least one case, 
burned by state authorities and the author removed from his position at the Magtumguly 
University because his history contradicted that in Ruhnama.”408,409 
 
“The ordinary Turkmen finds it impossible to carry out a daily chore without encountering 
Turkmenbashi.”410 
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“Official” Turkmen scholars claimed this penetration necessary as “a bridge to the world of 
moral values and the rich cultural heritage of the Turkmen people.”411 While at the same time it 
“cultivates personality” and sets out “the moral obligations of society.”412  
 
Before the Ruhnama was published many believed that Niyazov was pursuing policies of 
“Turkmenification,” which was legitimized along linguistic-nationalistic lines. Designed to be 
inclusive to the whole of the Turkmen diaspora (provided they spoke Turkmen) while at the 
same time internally exclusionary to all those living in Turkmenistan who did not speak 
Turkmen. The aim was to “to create cohesion among Türkmen, as defined by the state, and to 
keep non-Türkmen out of that collective.”413 In spite of this domestic exclusionary character a 
majority of the population “felt that they were not losing with the Türkmenification of social 
structures so much as they were gaining a country.”414 The makeup of this linguistically based 
identity was “an anti-Russian, pro-Western, Turco-Islamic heritage, which looked to its ancient 
cultural antecedents and ignored the Soviet experience, except to denigrate it.”415 
 
The publishing of the Ruhnama was the culmination of a process of inventing the necessary 
ideology and history to fully bring about the transmission of the ideological feedback loop. 
When in full force this ideological feedback transitioned from being about “Turkmenification” to 
being about “Niyazovification.” Even though the loop came into full effect with the publishing 
of the Ruhnama the decision to work towards its construction and deployment was made in 1991.  
 
“The construction of national identity is a lengthy process: identities are constructed” 
overtime.”416 
 
Immediately after independence Niyazov brought together “ideologues to produce the image of a 
highly idealized and divine leader”417 that combined national myth with the image of himself 
(Niyazov) as a “national savior.” In 1993 Niyazov awarded himself the title of Turkmanbashi 
(Prophet of Turkmen Nation). In 1999 awarded himself presidency for life, which he held until 
his death in 2006. The end representation was a semi-divine divine Niyazov who was an example 
of the Turkmen archetype.  
 
Turkmen citizens (daily) were “required to pray an oath of fidelity to Turkmenistan, and 
personally to the President.” Through “scientific research” Turkmen historians connected 
Niyazov’s bloodline to all the important historical figures in the Turkmen culture (i.e. Turkmen 
hero Oghuz Khan, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and even Muhammed). Upon this 
bloodline Niyazov was celebrated as the most important person in Turkmenistan’s history.”  His 
biography was instilled as a “mandatory school subject.”418 State media and institutions were 
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used to reinforce the connection between Turkmenbashi and the motherland in the attempt to 
make loyalty to one inseparable from the other.  
 
The Niyazov homegrown ideology was portrayed as reflecting the Turkmen organic nation. 
Though this reflection was a bit different than was seen in Uzbekistan. The “Ideology of 
National Independence” was overarching and connected web that drove all party members to be 
indelibly pushed towards doing right by Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, the reflection was not sold 
as an overarching web that encompassed the whole system. Rather the reflection of the organic 
nation was contained in Saparmurat Niyazov, in Turkmenbashi. Denison explains this difference 
in the comparison between the cult of Turkmenbashi and Ataturk:  
 
“The visual forms of the Niyazov cult clearly draw from the imagery, texts and rituals of both 
Stalinist and Kemalist rule. {…} The adoption by Niyazov of the appurtenance of Turkmenbashi 
in 1993 is an obvious referent to Ataturk. The principal difference between Niyazov and Ataturk 
lies not only in the obvious disparity in the quality of their political leadership, but that the 
image of Ataturk symbolizes a certain abstract developmental path of secular modernization and 
national unity-it embodies a set of values beyond the personage of Ataturk-whereas in 
Turkmenistan, the cult has been really rather indissoluble from Niyazov's own predilections and 
idiosyncrasies-and, as a consequence, really only came to stand for little more than Niyazov 
himself.”419 
 
This difference in the way that reflection was practiced affected the way in which unification 
was practiced. In Uzbekistan, the elite was divested from accountability resulting from policy 
failure due to the fact that these elite were not acting out of self-motivation rather than being 
driven to action by the “Ideology of National Independence,” which was a reflection of the 
organic nation. Therefore, any blame ultimately runs downhill to the Uzbek populous. For it is 
impossible that the reflection be faulty, rather than fault lying in the object of reflection, which 
(in this case) would have been the organic Uzbek nation.  On the other hand, in Turkmenistan, 
the constructed ideology was not part and parcel of the whole elite running the system rather than 
the president being the sole incarnation of the ideology, thus also the sole reflection of the 
Turkmen organic nation.  In Uzbekistan, the protection emanating from unification was spread 
out among the party elite. While in Turkmenistan the protection from unification was centered in 
the President himself.  
 
Viktoria Clement (2014) who did extensive fieldwork in Turkmenistan describes how this 
individualistic type of unification made it easy for Turkmenbashi to avoid taking blame for 
“administrative excesses like the bugging of phones, or social deficiencies such as rampant 
bribery. Citizens told me, ‘if he knew about it, it wouldn’t be happening’ (Fieldwork 
observations, 2001– 2002). Turkmen knew that Niyazov was ultimately in charge. But, they also 
rationalized that he could not control every detail in daily life, and thus cited self-interested 
elements within the administration as the source of Türkmenistan’s social problems (Fieldwork 
observations, 2001–2002)  The element of psychological defensiveness that is apparent in such 
an outlook is part of how {ideology feedback loops} personality cults work. They succeed as 
cults because they are able to claim loyalty and credit, while evading responsibility. In fact, 
Niyazov deliberately kept his administrators and state institutions weak by allowing individuals 
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to hold their posts for only short periods of time. It was not unusual to turn on the evening news 
and see the president calling ministers to task in a televised meeting. He would berate them for 
corruption, disloyalty, thievery, or incompetence and then force them to beg for forgiveness, 
before firing them and sending them off to jail or demoting them to a menial job. Many were 
indeed guilty of corruption since they knew they would only be in office for a short period of 
time, and hoped to make the most of it. If Niyazov had allowed individuals to stay in office long 
enough to gain some professional knowledge and build some political capital, his people may 
have become effective administrators; but then his own {ideological feedback loop} cult-like 
role would have been diminished. Niyazov’s pose as the people’s protector against corruption 
and incompetence required a continuous supply of both; his regime was calculated to produce 
them.” 420 
 
“Niyazov asserted that only the state with himself at the helm could guide the Turkmen on their 
new path, uniting Turkmen national identity with what became a personality cult.”421 
 
Presidential immunity can be seen in the very early stages of Turkmen independence.  Article 54 
of the constitution claimed that Turkmenbashi was the “chief guarantor of national independence 
{and} territorial integrity.” This logic suggest that it is Turkmenbashi who is providing the 
continuation of said independence and territorial integrity, that without Turkmenbashi at the 
helm there is the very real risk of losing them both. It is Turkmenbashi the individual who is 
providing the immunity to move into positive future and it was Turkmenbashi who offered 
immunity from tribal conflict and potential civil war.  
 
The result was that Turkmenbashi deployed a homegrown ideological feedback loop that was 
unified in the president. Presidential immunity was used to orient the goals of the path forward 
towards to securing the safety and security of Turkmen independence and prosperity.  This 
ideological feedback loop was constructed on three main components: 1) independence, 2) the 
Ruhnama (which included the created ideology and Turkmen history), and, 3) permanent 
neutrality. 
 
The first two pieces are directly held in the President himself.  Turkmenbashi is the guarantor of 
independence and the sole creator and inspiration behind the musings found in the Ruhnama. 
The third component permanent neutrality was designed to provide protection from outside 
meddling in the internal affairs of Turkmenbashi’s power consolidation. The idea is that a neutral 
country will be more likely to be left to its own devices than a country that is taking sides.  
 
 
Tajikistan 
The first president of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon was a strong man rollover from the CCCP. He 
was president before the civil war (1992-1997) and remained president after. Clan Rahmon 
attempted to transmit a populational internalization of an organic Tajik populational character 
connected to an ancient past, what Cummings has called “internally invented signs of national 
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certainty.”422  As such, Clan Rahmon began to create an “imaginary of the nation.”423  Resulting 
in him (Rahmon) becoming the only visible architect of the Tajik national identity and the 
incarnation of Tajik independence. As a path towards legitimacy Clan Rahmon took to 
“formation of a new national identity.”424 Like Niyazov in Turkmenistan, Rahmon wrote a multi 
volume book “The Tajiks in the Mirror of History,” which like the Ruhnama, set out to rewrite 
(in disregard to accepted facts) Tajik history. The book sold Rahmon as the single and 
authoritative expert of Tajik history as well as the guarantor of national unity and the only man 
capable of preventing a slide back into civil war. The attempt was to instill a populational 
perception that the enclosed ideology and history is the reflected image of the organic Tajik 
nation, a reflection to which only Rahmon can bring to the Tajik population. A point divested in 
the title of the book. A point reiterated by the state news agency Khovar when they claimed that 
the volumes “aim to be mirror of sacred values of the Tajik nation.”425 Like the Ruhnama the 
“Tajiks in the Mirror of History” became required reading in almost all aspects of Tajik life. 
Including the requirement that university students take the following two courses: “Emomali 
Rahmon-the architect of the new Tajik state,” and, “The Tajiks in the Mirror of History.” 
Fergananews.com explains that each of the two courses comprises of 32 hours of theory and 32 
hours of practical work. Like Turkmenbashi, Rahmon enveloped the Tajik public spaces as well 
as the physical landscape. Villages and neighborhoods were renamed Ramonhood and his 
depiction through monumentation (supposedly at the request of the Turkmen populous) is 
“anchored throughout Tajikistan’s landscape”  
 
In December 2015 Rahmon was formally confirmed as the “founder of peace and national unity 
and the Leader of the Nation.” In 2016 parliament went a step further when the constitution was 
amended to include the “Law of the President,” which comprised of 16 articles whose purpose 
was to push unification, Presidential/ideological immunity and reflection.  Article 1 designates 
Rahmon as the “symbol of the longevity of the Tajik sovereign state, of peace, of national unity” 
and the “guarantor of stable development.” Article 3 granted Rahmon a parliamentary seat for 
life and appoints him as the sole “representative of the public movement and national unity of 
Tajikistan.” Article 4 requires that official decorations and prizes (in his honor) be established; 
also, both Rahmon and his family received lifelong immunity from prosecution. Article 11 
requires that “museums, a library and archives of the Founder of Peace and National Unity- the 
Leader of the Nation will be erected.” Article 14 stipulates that these be included in the state 
budget.  
 
Parliament claimed amending the constitution to include the “Law of the President” was 
necessary to assure that the “people acknowledge the merits and qualities of the one who made a 
great service to [the] nation and country.”426 
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The way in which Rahmon deals with Islam is characteristic of how the ideological feedback 
loops function. The claim is that Islam should enhance societal coherence. As such, any “Muslim 
who challenges the government is depicted as a ‘radical’ {and} a threat to society. In defining 
radicalism in this way {...} all opposition {can be considered} extremist and potentially 
violent.”427  Rahmon also advocates for “an expansion of political pluralism” as long as it is 
“exercised in the boundaries of the law, for if not, it can undermine the stability of the 
government” as the weapon of “antipatriotic groups, domestic extremists and some interested 
foreign circles.”428 Like Islam, political pluralism is accepted only as long as it does not buck 
against preferred presidential policies. If it questions preferred presidential policies then it 
becomes a dangerous threat to national stability and independence and is against the organic 
Tajik nation.  The take away is that political debate is viewed as a challenge to the wants and 
needs of the organic nation.  
 
The conceptual foundations of the organic Tajik nation are national unity, solidarity and 
independence, all of which are exclusively embodied in the President Rahmon. The logic relied 
upon is that without Rahmon at the helm these foundations are at risk of being lost and that any 
opposition to the president is also opposition to said foundations of the organic nation.  
 
Central Asian Feedback Loop Conclusion 
(Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) 
In the main text it was pointed out that ideological feed back loops do not have the possibility of 
being built on legitimate manipulation, only on illegitimate manipulation. Ergo it follows that 
ideological feedback loops cannot produce positive hope confidence momentum. It was 
discussed above that ideological feedback loops produce negative hope confidence trajectory 
buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the connected ideology. Therefore, this should 
be the expectation for all of the three countries discussed above, for all of these countries framed 
their domestic legitimacy by deploying ideological feedback loops. 
 
Other Legitimized Frames-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan  
Concerning domestic power consolidation, the major analytical difference between the 
ideological feedback loop group and this (other legitimized) group is the necessity of considering 
additional external players, which is a result of the deployed frame being self-contained vs. non-
self-contained. Therefore, identifying additional external players is the first step when analyzing 
this (other legitimized) group of Central Asian republics. Identifying potential other external 
players is achieved through understanding the details of the legitimacy frame deployed by player 
one (in this case Clan Akaev and Clan Nazararbaev). Said details will pinpoint necessary frame 
components that cannot be procured domestically.  Knowing these missing components allows 
the generation of a list of potential suppliers. This list of suppliers is the list of potential external 
players. 
 
In 1990, in the immediate post-soviet world, Clan Neoliberal was the only player who controlled 
access to the international level of play. As such, all post-soviet leaders who deployed non-self-
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contained frames that necessitated components found in the international level of play were left 
with only one choice with whom to collaborate (i.e. Clan Neo-liberal). Before we turn to 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan we will discuss Clan Neoliberal. 
 
Clan Neo-Liberal  
Clan Neo-Liberal was consolidating internationally through inter-level play aimed at domestic 
momentum in the post-soviet space to be leveraged against an international audience. It must be 
understood that Neo-liberal ideologues did not in and of themselves consolidate, hold and control 
access to the international level of play. They accomplished this through coopting host 
organizations. There are two types host of organizations that can be co-opted. Rooted and non-
rooted, the difference between the two is populational liability.  Rooted organizations hold 
populational liability, non-rooted do not.  
 
Populational Liability (rooted)-when a player holds responsibility of and to a population. The 
determining factor is whether the structure of the player is directly intertwined with a geographic 
space. This geographic space usually contains a population. Therefore, this population is also 
intertwined into the structure. As such, said player must (to a greater or lesser extent) consider 
said citizenry when implementing policy. For a structurally intertwined citizenry means that 
policy implementers (to a greater or lesser extent) will be held accountable for the results of 
implemented policies. This accountability (to varying degrees) forces leaders to consider the 
outcome that said policies will produce. Which means that pushing policies that are risky 
towards the collective good are also risky to the implementers. Rooted organizations (to varying 
degrees) have “skin in the game.”  
 
Players without populational liability (non-rooted) have a dangerous modus operandi. One in 
which there is no concern with the outcome because they are not accountable to those that will 
suffer the consequences of their implemented policies. They do not care about the outcome 
because in the scheme their slice of the pie is not connected to the result rather than being a 
commission on the transaction. Non-rooted players often sell hope to vulnerable and traumatized 
populations to induce them to accept taking risky bets that they themselves (non-rooted 
organizations) design and facilitate. Non-rooted host organizations are not playing with their 
own money or lives, which enables them to play hard and fast on schemes expected, if not 
designed to fall flat. The scheme falling flat is a boon for the non-rooted neo-liberal host 
organization, for it drives already vulnerable and despondent populations deeper into 
desperation, which induces a willingness to take even riskier bets. Which, of course these non-
rooted organizations are more than happy to underwrite. Non-rooted organizations will only 
move away from their preferred policies when their bottom line is affected. Which is seldom, 
because they use all their power and wealth to protect said bottom lines. It is this non-rooted 
nature of the beasts of war, industry and fossil fuels that is the reason that they will probably 
destroy the planet before their bottom line suffers, before they voluntarily make changes. The 
opinion here is that non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations are the biggest threat to long-term 
global security and survival.  
 
In the early post-soviet world Clan Neoliberal based their power consolidation on 
“democratizing” towards prosperity through implementation of neo-liberal market and political 
reforms, as well as privatization. The question becomes whether this “democratization” should 
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be considered a concrete or non-concrete event. The concreteness of “democratization” is 
determined by whether said “democratization” was transmitted directly or 3rd party. 
 
Direct “democratization” is when the leading power behind the design and transmission of said 
democratization holds populational liability of the peoples being “democratized.”  
 
Third party “democratization” is when the leading power behind the transmission and design 
does not hold populational liability towards the peoples being “democratized.”  
 
As a general rule, 3rd party democratization will not push towards egalitarianism, and thus, 
should not be considered a concrete event. On the other hand, direct democratization 
situationally has the potential to push towards or away from egalitarianism, which means that it 
can situationally be considered a concrete or non-concrete event. Whether direct democratization 
should be considered a concrete event is dependent on the actual objective of the main author. It 
should be counted a concrete if the main objective is towards process resolution rather than at 
indefinite processing. The aim must be towards creating a democracy rather than towards 
producing an indefinite process of “democratization.” There is a finite amount of time in which 
“democratization” should finish processing and a result rendered. A democracy achieved or a 
failed attempt, in either case the process has come to a resolution.  The longer the process of 
direct “democratization” is the base of the legitimacy frame being deployed the less concrete it 
should be considered.  
 
EU transmission of democratization onto Eastern Europe and West Germany onto East Germany 
should be considered direct democratization. For both transmitting organizations (EU and West 
German government) held populational liability for the populations being “democratized.” In 
both cases the transmitting organization was attempting to fold willing populations into their 
societal structure (the melding of east and west Germany and Eastern Europe becoming part of 
the EU). Almost all U.S. programs of “democratizing” should be considered 3rd party 
“democratization” for the U.S. has rarely held populational liability for the myriad of nations 
they have “democratized.”429   
 
Third party “democratization” has a minuscule likelihood of resulting in a democracy, while 
direct “democratization” has potential (rather than likelihood) of resulting in democracy. As a 
general rule, 3rd party “democratization” will push away from egalitarianism while direct 
democratization, situationally depending, has the potential to push towards or away. Lastly, non-
rooted players are precluded from partaking in direct democratization. For the non-rooted player 
does not hold populational liability to anyone. Therefore, it is impossible for the non-rooted to 
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hold populational liability to the recipients of said “democratization.” As such, it is impossible 
for the non-rooted partake in direct “democratization.”     
 
In early 90s post-soviet transition major non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations were the 
IMF430 and World Bank. Major rooted neo-liberal host organizations included the U.S., EU and 
UN.431 In the context of 90s Central Asian post-soviet transition rooted players (U.S., EU and to 
an extent the U.N.) played a diminished role as compared to Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe 
90s post-soviet transition rooted organizations can be considered as the main force and architect 
behind “democratization.” In central Asia it was non-rooted organizations (IMF and World 
Bank) that were the main force and architects behind democratization.  
 
This tells us that from the beginning there was a chance that Eastern Europe democratization 
might reach democracy. On the other hand, Central Asian democratization had very low 
likelihood of reaching democracy.  
 
Below we speak about the two Central Asian republics that did not deploy ideological feedback. 
Speak about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who deployed non-self-contained frames, which 
required collaboration with clan Neo Liberal.  
 
Kazakhstan  
Historical statehood as legitimacy was tried: populational manipulators attempted to link the 
post-colonial statehood to historical statehoods. In Kazakhstan, the link was the Kazakh 
khanate,432 whose establishment was marked and projected as the beginning of Kazakh 
statehood. This historical link did not particularly resonate due to the fact that it is widely 
understood that the Central Asian states were a Stalinist creation. Also, claiming historical 
statehood to a traditionally nomadic people was counterintuitive and in contrast to a nomadic 
historical memory. Therefore, a legitimacy frame based on historical statehood was not likely to 
be widely accepted by the citizenry.433 In 1990 the Kazakh economy showed negative indicators 
in all macroeconomic and human development indicators.434,435 As such, a legitimacy frame 
based on economic performance was a nonstarter. Nazarbaev ran unopposed in the 1991 
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presidential elections. Therefore, democracy also was not likely to convince the Kazakh 
audience.  
 
A frame of ethnic legitimacy would have demanded Kazakh populational lobbyist push the idea 
that they would make amends for systemic disadvantages that the CCCP placed upon ethnic 
Kazakhs. Deployment of such a frame was problematic in two ways: (1) at the time, in 
Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority, and, (2) such a push would threaten the majority 
ethnic Russian population. The ethnic frame was deployed in other former soviet republics 
resulting in increased ethnic tensions leading a number of civil wars. Nazarbaev did not pursue 
an ethnic legitimacy frame. Legitimacy based on Islam may have reverberated, but was never 
tried in Kazakhstan.  
 
Ultimately, the frame of legitimacy deployed was domestic rule based on international 
engagement, recognition and “respect.”436 Claims of legitimacy based “on external recognition 
broadcast inward to domestic audiences.”437 Olcott (1992) highlights that Kazakhstan “paid more 
attention to its international representation than any other Central Asian republic.”  
 
This was a non-self-contained frame. The critical component (international respect, recognition 
and engagement) is not something that could be produced domestically. As such, Nazarbaev had 
to look to outside markets to find the missing component. This is inter-level play. The power of 
the deployed frame is gained in the international sphere while the primary targets of its leverage 
reside in the domestic sphere. As stated above, in the early 90s Clan Neo-liberal (whom in the 
context of Central Asia were primarily represented by non-rooted organizations) controlled the 
only avenue of access to the international level of play.  
 
Player 1-Clan Nazarbaev; Consolidating domestically through a non-self-contained legitimacy 
frame based on international engagement, respect, and recognition.  
 
Player 2- Neo-liberal non-rooted host organizations; Consolidating internationally using 
momentum gained in the post-soviet domestic sphere, and, legitimizing through 
“democratization” supported by privatization and market reforms  
 
An insightful note:  In this situation neither player deployed a legitimizing frame based on 
democracy. Therefore, neither side needed to produce a democracy. Neo-liberal ideologues 
needed show an international audience the process of Kazakh “democratization,” not a Kazakh 
democracy. Clan Nazarbaev needed to show domestic populations international engagement, 
recognition and respect. This tells us that there was virtually no potential of Kazakhstan 
becoming democratic. 
 
Because Clan Nazarbaev deployed a non-self-contained frame it is expected that Kazakhstan is 
more susceptible to external pressure towards change. Also expected is a lessened likelihood that 
Kazakhstan would experience periods of isolation. Lastly, as discussed above, the international 
recognition and respect that Narzabaez aimed for was verifiably achieved. Therefore, this 
international recognition and respect should be considered a concrete event. Above it was 
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discussed that concrete events when used as a basis for legitimacy frames push positive hope 
confidence trajectory. As such, the expectation should be that Kazakhstan would push a positive 
hope confidence trajectory.  
 
Kyrgyzstan  
Following the collapse of the CCCP Kyrgyzstan was the only country who did not experience a 
strong man rollover. Askar Akaev, the countries first president, was an outsider to the political 
power game. Akaev was also the only Central Asian leader who deployed a frame of legitimacy 
based on “democratizing.” Akaev’s implemented program of democratization claimed to be 
aimed at bridging east and west. Towards becoming the “Switzerland of Central Asia” with the 
aim of adopting the neo-liberal western model, while at the same time holding on to Kyrgyz and 
Central Asian values and culture. A self-determinant central Asian “island of democracy” 
dominated by no one, yet, still friends with all. Akaev did not have the resources nor the know 
how to implement domestic democratization and therefore had to look to external players for 
help. As such, the legitimacy frame deployed was a non-self-contained frame and necessitated 
support from the international level of play. As with Kazakhstan, and as mentioned above, in the 
early 90s the only avenue to international level of play was controlled by Clan Neo-liberal who 
in the context of Central was primarily represented by non-rooted organizations.  
 
Player 1-Clan Akaev; Consolidating domestically with a non-self-contained frame of 
“democratization” towards becoming the “Switzerland of Central Asia.” 
 
Player 2-Neo-liberal non-rooted host organizations; Consolidating internationally using 
momentum gained in the post-soviet domestic sphere, and, legitimizing through 
“democratization” supported by privatization and market reforms.  
 
The frame suggests that non-self-contained deployed frames in likelihood will produce regimes 
more susceptible to external pressure towards change. Also suggested is that regimes that deploy 
non-self-contained frames are less likely to experience periods of isolation. This should have 
been the expectation of Kyrgyzstan in 1990.   
 
In the early 90s Kyrgyzstan committed to rapid liberal economic reforms. It was the first republic 
to convert to its own currency (1993) and the first to join the WTO. Quickly, land reform and 
privatization proceeded thus securing financial assistance from the international community. The 
implemented neo-liberal democratization saw inflation, unemployment, poverty and the equality 
gap skyrocket. Akaev was aware that the negative economic outcomes of these reforms would 
create a pushback towards their implementation. To counter this, he tried to normalize said 
reforms: “It is my conviction that radicalization of the reforms is the only correct way for 
Kyrgyzstan. A comprehensive and decisive breakthrough in every course of the reform is 
required, while we enjoy serious support from CIS countries, the world’s economically 
developed nations, and international finance organizations. We have no right to miss this historic 
opportunity.”438 Also there was the understanding that the negative economic slide would 
produce negative hope confidence. Negative hope confidence, unless buttressed against, will 
quickly lead to pressure to overturn the sitting status quo.  
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Buttressing against an expected negative slide in hope confidence is aimed at making the 
populations look past their belief that the status quo is leading a less secure, safe and 
economically abundant future. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan buttressed against 
negative slides with a hard transmission of ideological feedback loops. On the other hand, Akaev 
and his neo-liberal conspirators attempted to buttress against this negative slide with increasing 
the populations’ personal and political freedoms.  
 
As a long-term tactic buttressing against a negative slide with increased political and personal 
freedoms can only be successful if there is a pre-existing infrastructure of distracting elements 
and wedge issues to fill the personal freedom and political space. Without this infrastructure the 
people are not distracted from the negative slide. Without this distraction network the population  
will use the personal and political freedom to air and spread their negative grievances. As such, 
without this this prepared infrastructure the buttressing effect of political and personal freedoms 
is extremely transitory and will quickly transform from a buttress against the negative slide into 
an exasperating factor.  
 
By the mid 90s, in Kyrgyzstan, buttressing against the negative hope confidence slide with 
increased personal and political freedom started to exasperate the slide into negative territory. To 
quell this exasperation of negative hope confidence Akaev started to roll back the freedoms and 
buttress with the authoritarian stick. Clan Akaev was able to attempt rolling back the democratic 
gains for two reasons:  
 
The first reason: To sponsoring neo-liberal host organizations the gain in Kyrgyz freedom of 
speech and press had already served its two-fold purpose: 
 
1) To be paraded to the international audience to show that the almighty western liberal program 
had already made Kyrgyzstan a better place, both for its people, but more importantly for the 
world. This move is leveraged against an international audience and aimed at Neo-liberal 
consolidation in the international level of play.  
 
2) To be paraded to the Kyrgyz domestic audience. To show that almighty western liberal 
program had already made Kyrgyzstan a better place for Kyrgyz. That accepting the rest of the 
western-liberal policies would similarly make Kyrgyzstan even better for the Kyrgyz.  
 
By the mid 90s, neoliberal international power consolidation had been achieved and Kyrgyzstan 
had accepted implementing a whole foray of western liberal privatization and market reforms.  
Non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations had achieved their goals and hence no longer cared 
what Akaev did domestically. If he wanted to roll back the political and personal freedoms his 
non-rooted neo-liberal cohorts would not stand in his way.  
 
The Second reason: In the mid 90s Akaev started receiving the promised billions of dollars in 
kickbacks (aid) from the sponsoring non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations. This money 
allowed him the power and resources necessary to attempt a push towards authoritarianism. This 
tracks with the argument of McGlinchey; “only if central governments are consistently starved of 
the economic resources of rule, do opportunities for liberal change arise”, and that, “the initial 
period of Kyrgyz independence between 1991–1994 was characterized by political contestation 
144 
 
and a lack of economic resources leading to liberal change, while in 1994–1995, upon the receipt 
of international aid, the leadership was able to use Soviet-era institutions (hierarchical patronage 
networks and a predatory judicial system) to exert control over political opponents.”439 
 
The trajectory of Kyrgyzstan did not take the same path of the rest of the region because 
Kyrgyzstan was the odd man out concerning the two Central Asian trends mentioned in the main 
text. Kyrgyzstan did not experience the strong man rollover (unlike the other 4 Central Asian 
republics) and Clan Akaev did not deploy an ideology-based frame of legitimacy (unlike 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Kyrgyzstan (unlike all neighboring republics) never 
reached authoritarian stability. The political and personal freedoms that were introduced in the 
early 90s were not able to be fully rolled back, and to this day persist (relative to the other central 
Asian republics).  The result is that Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian republic to be 
considered as having a negative hope confidence trajectory. 
 
 
ANNEX 4 
RUSSIAN IDENTITY PROJECTION AND UKRAINE 
The CCCP historically depended on soft power as collective identity. The Soviet narrative of 
collective identity based on anti-capitalist class markers was both accepted and rejected by 
portions of the Soviet audience. During the early post-soviet era, the Russian Federation pursued 
a warmer association with the West, though Moscow overlooked creation of an organized 
projection of common collective identity. In the 1990s Moscow expressed a muddled identity 
narrative lacking a well-defined vision of commonality. 
Post CCCP Moscow was particularly interested in promoting Russianess (i.e. Russian language, 
Russian-language media, the Russian Orthodox Church and business networks.)440 Focusing on 
the blurry idea of “compatriots” Russianness was not clearly defined, sometimes meaning all 
Soviet born and descendants (excluding the populations of the now independent republics) and at 
other times meaning all those with cultural links to Russia. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 
1993 underlined Moscow’s pledge to advance the newly founded Commonwealth of 
Independent States into a capable organization “based on the commonality of interests.” Though, 
this “commonality of interests”441 was unclear. What was clear was that Russian perceived 
interests were held above the best interests of the organization.442 
In the 1990s projected Russian identity simultaneously stressed two competing ideas: (1) That 
the Russian identity belonged to Europe, and, (2) Russia exists apart from Europe as its own 
great power.443 By the early 2000s narratives 1 had been sidelined by narrative 2, the focus 
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became Russia’s civilizational distinctness and preeminence vis-a-vis the declining West. As 
such, Moscow pushed issue narratives highlighting Russia’s special responsibility for 
maintaining stability in the post-Soviet region.444 This interpretation of Russia’s identity created 
a narrative of a broader community. This Eurasian narrative was frequently appealed to in the 
Kremlin’s relationships with the post-Soviet states. Marketed through the observance of 
traditional values protected by Russia against the fraudulent influences of a capitalistic, post-
modern declining West. Marshaled and sold by RT (Russia Today), this narrative gained a 
foothold in both post-Soviet states and among right wing parties throughout the EU. 
Faltering relations with the West (late 2000s-early 2010s) lead Moscow to try and regain some of 
its lost influence through being more forceful in its regional policies. The goal was to prevent 
other players (i.e. U.S., NATO and EU) from further infringement upon the Russian “sphere of 
privileged interests.”445A rejuvenation of Russian inspired integration was the whole point 
behind the Eurasian Union, which Putin (2013) claimed was “a chance for the entire post-Soviet 
space to become an independent center for global development, rather than remaining on the 
outskirts of Europe and Asia.”446 This Union was designed to transcend purely economic 
considerations and aimed at being a mechanism “for maintaining the identity of nations in the 
historical Eurasian space.”447 Unfortunately, there was a missing link - Ukraine. The Kremlin 
failed to induce Kyiv to join their Customs Union. 
 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, referring to US and EU democracy promotion, talked 
of “a risk of destructive and unlawful use of ‘soft power” and human rights concepts to exert 
political pressure on sovereign states.” The document advised for a more efficient use of 
Russia’s own mechanisms of soft power.448  Shortly after there was an increase in the presence 
of existing Russian actors in the area of public diplomacy449,450 (i.e. Agency for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, International Humanitarian 
Cooperation and Voice of Russia) also new organizations were created (i.e. “Russki Mir” 
(Russian World) Foundation, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund as well English, 
Arabic and Spanish language news channels.  
The 2004 the Ukrainian revolution and the rise of pro-Western President Yushchenko were 
perceived by Moscow to be the result of EU and US meddling.451 The worry was that Ukraine 
was steadily sliding into European arms, or worse, into the arms of NATO. From the outset 
NATO ascension was geopolitically unviable. For Russia was and is willing to commit the 
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necessary resources to raise the associated costs of Ukrainian NATO membership, making it, in 
the end, too expensive for both NATO and Ukraine. One of the methods used to stop movement 
towards ascension was the narrative that membership was a betrayal of Russian/Ukrainian unity. 
In 2010 NATO ascension was removed from Ukraine’s official security policy.452 To Russia 
Ukraine is pivotal in terms of Russian economic and military security, and also, in terms of 
identity.453 Considering this, Ukraine became the key target of a substantial propaganda 
operation to prevent further Ukrainian-Euro integration and ensure Ukrainian ascension into the 
Customs Union, and theoretically into the Eurasian Union. 
Another narrative that gained strength during this time was “Russian world” (Русский мир), 
which was aimed at ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The “Russian world” narrative was 
especially conspicuous in official Russian discourse in the run-up to the current Ukrainian crisis. 
A “Russian world” that extends past the borders of the Russian Federation is not a new idea.454  
The idea of the “Russian World” had already been long discussed by Russian philosophers, 
sociologists and political scientists before being mentioned by Putin in a 2007 address to the 
Russian Parliament.455,456 By including the “Russian world” into official discourse the Kremlin 
aimed to muster a specific understanding of this idea while weakening opposing iterations. The 
Kremlin’s preferred iteration was constructed on four points. 
1.    The “Russian world” was conceived to be a civilizational community defined by cultural 
rather than ethnic markers (i.e. Russian language, Orthodox Christianity and Russian 
culture). Putin (2007) styled the Russian language as a “living space of a multimillion 
Russian worlds, which is, of course, significantly wider than Russia.” The “Russian 
world” included “millions of ethnic Russians, native Russian speakers, their families and 
descendants”, as well as, “the millions of people worldwide who have chosen the Russian 
language as their subject of study, those who have developed an appreciation for Russia 
and its rich cultural heritage.”457 Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill 
(2009) claimed the “core of the Russian world are Russia, Ukraine, [and] Belarus.”458 
Putin (2013) also reinforced this understanding by articulating the significance of 
Orthodox Christianity in “uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus through strong bonds of 
brotherhood.” A wide definition of the “Russian world” includes all Ukrainians 
irrespective of their ethnic, linguistic or religious background, while a tighter definition 
only includes Russian speakers and ethnic Russians.459 
 
2.    The “Russian world” was constructed on the common past and heritage of the Russian 
Federation and (the now independent) post-Soviet states. Putin (2013) claimed “Kievan 
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Rus started as the foundation of the enormous future Russian state, with Russians and 
Ukrainians as its descendants sharing common traditions, a common mentality, a 
common history and a common culture.”460 This reading inferred the Russian empire 
with a natural quality while disregarding examples of forcible expansion and oppression. 
According to Putin (2012): “for centuries, Russia developed as a civilization-state bonded 
by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us.”461 This 
celebrated shared history was contrasted with the aberration of present estrangement. In 
spite of separation from the flock the “Russian world” narrative did not explicitly 
question the sovereignty of the post-Soviet states. In fact, Putin (2013) continually stated 
that Russia had “no desire or aspiration to revive the Soviet empire.”462 Even so, at the 
same time, Russians and Ukrainians were (and still are) “one people” in terms of their 
shared past and shared culture. A theme echoed and reiterated by Patriarch Kirill (2009) 
when he described Russians and Ukrainians as ‘spiritually’ one people. 
 
3. The “Russian world” narrative and its projected identity created a massively inconsistent 
graded connection between Russia and other post-Soviet states. There was conspicuous 
tension between the visions of the “Russian world” as a multinational civilizational space 
(in which Russia was one of many integral components) and that of a Russo-centric 
“Russian world.” On the one hand, there is the story of a civilizational identity that 
encompasses various cultures.  On the other hand, it is the story of an ethnicity that 
subjugated various cultures.  When speaking about the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian 
culture, Putin (2013) termed them as “part of our greater Russian, or Russian–Ukrainian, 
world.”463 This iteration of the “Russian World” was in line with the concept of medieval 
Russia, which included Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and much of the post-Soviet space. The 
underlying and unspoken claim here was that Russia has historical claim to the region. 
Building on this, Patriarch Kirill (2009) referred to the Ukrainian, Belarusian and 
Moldovan cultures as “organic parts” of the “Russian world” that had “enriched [its] 
multi-faceted culture.”464 Conceptually Russia was placed at the center of this constructed 
community.  Being part of the “Russian world” inferred connection with Russia rather 
than with the Rus. The Russian World Foundation’s website claimed “all layers of the 
Russian world {...} are united through perception of their connection to Russia,” and that 
the “Russian world is the world of Russia.”465 
 
4. This projected collective identity constituted self and other by stressing the difference 
between the “Russian world” and the West. The result was farther movement from the 
idea of Russia as Europe, moving from a European/Russian in-group perception to an 
out-group perception. In effect, moving a perception of friends to that of the “other.” The 
first option breeds cooperation, friendship and trust. The latter is built on mistrust and 
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scapegoating. The “Russian World” was fashioned as a “unique civilization”466 based on 
the “ideals of freedom, faith, spirituality, kindness, [and] conscience.”467 While both 
(Russia and Europe) have Christian heritage, the “Russian world” was invented to be 
distinct and superior to Europe. Europe had lost the tie to traditional Christian values 
Putin (2013): “without the values embedded in Christianity and other religions, without 
standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose 
their human dignity.” The civilizational distinctiveness of the “Russian world” inferred 
that it could not duplicate Western political models, and, therefore, the only potential 
road to be taken is a distinct one. This conception of identity inferred specific versions of 
common interests. For the “Russian world” to continue to sustain its values, all of its 
component parts needed to come together and oppose any efforts to leave the common 
space. This understanding of common interests conflicts with foreign policy choices that 
would embody treachery against the imagined community. Membership in the EU or 
NATO is framed as the largest betrayal that could be imagined. At the same time, being 
part of the “Russian world” required closer collaboration with Russia, including 
membership in regional Russian sponsored integration projects. 
A common characterization of Ukraine is of a country split among amid two opposing ‘identity 
complexes: (1) “Eastern Slavic identity complex”, constructed on being part of the “Russian 
world”, and, (2) an “ethnic Ukrainian identity complex”, based on dissociating with Russia and 
integrating into Europe.468 
White and Feklyunina (2014) argue that acknowledging only two competing identity complexes 
is shortsighted. In fact, there are three narratives at work in the Ukraine: 
(1) European Ukraine.  
A conception, in which Ukrainians are distinctly different from Russians, that is buttressed 
by a distinct Ukrainian language and historical accounts of Russian oppression, and, appeals 
to the idea of Ukraine’s historical belonging to Europe. The emphasis is the normative 
superiority of the democratic values associated with the European integration project. The 
good times are sold to be at the end of the golden road of European economic prosperity469 
and that this road leads to healing and moving past the traumatic CCCP experience.  
   
(2) Ukraine as part of the “Russian world” 
Here the Russian language is the primary identity marker and is bolstered by a “remember 
good times” mentality, in which the historical relationship with Russia is sold as a fond 
memory of better times. 
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(3) Ukraine as part of a greater Europe. 
This construction acknowledges the cultural similarities with Russia while at the same time 
claiming distinct differences. Here Russian is accepted as the everyday language and 
Ukrainian independence seen as the road to the good times. 
As with any narratives, these resonate with some audiences more than others (one of the main 
points of this research is to examine the degree of acceptance across the populational spectrum), 
acceptance of the “Russian world” narrative was (for the most part) accepted by ethnic Russians 
and members of the political class “who articulated the vision of self as an “Alternative Europe.” 
In Crimea, the political party Russian Unity embraced the idea and served as a major force that 
pushed the referendum to be amenably expanded upon by the Russian Federation. The 
southeastern-based Party of Regents also attempted to push alternative Europe. Though they had 
considerable less success when a number of their key members rejected many of the tenants 
involved. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church embraced alternative Europe.  
An organic regional “Russian” community was frequently summoned by and described as “a 
unique civilizational thousand-year unity of our peoples.”470  In this context the “Russian world” 
“does not deny our countries, or our peoples, or our national languages or cultures.”471  Here the 
foundation of belonging to the “Russian world” laid in common religious roots. Though for some 
the connection lay in the Soviet past, which the frames the  “Russian world” as fundamentally 
different from a declining West. At the same time the more forceful Russian hand in setting the 
agenda in the post-Soviet space was understood as reinforcing a pre-existing collective identity. 
Dmytro Tabachnyk wrote that the 2008 Georgian/Russian war was confirmation that “from now 
onwards any attempt to exercise aggression or force towards any part of the Russian cultural 
world will be suppressed by Russia.”472 
Acceptance of being part of the “Russian world” necessarily places Ukrainian and the interests of 
the Russian Fedaratiom as one and the same. Symonenko (2013) views full Ukrainian 
“participation in the Eurasian integration processes” as the first measure of “maintaining 
civilizational identity.”473 Russian Unity leader Sergey Aksyonov (2013) often claimed, “Our 
strength is in unity and solidarity {with the “Russian world”}.474 
The “Russian world” narrative emboldened unconditional belonging to the wants and wishes of 
Russian Federation while the “Greater Europe” narrative saw belonging to the “Russian world” 
as being conditional on Ukrainian status. There was an acceptance of cultural affinity with 
Russia, but also an emphasized distinctness that challenges the intrinsic hierarchical structure in 
which Russia is the natural core. To Volodymyr Zubanov (deputy head of the Party of Regions 
faction) the “Russian world” is too narrow. As such, he supports a “Slavic Europe” narrative. A 
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“Slavic Europe” is more encompassing and (more importantly) validates Ukraine as the “cradle 
of Slavdom.”475 To the “Slavic Europeans”, Russian coercion of Kyiv away from the EU has a 
negative tenor. 
The closer Ukraine got to signing the association agreement with the EU, the stronger Moscow 
flexed it coercive strength. The more flex projected by Russia, the more adamant was the 
rejection of the “Russian world” narrative. Both sides painted the situation as having only two 
options: “loyalty” or “betrayal.” Olena Bondarenko (Party of Regions member) pointed out the 
fallacy in these two choices, as “Ukraine hasn’t taken up a job of Russia’s soldier or scout.” 
Russia’s conduct of coercion refuted their projected narrative of Russian/Ukrainian friendship, 
for friendship requires “mutual compromises, mutually beneficial contracts, patience [and] 
understanding”476 rather than “blackmail, ultimatums, [and] insults.”477 The fact that Russia was 
not willing to negotiate on cheaper gas drove the belief of divergent Russian/Ukrainian interests. 
The feeling was that friendship is incompatible with “profiteering on a friend.” 478 
The “Russian world” narrative was most vehemently rejected by the “Ukraine as Europe” 
audience, a narrative that is most populous in western Ukraine, especially supported by the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church and numerous political parties aiming at capturing the nationalist 
vote. Patriarch Filaret stressed that critical to the Ukrainian identity was an independent (from 
Moscow) Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian language.479 Positive reminiscing of the 
common past was overshadowed by historical grievances, which confirmed (to this audience) 
their perception of the “Russian world” as being an oppressive world. Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2013) 
(who became head of post-Yanukovych government):  
“what did we have in the [common] past apart from Holodomor, Stalin, {...} executed priests, 
burnt down churches [and] destroyed genetic code of the Ukrainian nation.”480 
Archbishop Evstratiy Zorya claimed “that by accepting itself as a “country of the Russian world” 
Ukraine would have to accept itself as Russia’s colony.”481 Russian pressure leading up to the 
2013 EU summit in Vilnus was viewed as strong-arming that had to at all costs be opposed. 
Yatsenyuk (2013) talks about the Ukrainian/Russian relationship as a “wall of threats, hostility 
and trade wars.” In this narrative, Ukraine and Russia are not part of the same imagined 
community, and therefore have foundationally different interests.482 
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The “Russian world” identity was mostly accepted by political players who subscribed to the 
“Alternative Europe” narrative, and, was generally was rejected by those subscribing to the 
“Ukraine as Europe” narrative. The “Greater Europe” audience accepted cultural similarity with 
Russia but spurned Russian declarations of supremacy. 
To what extent is the “Russian world” identity acceptable to the populations of Ukraine? 
According to a Razumkov Center (2013) survey few respondents were even aware of “Patriarch 
Kirill’s doctrine of the Russian world.” Counter intuitively, the most respondents aware of this 
creed were found in west Ukraine (36.3%). The smallest aware percentage was in the east 
(12.9%). The larger awareness percentage of the west may be attributed to a visceral rejection of 
any border transcendent identity emanating from Moscow. The eastern populations reacted less 
viscerally, and hence less likely was the narrative to attract media attention. There was divided 
assessment among respondents (familiar with the “Russian world” border transcendent identity) 
when asked about their perception about (Russian) goals driving the narrative. Western 
respondents (78.3%) saw the “Russian world” as being driven by restoration of empire. 
Conversely, southern (14.8%) and eastern (28.6%) respondents perceived the “Russian world” in 
terms of empire restoration. Moreover, a majority of Southern (59.5%) and eastern (70.5%) 
respondents perceived that the “Russian world” supported the “spiritual unity of the brotherly ... 
peoples.”483  Between 2010 and 2013 the overall percentage of respondents that perceived the 
“Russian world” as empire restoration rose (2010-30.4%; 2013-48.4%). At the same time, 
respondents who viewed the “Russian world” positively fell (2010-48.4%; 2013-39.7%).484 
The suggestion is that the Kremlin was not especially effective in marketing the “Russian world” 
to Ukrainian populations. Yet it is important to recognize levels of tacit approval or rejection, 
which can be achieved by considering prevailing feelings towards pre-crisis Ukrainian/Russian 
integration. In March-April 2012, close to half of southern respondents (47%) and a majority of 
eastern respondents (60%) supported joining Russia’s Customs Union. On the other hand, 
western respondents showed much less (7%) support for the Customs Union and great support 
(70%) for joining the EU.485 There were also noteworthy regional disparities in what respondents 
anticipated from integration with Russia. A 2013 survey showed that in the south and the east 
(59% and 53%, respectively) there was an expectation that joining the Customs Union would 
positively affect the economy. Comparatively, in the west the percentage (22%) that expected 
Customs Union to bring positive results was much lower.486 Therefore, it can be claimed that 
part of the Russian allure was potential economic gains. Though, it can also be claimed that these 
expectations were disproportionately spread across the regions, with much higher expectations in 
the south and east than in west, where low expectations reigned supreme. 
The varied response to which the “Russian world” narrative was met indicates that weight of 
Russian soft power was essentially limited to one out of three audiences (an audience consisting 
of mostly of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the south-east). Also, the amount of civic 
support significantly declined in the years leading to the present crisis. The supporters of the 
“Russian world” narrative viewed more forceful Russian policies in the immediate region as 
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confirmation of the Kremlin’s willingness to protect the “Russian world” community.  Though, 
on the other hand, those who subscribed to the other two narratives were pushed farther away as 
Russian pressure increased. In Crimea, both the public and politicians prodigiously backed being 
part of the “Russian world.” However, supporting the Russian border transcendent identity 
did/does not necessarily come with an innate willingness towards separatism. 
The present crisis has fractured the Ukrainian national identity, and thus created space for more 
populational lobbyist to market their particular identity narrative. More space to work means the 
possibility of a larger and more diversified platform. Not only has there been an uptick of 
available identity narratives to choose from, but also more robust efforts from the classic actors. 
For example, the extra space allows the Russians to market a number of what Rosselle et al. 
(2014) calls “issue narratives,” (i.e. fear of fascist leanings emanating from Kyiv). This narrative 
simplified the “transfer of power to pro-Russian forces” and ultimately, territorial expansion into 
Crimea.  Though, Russian lobbyists were not able to garner enough across the board support in 
the Southeast towards gaining more territory than Crimea. Only parts of the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions actively moved towards separatism, and even in these regions it is 
“questionable whether this could have happened without the involvement of Russian 
operatives.”487 
The above narrative analysis comes to the same conclusion as the main text analysis in which 
Ukraine is parsed into 4 sub-populations.  The conclusion: the populations who have placed hope 
confidence in the Kremlin and actively push towards being expanded upon by the Russian 
federation are located primarily in the far east, is an 90/10 split of Ukrainian territory. The 
expectation is that only the Ethnic Russians will embrace the “Russian World” and that support 
from outside of ethnic Russians will steadily decline as it has a converse relationship to the 
amount of Russian pressure applied. On the other hand, support towards moving towards Europe 
(outside of ethnic Russians) will continue to increase as more Russian pressure is applied.  
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